90-000881 Maritime Tug And Barge, Inc. vs. Department Of Transportation
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, August 8, 1990.


View Dockets  
Summary: Petitioner not entitled to certification as Disabled Business Enterprise; 55% owner was disadvantaged under the rules (part indian) but he did not pay for stock; promise to pay father not enough

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8MARITIME TUG & BARGE, INC., )

14)

15Petitioner, )

17)

18vs. ) CASE NO. 90-0881

23)

24DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )

28)

29Respondent. )

31_________________________________)

32RECOMMENDED ORDER

34Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case on May 31,

481990, in West Palm Beach, Florida, before J. Stephen Menton, a duly designated

61Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

69APPEARANCES

70For Petitioner: Brenda Bryant, Esquire

75Fields, Wilkinson, Bryant

78& Aiken, P.A.

8155 East Osceola, Suite 100

86Stuart, Florida 34994

89For Respondent: William Peter Martin, Esquire

95Department of Transportation

98605 Suwannee Street, MS #58

103Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

106STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

110The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to certification

122as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise pursuant to Rule 14-78, Florida

132Administrative Code.

134PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

136On September 25, 1989, Petitioner, Maritime Tug & Barge, Inc. ("Maritime

148Tug"), applied to the Respondent, Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT"),

161for certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ("DBE"). By letter

173dated January 16, 1990, DOT informed Maritime Tug that its application for DBE

186status had been denied. By letter dated January 29, 1990, Maritime Tug timely

199requested a formal hearing on the application. The case was referred to the

212Division of Administrative Hearings which noticed and conducted the hearing. At

223the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of three (3) witnesses: Stanley

234L. Kraly, (President and fifty-five percent (55%) majority owner of Maritime

245Tug); Stanley R. Kraly, (Vice President and forty-five (45%) percent owner of

257Maritime Tug); and Alton Russell, (employed as a tug captain by Maritime Tug).

270Petitioner offered two (2) exhibits into evidence, both of which were accepted.

282Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a letter verifying Stanley L. Kraly's membership in

294the Penobscot Indian Tribe of Maine, and Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is a Transfer of

308Stock Agreement dated October 10, 1989. Respondent presented the testimony of

319Ms. Ruth Dillard, Coordinator of DBE Certification in the Minority Programs

330Office of DOT. Respondent offered four (4) exhibits into evidence, all of which

343were accepted. Respondent's Exhibit 1 is a copy of Maritime Tug's application

355to DOT for certification as a DBE. Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a copy of the

370Bylaws of Maritime Tug. Respondent's Exhibit 3 is a copy of the lease agreement

384between Maritime Tug and Maritime Fuel, Inc. Respondent's Exhibit 4 is a copy of

398notes made by DOT's consultant during her on-site interview of the Kralys in

411Stuart, Florida on December 20, 1989. Prior to the commencement of the hearing,

424the parties stipulated that Stanley L. Kraly is 37.5 percent Penobscot Indian.

436The parties also stipulated that Stanley L. Kraly is the son of Stanley R.

450Kraly.

451A transcript of the proceeding was filed with the Division of

462Administrative Hearings on July 2, 1990. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

475parties agreed that proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were to be

489filed within 15 days of the filing of the transcript. The Respondent has timely

503filed a proposed recommended order. However, no post- hearing submittals have

514been received from the Petitioner. A ruling on each of the Respondent's

526proposed findings of fact is included in the Appendix attached hereto.

537FINDINGS OF FACT

5401. Maritime Tug is a tug and barge company which purchases and sells

553barges in southeast Louisiana and transports them to Florida for repair, lease

565or sale. The company also engages in the lease of crew boats and tug boats.

5802. Stanley L. Kraly ("Stan L.") owns fifty-five percent (55%) of the stock

595of Maritime Tug and is the President of the company. Stan L. is twenty-four

609(24) years of age. He graduated from high school in 1984 and served four years

624in the United States Marines Corps in an infantry and reconnaissance battalion.

636His duties in the Marines included surface swimming, (the equivalent of a

648civilian lifeguard) and amphibious assault for hydrographic underwater beach

657surveys.

6583. Upon leaving the Marines, Stan L. began working for Maritime Fuel, Inc.

671("Maritime Fuel") in Stuart, Florida. Maritime Fuel is owned by Stan L.'s

685father, Stanley R. Kraly ("Stan R."). Maritime Fuel is engaged in the dockside

700delivery of diesel fuel and marine-grade gas to privately owned boats and

712marinas. At Maritime Fuel, Stan L. was as an "assistant team leader." His

725duties included pulling the hose from the truck to fuel boats and assisting the

"739team leader" with other jobs.

7444. Maritime Tug was incorporated by Stan R. and Ken Hayes in March, 1989.

758In approximately July of 1989, Stan R. bought out Ken Hayes and became the sole

773owner of the company.

7775. Stan L. began working for Maritime Tug in June, 1989 as a deckhand

791apprentice. Stan L.'s duties as a deckhand apprentice included throwing and

802splicing lines. He split his time between Maritime Tug and Maritime Fuel for

815approximately three months. On October 10, 1989, Stan L. began working full-

827time for Maritime Tug. At that time, he also became president and majority

840stockholder of Maritime Tug as evidenced by a Stock Transfer Agreement dated

852October 10, 1989.

8556. Stan R. remains involved with Maritime Tug in the capacity of Vice-

868President and Treasurer of the company. His duties include the following:

879soliciting new business; negotiating financing on behalf of Maritime Tug and

890signing notes and leases; preparing job estimates; negotiating and signing

900contracts for major purchases and leases of tugs, barges, and other pieces of

913equipment. The evidence established that Stan R. is primarily responsible for

924the financial arrangements for Maritime Tug and only Stan R. signed for the line

938of credit established at Sun Bank by Maritime Tug.

9477. Stan R. completed five semesters at Maine Maritime College majoring in

959marine engineering. He has been a sales correspondent and manufacturer's

969representative for several companies. Stan R. has also owned a Texaco gas

981station and a welding company. Stan R. currently holds an inactive real estate

994license in the state of Florida. He is the sole stockholder of Maritime Fuel.

1008He is also a partner in a business entity known as The Hast Corporation and is

1024currently the president of the Marine Industry in Stuart. Because of his other

1037business interests, Stan R. attempts to limit his involvement in the day to day

1051operations of Maritime Tug. However, it is clear that Stan R. still plays an

1065active role in the management of the company, especially with respect to

1077financial matters.

10798. There is some confusion regarding the timing of Stan L.'s acquisition

1091of his ownership interest in Maritime Tug. Maritime Tug's application to DOT

1103for certification as a DBE is dated September 25, 1989. On page 3, paragraph

1117number 10 of the application, the percentage of ownership of the company shows

1130Stan L. and Stan R. owning fifty-one percent (51%) and forty-nine percent (49%),

1143respectively. However, those numbers are crossed out on the application. On

1154the same page, paragraph number 11, the ownership breakdown is shown as fifty-

1167two percent (52%) and forty-eight percent (48%), respectively. Those

1176percentages were initialed on the application form by Stan L. sometime prior to

1189the final hearing. While both Stan L. and Stan R. testified that they had

1203agreed in principal during the summer of 1989 for Stan L.'s purchase of a

1217majority interest in Maritime Tug, there is no evidence of an actual transfer of

1231stock other than the Stock Transfer Agreement which is dated October 10, 1989.

1244On December 20, 1989, Ms. Kathy Garner, a consultant with DOT, conducted an on-

1258site review of Maritime Tug during which she interviewed both Stan L. and Stan

1272R. at Maritime Tug's place of business in Stuart, Florida. The notes recorded

1285by Ms. Garner during the December 20, 1989 on-site interview indicate that the

1298percentage of ownership was as it appears on the application, i.e., fifty- two

1311percent (52%) for Stan L. and forty-eight percent (48%) for Stan R. DOT was not

1326made aware of the October 10, 1989 stock transfer agreement between Stan L. and

1340Stan R. (and in fact, was told that no agreement existed) until January 17,

13541990, when DOT received an unsigned copy of the October 10, 1989, agreement.

13679. The October 10, 1989 Stock Transfer Agreement sets a purchase price of

1380fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000) for the fifty five percent (55%) interest

1392purchased by Stan L. The Agreement leaves the amount of the payments to the

1406discretion of the buyer (Stan L.) with a single required minimum annual payment

1419of one thousand dollars. The Agreement states that the loan period is to be ten

1434years. However, there are no acceleration provisions in the Agreement.

1444Arguably, the buyer can take up to fifty-five years to pay off the purchase

1458price. The first payment is due on October 10, 1990. As of the date of the

1474hearing, there have been no payments made to Stan R. pursuant to the Agreement.

1488Stan L. has given no collateral for this indebtedness which is apparently his

1501only capital investment in the company and the only method of financing his

1514purchase of fifty-five percent (55%) majority ownership in Maritime Tug.

152410. Stan L.'s fringe benefits are provided by Maritime Fuel, a corporation

1536solely owned by his father, Stan R. Maritime Tug does not employ a secretary,

1550but shares the full-time secretary employed by Maritime Fuel. Maritime Tug

1561leases its office space from Maritime Fuel pursuant to a lease agreement for one

1575hundred dollars per month. It is unclear whether the rental payments have been

1588made.

158911. Since Stan L. became president and majority owner of Maritime Tug, the

1602tug captain for the company (one of the most important positions for the

1615company) was fired and a new captain was hired. Stan R. fired the former

1629captain and hired the current captain, Mr. Alton Russell, in late April 1990.

1642Stan L. was not involved in these decisions.

1650CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

165312. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the

1663subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Section 120.57(1),

1674Florida Statutes (1989).

167713. In this proceeding, Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the

1689evidence that it is entitled to certification as a DBE. See e.g., Florida

1702Department of Transportation vs. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA

17151981).

171614. DBEs are small business concerns that are owned and controlled by

1728socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as defined by the Federal

1738Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, (STURRA),

174823 U.S.C. 101, et seq.

175315. Pursuant to Sections 339.0805, 337.125, 337.135 and 337.137, Florida

1763Statutes (1989), DOT administers a certification program which certifies

1772applicants as DBEs. DBEs are accorded competitive advantages and preferential

1782treatment because they are eligible to participate in DOT's set aside program

1794under DBE contract goals.

179816. Chapter 339, Florida Statutes, (1989) provides in pertinent part:

1808339.0805(1)(b)...It is the policy of the

1814state to meaningfully assist socially

1819and economically disadvantaged business

1823enterprises through a program that will

1829provide for the development of skills

1835through business management training, as

1840well as financial assistance in the form

1847of bond guarantees, to primarily remedy

1853the effects of past economic

1858disparity....

185917. The United States Department of Transportation has promulgated 49 CFR,

1870Part 23, to implement STURRA and provide guidelines for state "recipients" who

1882receive federal highway funds. Relevant provisions of 49 CFR, Part 23 are:

1894Section 23.61 Purpose.

1897(a) The purpose of this subpart is to

1905implement section 105(f) of the Surface

1911Transportation Assistance Act of 1982

1916(Pub.L. 97-424) so that except to the

1923extent that the Secretary determines

1928otherwise, not less than ten percent of

1935the funds authorized by the Act for the

1943programs listed in section 23.63 of this

1950subpart is expended with small business

1956concerns owned and controlled by

1961socially and economically disadvantages

1965individuals.

1966Section 23.62 Definitions.

1969The following definitions apply to this

1975subpart. Where these definitions are

1980inconsistent with the definitions of

1985Section 23.5 of this part, these

1991definitions control for all other

1996purposes under this part.

"2000Act" means the Surface Transportation

2005Assistance Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-424).

"2012Disadvantaged business" means a small

2017business concern: (a) which is at least

202451 percent owned by one or more socially

2032and economically disadvantaged

2035individuals, or, in the case of any

2042publicly owned business, at least 51

2048percent of the stock of which is owned

2056by one or more socially and economically

2063disadvantaged individuals; and (b) whose

2068management and daily business operations

2073are controlled by one or more of the

2081socially and economically disadvantaged

2085individuals who own it.

?2089~Small business concern" means a small

2095business as defined pursuant to section 3 of

2103the Small Business Act and relevant

2109regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

211318. Rule 14-78, Florida Administrative Code, is the rule which implements

2124STURRA at the state level and has followed the federal standards as set forth in

213949 CFR, Part 23 in all parts relevant here.

214819. Rule 14-78.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, defines a DBE as a

2159small business concern meeting two criteria. A DBE must be at least fifty-one

2172percent (51%) owned by "one or more socially and economically disadvantaged

2183individuals" and the "management and daily business operations [of the DBE) must

2195be controlled by one or more of the socially and economically disadvantaged

2207individuals who own it."

221120. Native Americans, as defined by the Rule, are those persons who are

2224members of "American Indian tribes acknowledged by the Secretary of the

2235Interior, or persons who are certified by such American Indian tribes as being

2248eligible for membership in their tribes. `Acknowledged by the Secretary of the

2260Interior' means those American Indian tribes who tribal existence has been

2271acknowledged by the Department of Interior pursuant to 25 CFR, Part 83." The

2284parties stipulated at the start of the final hearing in this case that Stan L.

2299is 37.5 percent Penobscot Indian and has been certified as eligible for

2311membership by the Penobscot Tribe of Maine. That tribe has been "acknowledged

2323by the Secretary of the Interior." Therefore, Maritime Tug meets the first prong

2336of the definition of a "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" if Stan L. is

2348determined to be the owner of at least fifty-one percent of the company.

236121. Rule 14-78.005(7) sets forth the standards for certification of a DBE.

2373Rule 14-78.005(7)(c) requires that the DBE be an "independent business entity"

2384and the ownership and control exercised by the socially and economically

2395disadvantaged individuals must be

2399. . . real, substantial, and continuing. . . and

2409go beyond mere pro forma ownership of the

2417firm, as reflected in its ownership

2423documents. The socially and economically

2428disadvantaged owners shall enjoy the

2433customary incidence of ownership and shall

2439share in the risks and profits commensurate

2446with their ownership interests, as

2451demonstrated by an examination of the

2457substance rather than form of financial and

2464managerial arrangements. In assessing

2468business independence, the Department shall

2473consider all relevant factors, including the

2479date the firm was established, the adequacy

2486of its resources, and the degree to which

2494financial relationships, equipment leasing,

2498and other business relationships with non-

2504DBE firms vary from industry practice.

251022. Rule 14-78.005(7)(f) recognizes that the contributions of a

2519disadvantaged owner may take the form of capital or expertise, but, in either

2532case, the contributions by the socially and economically disadvantaged owner

2542must be real and substantial.

254723. Rule 14-78.005(7)(f) provides:

2551(f) To be Certified under this rule chapter,

2559the DBE shall be one in which the

2567contributions of capital or expertise

2572invested by the socially and economically

2578disadvantaged individual owners are real and

2584substantial. Examples of insufficient

2588contributions include, but are not limited

2594to a promise to contribute capital, a note

2602payable to the DBE enterprise or its owners

2610who are neither socially and economically

2616disadvantaged individuals, or the mere

2621participation as an employee, rather than as

2628a decision-maker. (Emphasis added).

263224. In this case, both the capital and the expertise for Maritime Tug have

2646been supplied by Stan R. who does not qualify as a disadvantaged person under

2660the statutes and rules. While Stan L. is the titular owner of fifty-five

2673percent (55%) of the stock of Maritime Tug, the evidence established that he has

2687not paid anything for his ownership interest. While Petitioner contends that

2698Stan L. is obligated to pay Stan R. $55,000 for the majority ownership interest

2713in the company, such a promise to pay is clearly not sufficient under Rule 14-

272878.005(7)(f).

272925. The transfer of shares between Stan L. and Stan R. was not an "arms

2744length transaction." No collateral was pledged to secure the obligation, no

2755interest is being charged on the indebtedness and the required annual payments

2767are miniscule. These factors all indicate that Stan L. should not be considered

2780the true owner of the majority of the corporation for the purpose of determining

2794DBE status. Furthermore, if Maritime Tug were to default on its existing note

2807to Sun Bank, only Stan R. and not Stan L. would be responsible. Because he has

2823not had to pledge any collateral or guarantee any financial obligations as

2835consideration for receiving a fifty-five percent ownership interest in Maritime

2845Tug, and because he has not had to sign any promissory notes or lines of credit

2861for Maritime Tug, Stan L. has not assumed the normal financial risks

2873commensurate with the ownership of a business. These factors all indicate that

2885Stan L. should not be considered the true owner of the majority of the

2899corporation for the purpose of determining DBE status.

290726. Stan L. does not bring any special expertise to the company. It is

2921clear that Stan R. provides most of the financial, business and maritime

2933expertise to the company. Stan L. has very limited business or managerial

2945experience prior to his involvement with Maritime Tug and he admitted during the

2958hearing that to a large degree he was "in training" under his father at Maritime

2973Tug.

297427. Rule 14-78.005(7)(e) requires that the socially and economically

2983disadvantaged owner have "the power to direct or to cause the direction of the

2997management, policies, and operations of the firms and to make day-to-day as well

3010as major business decisions concerning the firm's management, policy and

3020operation." This subsection specifically recognizes that one factor to consider

3030in making this determination is the control lodged in nondisadvantaged persons.

3041(e) To be certified under this rule chapter,

3049the DBE shall be one in which the socially

3058and economically disadvantaged owner shall

3063also possess the power to direct or cause

3071the direction of the management, policies,

3077and operations of the firm and to make day-

3086to-day as well as major business decisions

3093concerning the firm's management, policy and

3099operation. In determining whether the socially and

3106economically disadvantaged owners also

3110possess the power to direct or cause the

3118direction of the management, policies and

3124operations of the firm and have the

3131requisite decision-making authority, the

3135Department may look to the control lodged in

3143the owners who are not socially and

3150economically disadvantaged individuals. If

3154the owners who are not socially and

3161economically disadvantaged individuals are

3165disproportionately responsible for the

3169operation of the enterprise or if there

3176exists any requirement which prevents the

3182socially and economically disadvantaged

3186owners from making business decisions

3191without concurrence of any owner or employee

3198who is not a socially and economically

3205disadvantaged individual, then the

3209enterprise, for purposes of this rule

3215chapter, is not controlled by socially and

3222economically disadvantaged individuals and

3226shall not be considered a DBE within the

3234meaning of this rule chapter.

323928. While Stan L. participates in the daily operations of Maritime Tug,

3251many of the major decisions are still made by Stan R. Stan R. handles many of

3267the major purchases of equipment, prepares bids and estimates on behalf of the

3280corporation, hires and fires key employees, negotiates contracts, and solicits

3290business on behalf of Maritime Tug. It is also clear that Stan R. is much more

3306familiar than Stan L. with the financial situation of the company. These

3318factors all raise significant concern as to whether Stan L. actually possesses

3330the power to control the corporation to the degree required to obtain DBE

3343certification. However, in view of the other conclusions reached herein, that

3354issue need not be resolved in this proceeding.

336229. Rule 14-78.005(m) requires a DBE to be an independent business entity.

3374The evidence in this case indicates that Maritime Tug is dependent upon Maritime

3387Fuel, which, as noted above, is a corporation owned and operated by Stan R.

3401Maritime Tug leases its office space from Maritime Fuel for one hundred dollars

3414per month and there is conflicting testimony as to whether Maritime Tug has

3427actually paid any rent to Maritime Fuel. Maritime Tug does not employ a

3440secretary, but uses Maritime Fuel's secretary for answering the phone and

3451miscellaneous bookkeeping tasks. Stan L. does not receive any fringe benefits

3462from Maritime Tug, but, instead, receives benefits from Maritime Fuel even

3473though he no longer works for that company. All of these factors confirm that

3487Maritime Tug is not independent of Maritime Fuel and that the company is in fact

3502dependent upon Stan R. and his business interests and expertise.

3512RECOMMENDATION

3513Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is

3526RECOMMENDED that the Respondent Department of Transportation enter a Final Order

3537denying Petitioner Maritime Tug's application for certification as a

3546Disadvantaged Business Enterprise.

3549DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of

3561August 1990.

3563___________________________

3564J. STEPHEN MENTON

3567Hearing Officer

3569Division of Administrative Hearings

3573The DeSoto Building

35761230 Apalachee Parkway

3579Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

3582(904) 488-9675

3584Filed with the Clerk of the

3590Division of Administrative Hearings

3594this day of August 1990.

3599APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-0881

3606The Petitioner has not filed any post-hearing proposed findings of fact, or

3618conclusions of law. The Respondent has submitted a Proposed Recommended Order.

3629The following constitutes the Hearing Officer's rulings on the proposed findings

3640of fact contained in that submittal.

3646Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact

3655of Fact Number in the Recommended Order where accepted

3664or the reason for rejection

36691. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact

36772. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2.

36863. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3.

36954. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5. However, the last sentence is

3709rejected as an overly broad summary of the testimony.

37185. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7.

37276. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6.

37367. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8.

37458. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9.

37549. Rejected as irrelevant. The provision in the bylaws appears to relate to

3767the issuance of stock by the corporation and not the transfer of stock by

3781individual holders of the stock.

378610. Rejected as unnecessary.

379011. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10.

379912. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12.

3808COPIES FURNISHED:

3810Brenda Bryant, Esquire

3813Fields, Wilkinson, Bryant & Aiken, P.A.

381955 East Osceola, Suite 100

3824Stuart, Florida 34994

3827William Peter Martin, Esquire

3831Department of Transportation

3834Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58

3839605 Suwannee Street

3842Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

3845Ben G. Watts, Secretary

3849Department of Transportation

3852Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58

3857605 Suwannee Street

3860Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

3863Robert Scanlan, Esquire

3866Department of Transportation

3869562 Haydon Burns Building

3873605 Suwannee Street

3876Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 11/30/1990
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 11/30/1990
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 08/08/1990
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED.

Case Information

Judge:
J. STEPHEN MENTON
Date Filed:
02/09/1990
Date Assignment:
02/13/1990
Last Docket Entry:
08/08/1990
Location:
West Palm Beach, Florida
District:
Southern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

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