93-002530
K. E. Donald vs.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, August 15, 1994.
Recommended Order on Monday, August 15, 1994.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8K. E. DONALD, )
12)
13Petitioner, )
15)
16vs. ) CASE NO. 93-2530
21)
22WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., )
26)
27Respondent. )
29__________________________)
30RECOMMENDED ORDER
32Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on June 13, 1994, in
47Tallahassee, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned Hearing Officer
59of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
65APPEARANCES
66For Petitioner: K. E. Donald, pro se
73Route 5 Box 205-L
77Quincy, Florida 32351
80For Respondent: Kenneth G. Mall
85Post Office Box B
89Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0297
92STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
96Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to an award of full-time employment
108and money damages as a result of an unfair employment practice of Respondent
121employer; to wit: Respondent's failure to "promote" Petitioner from part-time
131to full-time employment because Petitioner is black.
138PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
140On August 17, 1992, Petitioner Donald filed a Charge of Discrimination
151alleging that Respondent Winn Dixie was guilty of an unlawful employment
162practice, to wit, racial discrimination in failure to "promote" Petitioner from
173a part-time position to a full-time position because he is black.
184After investigation, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered and
194mailed a Notice of Determination: No Cause and Determination: No Cause on March
20723, 1993.
209Petitioner filed no Request for Redetermination and the Commission did not
220redetermine the charge, sua sponte, under its discretionary powers.
229Petitioner mailed his Petition for Relief and it was stamped in as filed at
243the Commission on April 28, 1993. On May 5, 1993, the Commission transmitted
256the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal hearing
267pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S.
272Aspirationally, the Division of Administrative Hearings schedules such
280cases for formal hearing within 120 days. Delays in scheduling are most often
293at the request of the parties. The procedural history of this case, however, is
307explanatory of much, including but not limited to the reasons that formal
319hearing on the merits of this cause did not go forward for over one year, until
335June 13, 1994.
338Because it is important for disposition of two oral motions made in the
351course of formal hearing, the further procedural history of this cause will be
364discussed in the findings of fact infra instead of here. Those motions are (1)
378Respondent's oral motion to dismiss the Petition for untimeliness, and (2)
389Respondent's oral motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case
402and/or because Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent's reasons for non-
413hiring/promotion were not non-discriminatory (sic).
418The scope of formal hearing was limited by prior orders in this cause so
432that only Petitioner Donald testified, subject to cross-examination by
441Respondent. He offered one exhibit which was marked for identification but
452which was not admitted or retained.
458At formal hearing, Respondent qualified as its representative, Kenneth G.
468Mall, its "in-house" counsel, who made several oral motions, two of which are
481described supra. and all of which are discussed infra.
490Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" (10 pages of the Commission
500transmittal package) was admitted in evidence by stipulation of the parties.
511Official recognition was taken of the April and May calendars for 1992 and 1993.
525No transcript of the June 13, 1994 formal hearing was provided. The
537parties stipulated to 30 days for the filing of proposed recommended orders, and
550on June 14, 1994, an order of instructions was entered explaining that process
563to them.
565Petitioner's post-hearing proposal was filed on July 8, 1994.
574Respondent's post-hearing proposal was filed on July 12, 1994.
583All proposed findings of fact have been ruled upon in the appendix to this
597recommended order, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S.
604FINDINGS OF FACT
6071. On August 17, 1992, Petitioner Donald filed a Charge of Discrimination
619alleging that Respondent Winn Dixie was guilty of an unlawful employment
630practice, to wit, racial discrimination in failure to "promote" Petitioner from
641a part-time position to a full-time position because he is black, the most
654recent non-promotion date being July 22, 1992.
6612. After investigation, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered
671and mailed a Notice of Determination: No Cause and Determination: No Cause on
684March 23, 1993. That Notice contained the following pertinent language:
694If redetermination is not requested, the
700Request for Hearing/Petition for Relief
705must be filed within 30 days of the date
714of mailing of this Notice and should be
722in compliance with the provisions of Rule
72922T-9.008 and Chapter 22T-8, Florida
734Administrative Code . . . Failure of
741Complainant to timely file either a request
748or petition will result in the dismissal
755of the complaint pursuant to Rule 22T-9.006,
762Florida Administrative Code. (See "Exhibit A"
768attached to, and incorporated in, this
774Recommended Order).
7763. Petitioner mailed his Petition for Relief and it was stamped in as
789filed at the Florida Commission on Human Relations on April 28, 1993. The
802Commission did not enter an order of dismissal or otherwise reject the petition
815as untimely. On May 5, 1993, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the
828Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for formal hearing pursuant to
838Section 120.57(1), F.S. On May 5, 1993, and simultaneously with its transmittal
850of the Petition to DOAH, the Commission served/mailed the Petition to Respondent
862with a Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful
876Employment Practice.
8784. The Commission's transmittal of Petition had included a Notice to
889Respondent containing the following specific language:
895You are required to file an answer with the
904Commission within 20 days of the date of service
913of the Petition. Your attention is directed
920generally to Chapter 22T-8, Florida Administrative
926Code, which pertains to general procedures before
933the Commission. You are also referred to Rule
94122T-9.008(5) which sets forth those matters which
948must be included in the Respondent's answer.
955Please note that the filing of a motion to dismiss
965does not toll the time for filing an answer.
974(See "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order).
9815. On May 11, 1994, DOAH's Clerk mailed an Initial Order to both parties.
995The parties were charged by Rule 60Q-2.003(6), F.A.C. and by DOAH's Initial
1007Order in this case with serving upon each other a copy of every pleading either
1022party filed with DOAH. The Initial Order also permitted the parties to advise
1035the undersigned hearing officer of dates and locations they preferred for
1046scheduling the de novo evidentiary hearing on the merits. Petitioner responded
1057to the Initial Order. Respondent did not.
10646. Respondent also filed no Answer to the Petition for Relief within 20
1077days as required by Rule 22T-9.008, F.A.C., [renumbered 60Y-5.008(5)(a),
1086F.A.C.]. If a Respondent fails to file a timely answer, such failure shall be
1100deemed to constitute an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition.
1113See, renumbered Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C.
11187. By DOAH Notice of Hearing mailed May 27, 1993, the cause was scheduled
1132for formal hearing on the merits for October 18, 1993. Simultaneous with that
1145Notice of Hearing, an Order of Prehearing Instructions was entered and mailed.
1157The Order of Prehearing Instructions was directed to both parties and was very
1170specific as to what was required of them, including but not limited to listing
1184witnesses and exhibits, clarifying which issues of material fact were disputed,
1195and listing any pending motions. A copy of the entire order is attached and
1209incorporated in this Recommended Order by reference as "Exhibit B". A joint
1222prehearing stipulation was not timely filed as required by the order of
1234prehearing instructions, and neither party filed a unilateral statement on or
1245before September 29, 1993 as permitted by the order of prehearing instructions.
1257In short, neither party timely complied with the first Order of Prehearing
1269Instructions.
12708. On October 1, 1993, certain unsigned, confusing, contradictory, and
1280incomplete papers were filed. This filing, which turned out to be filed by
1293Petitioner (see Finding of Fact 22) among other things requested that the
1305hearing officer subpoena the listed witnesses, listed "stipulations" not signed
1315by anyone, and listed motions never filed at DOAH. This ambiguous item not only
1329was unsigned, but did not reflect who, if anyone, it had been served upon.
1343Common practice and procedure require subpoenas to be sent by DOAH to a party
1357for service by that party on witnesses, and subpoenas may not be served upon
1371witnesses by the hearing officer.
13769. The October 1, 1993 filing prompted the entry and service upon both
1389parties of an order on October 12, 1993 which had attached to it the unsigned
1404filings of October 1, 1993. The October 12, 1993 order, with the unsigned and
1418ambiguous attachments is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by
1429reference as "Exhibit C". That order cancelled the October 18, 1993 formal
1442hearing on the merits, subject to rescheduling of the formal hearing on the
1455merits upon clarification of the unsigned papers filed. This order was entered
1467instead of automatically precluding either party from presenting evidence, an
1477option permitted by the prior Order of Prehearing Instructions. The order gave
1489both parties an equal opportunity to do what was procedurally necessary to
1501advance the case to formal hearing on the merits. The October 12, 1993 order
1515granted both parties 45 days in which to confer with one another and file the
1530joint prehearing stipulation contemplated by the prior order of prehearing
1540instructions and to submit several agreeable dates for rescheduling formal
1550hearing on the merits. In further pertinent part, the October 12, 1993 order
1563provided that if a joint stipulation could not be agreed upon between the
1576parties, they could still proceed to formal hearing on the merits by timely
1589submitting unilateral statements listing their respective exhibits and
1597witnesses. The order also went on to specifically provide as follows:
1608Failure of either party to submit at least
1616the names of witnesses to be called by that
1625party and a list of exhibits to be introduced
1634by that party will result in exclusion of that
1643evidence at formal hearing in this cause.
165010. Under the terms of the October 12, 1993 order, the date for filing of
1665unilateral witness and exhibit lists was November 26, 1993.
167411. Neither party timely filed witness or exhibit lists.
168312. On December 14, 1993, which was eighteen days after the last date for
1697compliance with the October 12, 1993 order had passed with Petitioner and
1709Respondent each failing to timely comply therewith, another order was entered.
1720That order advised the parties that since, by the terms of the October 12, 1993
1735order, both parties were now precluded from presenting any evidence in support
1747of, or contrary to, Petitioner's claim, it appeared that there was no need to
1761conduct an evidentiary hearing. However, the order also granted the parties 30
1773days in which to show cause why Petitioner's Petition for Relief should not be
1787dismissed for failure to comply with the October 12, 1993 order. A copy of the
1802December 14, 1993 order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order
1814as "Exhibit D".
181813. That same day, Petitioner filed a request for 22 blank subpoenas and
1831to reschedule formal hearing, but no witness or exhibit list. A copy of this
1845item is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as
"1857Exhibit E."
185914. The date for filing of responses to the December 14, 1993 order to
1873show cause was January 13, 1994.
187915. Respondent did not file any response to the December 14, 1993 order or
1893the December 14, 1993 pleading. 1/
189916. However, on January 13, 1994, Petitioner timely filed a paper
1910captioned "Pleadings Motions". This paper, a copy of which is attached and
1923incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit F," was similar, but not
1935identical to, the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993. It again requested
1947subpoenas be served by the hearing officer, listed names and addresses of
1959potential witnesses, and requested that the case not be dismissed because
1970Petitioner was without legal counsel and because it is "a very hard case". It
1985specifically stated, "Please consider hearing my testimony and others on this
1996matter." Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading could be read as a motion to
2009allow Petitioner to testify and present witnesses and exhibits. In an abundance
2021of caution, the undersigned mailed a copy of it to Respondent on January 18,
20351994. Respondent did not file any response to Petitioner's January 13, 1994
2047pleading.
204817. As required by law, the undersigned had served Respondent with all
2060DOAH orders and notices. Also, in an abundance of caution, the undersigned had
2073served Respondent with Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading and the unsigned
2084October 1, 1993 papers at the address of record for Respondent's "in-house"
2096counsel, which name and address was provided in the Florida Commission on Human
2109Relations referral papers. No documents were returned to the Division of
2120Administrative Hearings, creating the legal presumption that all materials had
2130been received by Respondent. Still, Respondent had failed to comply with any
2142DOAH order whatsoever and for nine months had not taken any affirmative action
2155to defend against the Petition for Relief. No Answer to the Petition for
2168Relief, timely or otherwise, had ever been filed by Respondent. The record, as
2181reviewed by the undersigned as of February 3, 1994, also indicated that
2193Petitioner's original Charge of Discrimination before the Florida Commission on
2203Human Relations had been directed to Respondent, not at a Jacksonville address,
2215but at a Quincy address.
222018. Therefore, because the law and the undersigned are loathe to cut off
2233any legitimate litigation, and in a further abundance of caution, the
2244undersigned determined that Petitioner and Respondent should have one last
2254opportunity to explain why they had not timely complied with prior orders and
2267why, if at all, a formal hearing with witnesses and exhibits on the merits of
2282the Petition for Relief should be rescheduled. To that end, and still in an
2296abundance of caution, an order was entered on February 3, 1994, a copy of which
2311order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as
"2323Exhibit G". The decretal portion of that order read:
23331. A hearing on the limited issue of
2341whether or not either party should be
2348permitted to present evidence at a rescheduled
2355formal hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m.,
2363March 1, 1994, at the Division of Administ-
2371rative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230
2377Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida.*
23812. Witnesses need not appear at that time.
2389Only parties or their legal counsel shall appear.
23973. Failure of Petitioner to appear in person
2405or through legal counsel at that date, time and
2414place WILL result in dismissal of this cause.
24224. Failure of Respondent to appear in person
2430or through legal counsel at that date, time and
2439place WILL result in the exclusion of all of
2448Respondent's witnesses and evidence.
24524. [sic] Whether or not a formal hearing
2460on the merits will be rescheduled at all will
2469be determined by an order entered after the
2477undersigned has heard what the parties may
2484have to say at the hearing now scheduled for
2493March 1, 1994. (Emphasis in the original).
250019. Still in an abundance of caution, the foregoing order was served by
2513the undersigned upon Respondent at both its Quincy and Jacksonville addresses.
252420. No court reporter was present at the March 1, 1994 interlocutory
2536hearing. Petitioner appeared and represented himself at the March 1, 1994
2547hearing. Respondent's "in-house" counsel from Jacksonville did not appear at
2557the Tallahassee hearing but authorized Winn-Dixie's District Manager W. E.
2567Carroll and its Quincy Store Manager Terry Miller to appear. Mr. Carroll works
2580in Tallahassee. Mr. Miller drove 23 miles from Quincy for the hearing. After
2593examination by the undersigned in open court pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.008, F.A.C.,
2605Mr. Carroll was accepted as a qualified representative for Respondent.
261521. Inquiry was also made by the undersigned at the March 1, 1994 hearing
2629as to any reason a formal hearing on the merits should be rescheduled. Each
2643prior order and pleading 2/ was explored orally in open court. Oral argument
2656was also invited as to why either party should be permitted to present evidence.
2670Oral admissions and stipulations of the parties were received.
267922. At that hearing, Petitioner contended that he had not understood the
2691prior orders and that the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993 (see Findings of
2705Fact 8-9 supra.) were his attempt to provide a witness list. Petitioner also
2718contended that he thought he was represented by legal counsel at one point and
2732to support that assertion, he presented a December 6, 1993 letter he had
2745received from Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. The original of this letter
2758(exhibit) is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit H".
277123. At that hearing, no clear explanation was given of why Respondent had
2784failed to Answer the Petition for Relief and also had filed no response to any
2799prior DOAH order or pleading by Petitioner.
280624. Still in an abundance of caution, and because the undersigned is
2818loathe to enter defaults or impose sanctions at any time, each party was
2831permitted 10 days after the March 1, 1994 formal hearing in which to file any
2846further written clarification of the record or pleadings. Petitioner filed a
2857response dated March 10, 1994 on March 10, 1994, but Respondent still filed no
2871Answer to the Petition for Relief, despite numerous questions by the undersigned
2883at the March 1, 1994 hearing concerning what facts asserted in the Petition for
2897Relief were admitted and which were denied by Respondent and inquiring why no
2910Answer had been filed by Respondent. On March 4, 1994, Respondent filed a
2923written response dated March 3, 1994. A copy of Petitioner's March 10, 1994
2936response, without attachments, is attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit
2946I." A copy of Respondent's March 4, 1994 response, without attachments, is
2958attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit J."
296525. Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter ("Exhibit J") was directed primarily
2978to providing the hearing officer with a history of settlement negotiations and
2990copies of proposed settlement documents. This is a practice contrary to Section
300290.408, F.S., The Florida Evidence Code. Respondent had filed no Motion to
3014Dismiss the Petition for Relief and no Answer, and although by rule, even a
3028motion to dismiss may not toll the 20 days provided by rule for Respondent to
3043answer the Petition for Relief, Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter response also
3055raised, for the first time, the untimeliness of the Petition for Relief as
3068grounds to dismiss this cause. However, Respondent's March 4, 1994 allegations
3079based on untimeliness of the Petition were not persuasive, in that the rule that
3093Respondent cited in support thereof applied only to what the Florida Commission
3105on Human Relations or its Executive Director may do either sua sponte or upon
3119motion regarding Requests for Redetermination. The rule cited therein was
3129inapplicable to the legal principle for which Respondent cited it. Therefore,
3140Respondent's argument against the Petition was incorrect or incomplete. Also,
3150due to the complexity of the several statutes and rules involved, ruling on the
3164issue of untimeliness vel non of the Petition for Relief required the taking of
3178factual evidence. For instance, there is a Commission rule which tolls the 30
3191days for filing the Petition if the Petitioner applies for, or the Commission
3204grants, an extension of time for filing the Petition. Consequently, Petitioner
3215was entitled to an opportunity to present all the facts concerning his filing of
3229the Petition in response to the allegations of the Respondent's March 4, 1994
3242letter.
324326. The representations of Respondent's qualified representative at the
3252March 1, 1994 hearing and the materials filed after that hearing by Respondent's
"3265in house" counsel ("Exhibit J") did not show good cause why Respondent should
3280be permitted to put on a defense by way of undisclosed oral testimony or
3294exhibits. Likewise, Petitioner did not demonstrate by his oral argument,
3304exhibit, and post-hearing response ("Exhibit I"), any legal good cause why his
3318noncompliance with prior orders should be excused so as to permit him to call
3332any witnesses or put in evidence any exhibits not disclosed to Respondent. More
3345specifically, the date and contents of the December 6, 1993 letter to Petitioner
3358from Legal Services (original is "Exhibit H" hereto) did not support
3369Petitioner's oral assertions at the March 1, 1994 hearing that he had been
3382represented in this case by legal counsel, had relied on a lawyer to meet his
3397November 26, 1993 filing date, or that Legal Services' retention of his
3409documents at a critical time had prevented his timely compliance with any of the
3423prior orders herein.
342627. Accordingly, an order was entered on April 21, 1994. A complete copy
3439of that order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by
3451reference as "Exhibit K". That order provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
34648. The representations of Respondent's
3469qualified representative at the March 1,
34751994 hearing and the materials filed after
3482that hearing by Respondent's legal counsel
3488have not shown good cause why Respondent
3495should be permitted to put on a defense by
3504way of undisclosed oral testimony or exhibits.
35119. Likewise, Petitioner has not demonstrated
3517good cause why his noncompliance with prior
3524orders should be excused so as to permit him
3533to call any witnesses or put on any exhibits
3542not disclosed to Respondent. However, since
3548Petitioner clearly has always been an appropriate
3555witness and his oral testimony could be reasonably
3563anticipated by Respondent, a formal evidentiary
3569hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. will
3576be convened solely for the taking of Petitioner
3584Donald's oral testimony, subject to cross
3590examination by Respondent.
359310. Also, the materials filed by Respondent's
3600counsel after the March 1, 1994 hearing state for
3609the first time that Respondent believes the Petition
3617for Relief is subject to discretionary dismissal
3624for untimeliness, pursuant to Rule 22T-9.07 F.A.C.
3631[new number, if one exists, was not given].
3639However, Respondent still did not see fit to put
3648this observation or belief in the form of a motion.
3658Jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time.
3666The jurisdictional issue requires evidence to sustain
3673a motion, if a motion is made. Should Respondent
3682see fit to defend on that issue by motion and
3692evidence, Respondent remains free to do.
3698(Emphasis supplied)
370028. Simultaneous with the entry of the April 21, 1994 Order, a Notice of
3714Hearing was mailed to the parties. It provided for a formal hearing on June 13,
37291994 and stated the issues as: "As set forth in the order entered
3742simultaneously herewith. [The only witness will be K.E. Donald.]"
375129. Despite the language employed in the April 21, 1994 order, which still
3764permitted Respondent to assert the untimeliness of the petition for Relief as a
3777bar or jurisdictional issue, Respondent did not file a written motion or submit
3790supporting documentation (evidence) on that issue prior to the June 13, 1994
3802formal hearing.
380430. At formal hearing on June 13, 1994, Respondent moved orally to dismiss
3817the Petition for Relief due to its late filing.
382631. Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" was admitted in evidence.
3836Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" consisted of The Florida Human Relations
3847Commission Transmittal of Petition (one page), Charge of Discrimination (one
3857page), Petition for Relief (three pages), Notice of Determination: No Cause
3868(two pages) and Determination of No Cause (two pages). The original of this
3881composite exhibit as received in evidence at formal hearing is attached and
3893incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order.
390532. At formal hearing, Petitioner testified that he had not moved the
3917Florida Commission on Human Relations for an order extending his time to file
3930his petition, no order extending time had been entered, and he had neither a
3944postmark nor any clear recollection of the date he mailed his Petition to the
3958Commission.
395933. If Florida Commission on Human Relations Rules 60Y-4.004, 60Y-
39694.007(1), 60Y-4.008(2), F.A.C., are not applicable, the Petition for Relief
3979should have been filed with the Commission on April 22, 1993, a Thursday, and
3993was filed late by six days, since it was filed with the Commission on April 28,
40091993, the following Wednesday. These foregoing rules provide that when a
4020document is received by mail, the date of filing shall relate back to the date
4035of the postmark, provide three days for mailing where notice is mailed, and
4048provide an extra day for filing when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
4063or legal holiday. If those rules apply, then the Petitioner's delay is shorter
4076than six days or indeterminable.
408134. The Petition for Relief was admittedly received by Respondent's "in-
4092house" counsel on or before May 6, 1993. Respondent was specifically asked by
4105the undersigned hearing officer how the late filing of the Petition for Relief
4118had prejudiced Respondent's position. Respondent asserted that Respondent could
4127not have foreseen that Petitioner would ultimately have been permitted to
4138testify on his own behalf, and that, but for the Petition for Relief being filed
4153six days late, Respondent might have filed an answer, would not have assumed
4166that the Petition was barred and would not have, due to a conflict in the rules,
4182failed to respond to all pleadings and orders, might have secured "out of house"
4196counsel, would not have expended the cost of trying to negotiate a settlement
4209with Petitioner after the cancellation of the October 18, 1993 formal hearing,
4221and would not have incurred "enormous expense" during the Florida Commission on
4233Human Relations' investigatory phase, in sending Messrs. Carroll and Miller to
4244the March 1, 1994 DOAH hearing, and in filing its only written materials on
4258March 4, 1994.
426135. Since the investigatory phase before the Florida Commission on Human
4272Relations predated that agency's March 23, 1993 Determination of No Cause and
4284also predated the filing of the April 28, 1993 Petition for Relief, that portion
4298of Respondent's argument related to incurring enormous expense is patently
4308absurd, as is Respondent's assertion that Respondent could not have foreseen
4319that Petitioner would be permitted to testify on his own behalf. The expense
4332incurred by Respondent in having one layman travel twenty three miles to
4344Tallahassee and the other travel across town to formal hearing, even considering
4356the value of those gentlemen's time to the corporation, and in having "in-house"
4369counsel file Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter is de minimus, and these expenses
4382have no nexus to the lateness by six days of the April 28, 1993 Petition for
4398Relief. Respondent failed to demonstrate how the filing of the Petition for
4410Relief on April 28, 1993 instead of on April 22, 1993 could have reasonably
4424prevented Respondent from filing an Answer within 20 days as required by Rule
443722T-9.008(5), F.A.C., [now renumbered as 60Y-5.008(5), F.A.C.], and as
4446specifically instructed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations in its
4457Transmittal of the Petition to Respondent. (See Finding of Fact No. 4, supra
4470and "Exhibit A"). Respondent also failed to demonstrate how, under the
4482circumstances of the language contained in the Florida Commission on Human
4493Relations Transmittal of Petition and the DOAH orders, Respondent could have
4504been misled by conflicting language in Rules 22T-9.07 [now renumbered 60Y-
45155.007(9) and (12)], 22T-9.08 [now renumbered 60Y-5.008(1) and (5)] and 60Q-
45262.004(5), F.A.C., 3/ into not answering the Petition for Relief for more than
4539thirteen months, indeed, never answering it, or how such circumstances prevented
4550Respondent responding to other motions and orders or prevented Respondent from
4561obtaining "out of house" counsel. Settlement negotiations are not cognizable by
4572the trier of fact, are always undertaken at the parties' mutual risk, and have
4586never been deemed sufficient to toll filing dates. See, Section 90.408, F.S.
459836. After Respondent had been given the opportunity to present any further
4610evidence on its oral motion to dismiss the Petition for Relief, the oral motion
4624to dismiss was taken under advisement for resolution in this Recommended Order.
4636(See Conclusions of Law, infra.)
464137. Respondent then orally moved for clarification of the April 21, 1994
4653Notice of Hearing and Order Limiting Scope of Formal Hearing, which was resolved
4666by rereading that order and notice into the record.
467538. Respondent next orally moved for leave to present witnesses, contrary
4686to the decretal portion of the April 21, 1994 order. No good cause was shown to
4702vacate the April 21, 1994 order limiting evidence. To permit Respondent to put
4715on undisclosed witnesses while Petitioner was precluded from doing so after
4726Petitioner had appeared at formal hearing believing that Respondent's failure to
4737answer constituted an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition
4749and Petitioner had come prepared only for direct and cross-examination of
4760himself would be unduly prejudicial. The motion was denied.
476939. The facts that Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C. presumes admitted under the
4780unanswered Petition for Relief are those set out in the Petition itself. They
4793are fully set out in "Exhibit A" hereto and provide, in part, as follows:
"4807The company had followed discriminatory
4812hiring assignment and promotion policies
4817against minority group members on an equal
4824basis with white people. My fourteenth amendment
4831were [sic] violated. That white get hired off
4839the street and get full time without any training,
4848the first day.
4851* * *
4854Discriminatory hiring, firing, assignment and
4859promotion policies against Negroes using their
4865position and power to destroy black worker jobs
4873in order to bestow them on white workers."
4881("Exhibit A")
488540. Petitioner's unrefuted testimony elaborated on the foregoing admitted
4894facts to show that Respondent employed fifteen or more employees and that
4906Petitioner, a black male, had been employed part-time for nearly four years by
4919Respondent in its Quincy store managed by Mr. Terry Miller; Mr. Miller's
4931assistant had hired Petitioner as a member of a truck unloading crew.
4943Petitioner also showed that other white workers were hired off the street
4955without job training for full-time positions. However, Petitioner was hired by
4966Mr. Miller as a full-time employee effective June 9, 1994, four days before
4979formal hearing.
498141. Petitioner admitted that at some time before June 9, 1994, he had been
"4995written up" for not meeting the employer's dress code and appearance standards
5007and had also been "written up" for not meeting the employer's performance
5019standards of moving at least 45 cases per hour. Petitioner maintained, without
5031refutation, that these "write-ups" were unwarranted, pretextual citations
5039because he was black. Petitioner testified, without refutation, that on at
5050least one occasion he was "written up" in a category that did not include his
5065regular job duties. This admission is no different that the expanded
5076allegations included in an attachment to the Petition ("Exhibit A"), all of
5090which allegations have been admitted by Respondent by its failure to answer the
5103Petition. Petitioner also conceded, upon cross-examination, that in July 1992
5113there were some black full-time associates in the Quincy store and that
5125promotions have been based on job performance, not seniority. However, no
5136similarity of these other black full-time employees' employment situations or
5146job duties was drawn to compare with Petitioner's personal employment situation
5157or job duties. Consequently, the "write-ups" of Petitioner are found to be
5169pretextual reasons for the employer's refusal to promote him.
517842. No stipulation or order bifurcating damage evidence from evidence of
5189discrimination was entered in this case. Petitioner asserted that he was
5200entitled to "compensation" from July 22, 1992 to June 9, 1994, but he presented
5214no evidence of his pay rate per hour in either the full time or part time
5230positions, nor any other nexus upon which lost compensation damages could be
5242calculated. There also is no record evidence of what increases and/or decreases
5254occurred in pay, pay rate, or emoluments for either position over that period of
5268time. Likewise, there is no record evidence of how many hours Petitioner worked
5281or could have worked in either the part-time or full-time position so that
5294damages based on a pay differential can be calculated.
530343. Respondent orally moved to dismiss for failure of Petitioner to state
5315a prima facie case. That motion was also taken under advisement for resolution
5328in this Recommended Order.
5332CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
533544. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the
5345parties and subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S.
5357Motion to Dismiss Petition
536145. The issue with regard to Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition
5373hangs upon the following applicable rules:
5379At all times material, Rule 22T-9.008 F.A.C.
5386[now renumbered 60Y-5.008 F.A.C.] had provided
5392in pertinent part:
5395(1) Petition. A complainant may file a
5402Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment
5409Practice within 30 days of service of a Notice
5418of Failure of Conciliation, a Notice of
5425Determination of No Reasonable Cause, a Notice
5432of Determination of No Jurisdiction or a Notice
5440of Determination of Untimeliness; or where
5446redetermination has been requested, a Notice of
5453Redetermination of No Reasonable Cause, a Notice
5460of Redetermination of No Jurisdiction or a Notice
5468of Redetermination of Untimeliness. Notwithstanding
5473the provisions of Rules 60Y-4.004(2) and 60Y-4.005,
5480a complainant who is not represented by an attorney
5489may file a Petition for Relief without copies or
5498proof of service, and the Clerk shall prepare
5506copies and serve them upon all other parties.
5514* * *
5517(3) Procedures. Petitions for relief, and
5523proceedings thereupon, are governed by the
5529provisions of Chapter 60Y-4, Florida Administrative
5535Code, except as otherwise provided by this section.
5543* * *
5546(5) Answer.
5548(a) Each respondent shall file an answer
5555with the Commission within 20 days of service
5563of the petition.
5566(b) The answer shall include a specific admission,
5574denial, or explanation of each allegation of the
5582petition; or if the respondent is without knowledge
5590thereof, it shall so state, in which case such
5599statement shall operate as a denial. Admissions
5606or denials may be made to all or part of a
5617particular allegation.
5619(c) The answer shall include a specific,
5626detailed statement of any affirmative defense.
5632Failure to plead an affirmative defense shall
5639constitute a waiver of that defense.
5645(d) If a respondent fails to file a timely
5654answer, such failure shall be deemed to constitute
5662an admission of the material facts alleged in the
5671petition. Any allegation within the petition
5677which is not denied in the answer shall be deemed
5687admitted.
5688(e) The filing of a motion to dismiss shall
5697not toll the time for filing an answer.
570544. Since no postmark was available at formal hearing convened more than a
5718year after the filing of his Petition, it was not possible for Petitioner to
5732demonstrate the date he mailed his Petition. Therefore, the date of filing his
5745Petition cannot be related back, pursuant to rule, to a date before April 28,
57591993. Likewise, the rules giving an additional three days for mailing and an
5772extra day after specified days are not helpful to Petitioner under the facts of
5786this case. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Petition for Relief was
5799filed six days late.
580347. Normally, the foregoing conclusion would resolve a jurisdictional
5812issue against Petitioner, because Petitioner always bears the burden of
5822establishing jurisdiction. However, Respondent's proposed recommended order
5829acknowledged that Clark v. Department of Corrections, 8 FALR 679 (FCHR 1985)
5841stands for the proposition that the thirty-day period for filing the Petition
5853for Relief is not jurisdictional but is subject to equitable tolling.
586448. Respondent maintained, however, that Clark also stands for the
5874proposition that the Petitioner has the burden of proving that the limitations
5886period should be tolled and further argued that Petitioner has not met that
5899burden in the instant case. Respondent's argument in favor of dismissal of the
5912Petition for Relief also requires engrafting upon the Florida Commission on
5923Human Relations' rules certain federal rules and/or statutes which require a
5934Petitioner to include in a federal Title VII petition allegations of fulfilling
5946all conditions precedent. One of such conditions precedent for a Title VII
5958federal petition is an allegation that the petition itself was filed timely.
5970The Florida Commission on Human Relations has not adopted those federal pleading
5982requirements either by rule or by case law. Accordingly, Respondent's foregoing
5993arguments are not persuasive.
599749. Some other Florida Human Relations Commission cases dealing with
6007timeliness vel non of a Petition for Relief have tolled the 30 day time frame
6022for filing a Petition for Relief, absent a showing of incurable prejudice to the
6036Respondent. See, Owens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., FCHR
6049Order 84-019 (FCHR 9/26/84); Dittrich v. Wackenhut Services, Inc. FCHR Order
6060No. 84-020 (FCHR 9/26/84); Gloss v. City of Mascotte, 3 FALR 238-A; Park v.
6074Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 4 FALR 1795-A, and Matson v. General
6087Cinema Beverages of North Florida, Inc. DOAH Case No. 89-4318 (RO 5/11/90; Final
6100Order entered 7/19/90, filed 11/20/90).
610550. The instant case does not present a situation in which the Petition
6118for Relief attempts to amend or add to the original charge of discrimination any
6132allegations which the Commission had never formally investigated or reviewed.
6142That would be an entirely different situation than the one at bar, and one which
6157would be purely jurisdictional, not subject to equitable tolling. See, Austin
6168v. Florida Power Corporation, DOAH Case No. 90-5137 (RO 6/20/91; Final order
6180entered 10/24/91, filed 10/30/91). Nor is this a situation where Petitioner's
6191intention, volition, or inadvertence should equitably bar him. It is noted that
6203mail is presumed to take five days everywhere except in the Commission's rules.
6216It is also entirely possible that Petitioner's post-mark, if it were available
6228at this late date, would establish an earlier filing date. Respondent's delay
6240in making its motion to dismiss has prejudiced Petitioner's ability to defend
6252against that motion.
625551. It is important in applying any rule, to look first to the purpose of
6270the rule, and second, to determine whether or not a strict interpretation of the
6284rule serves that purpose. One purpose of a strict interpretation of Rule 60Y-
62975.008 F.A.C. is to require issues to proceed forthwith to a finite conclusion
6310while events are still fresh in the witnesses' minds and while witnesses are
6323still available to both parties to present the best possible case that each
6336party can.
633852. In the instant case, there is not even a scintilla of evidence that
6352Petitioner's six days' delay in filing his Petition for Relief prejudiced
6363Respondent's case in any tangible way. Respondent was in possession of a copy
6376of the Petition by May 6, 1993. From May 6, 1993 onward, Respondent did not
6391answer the petition and filed no discovery. Respondent simply sat on its
6403rights, failing to defend despite every opportunity to do so, until Respondent
6415finally, and obliquely, raised the issue of the Petition's untimeliness in its
6427March 4, 1994 letter. Advised by the April 21, 1994 order that a motion and
6442evidence would be necessary to resolve the timeliness issue, Respondent waited
6453to raise its oral motion to dismiss the petition until the June 13, 1994 formal
6468hearing. At that time, Respondent still could not demonstrate any prejudice
6479resulting from the six days' delay in filing the Petition.
648953. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and due to
6503Respondent having conceded that timely filing of the Petition for Relief is not
6516jurisdictional, the oral motion to dismiss for untimeliness of the petition is
6528denied.
6529The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prove a Prima Facie Case
654154. Under the provisions of Section 760.10 (1)(a), F.S. it is an unlawful
6554employment practice for an employer:
6559To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire
6568an individual, or otherwise to discriminate
6574against any individual with respect to
6580compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
6585of employment, because of such individual's
6591race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
6597age, handicap, or marital status.
6602[Emphasis supplied]
660455. The United States Supreme Court set forth the procedure essential for
6616establishing claims of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
6627U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973), which was then revisited in
6643detail in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.
6657Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). Pursuant to the Burdine formula, the
6671employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
6683intentional discrimination, which once established raises a presumption that the
6693employer discriminated against the employee. The preeminent case at the present
6704time in Florida is still Department of Corrections v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183
6718(Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
672256. When an individual alleges he has been subjected to "disparate
6733treatment," the standards of proof require that the Petitioner show the
6744existence of "actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such
6758actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions
6771were "based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act." See, McCosh
6783v. City of Grand Forks, 628 F. 2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1980), and Furnco Const. Co. v.
6800Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1978), citing Teamsters
6816v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396
6833(1977). Once a Petitioner establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts
6845to the employer to rebut the adverse inference by articulating "some legitimate
6857nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." See, McCosh v. City of
6868Grand Forks and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, both supra. But even if the
6882employer meets this burden, the complaining party is given the opportunity to
6894show that the proffered evidence is merely a pretext for discrimination, Id. at
6907804-05, 93 S. Ct. at 1025. See, generally, Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613
6921F. 2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980).
692757. The foregoing order of proof was abbreviated in the instant case by
6940Respondent's failure to answer the Petition for Relief, by the application of
6952the rule's instruction to deem unanswered allegations to have been admitted, and
6964by subsequent interlocutory orders limiting both parties' presentation of
6973evidence.
697458. Petitioner has presented a prima facie case of discrimination on the
6986basis of race (black) by an employer covered by the Act, and the
6999nondiscriminatory reasons therefore are deemed pretextual. Therefore,
7006Respondent's oral motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case
7019and/or because Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent's reasons for
7030non-hiring/promotion were not discriminatory (sic) is denied.
7037The Case on the Merits
704258. The case on the merits as to the existence of a discriminatory and
7056illegal employment practice has been proven, and the non-discriminatory reasons
7066therefore are deemed pretextual.
707059. Petitioner was finally hired full time by Respondent a few days before
7083formal hearing, but he is still entitled to an order awarding him full-time
7096employment.
709760. However, nothing in the procedural history of this case establishes
7108that there was any agreement or order bifurcating the issues of liability and
7121damages. Accordingly, the burden was upon the Petitioner to go forward to
7133establish the amount of money and/or benefits Petitioner lost in
7143wages/compensation/job emoluments during the two-year period of non-promotion.
7151Petitioner presented no clear evidence as to either wages or other damages at
7164formal hearing on June 13, 1994. Moreover, Petitioner presented no evidence
7175which would permit the calculation of such damages. Accordingly, money damages
7186cannot be awarded.
7189RECOMMENDATION
7190Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
7202RECOMMENDED
7203That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order FINDING:
7215(1) That Petitioner has shown a prima facie violation of the Human Rights
7228Act of 1977, Section 760.10 F.S. [1989], to wit: failure of a covered employer
7242to "promote" Petitioner-employee to a full-time position because he is black;
7253(2) That Respondent has articulated, but has not substantiated, legitimate
7263nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions complained of; and
7271(3) That Petitioner has shown the articulated reasons to be pretextual;
7282AND ORDERING:
7284That Respondent employ Petitioner in a full-time position.
7292RECOMMENDED this 15th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida.
7302___________________________________
7303ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
7307Hearing Officer
7309Division of Administrative Hearings
7313The DeSoto Building
73161230 Apalachee Parkway
7319Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
7322(904) 488-9675
7324Filed with the Clerk of the
7330Division of Administrative Hearings
7334this 15th day of August, 1994.
7340ENDNOTES
73411/ Respondent did not file, within 12 days, a response in opposition to
7354Petitioner's pleading filed December 14, 1993 as permitted by Rule 60Q-2.016
7365F.A.C., even though the prayer of Petitioner's December 14, 1993 pleading could
7377have been read as a request for all of Petitioner's witnesses to be heard on the
7393merits of the case. It is noted, however, that Petitioner's December 14, 1993
7406pleading does not reflect that Petitioner served a copy of it on Respondent, and
7420DOAH's file does not reflect that the undersigned hearing officer copied
7431Respondent with Petitioner's December 14, 1993 filing, probably because the
7441December 14 order was entered before the December 14 pleading was physically
7453received by the hearing officer.
74582/ This examination included but was not limited to the Petitioner's December
747014, 1993 pleading, in case Respondent had not received it. (See note 1 Id.) It
7485is noted that Respondent never claimed it had not received Petitioner's December
749714, 1993 pleading, even after the March 1, 1994 hearing.
75073/ FCHR Rules 60Y-5.007(9) and (12) cover potential vacations of orders and sua
7520sponte redeterminations by the FCHR director; 60Y-5.008(1) makes Petitions for
7530Relief due for filing at the Florida Commission on Human Relations in 30 days.
7544FCHR Rule 60Y-5.008(5) mandates the filing of Answers to Petitions for relief
7556within 20 days of the filing of the Petition for Relief. DOAH Rule 60Q-2.004
7570does not mandate answers to petitions and administrative complaints but
7580subsection (5)thereof permits Answers with affirmative defenses to other
7589administrative complaints and petitions to be filed at DOAH within 20 days of
7602the filing of those petitions.
7607* NOTE: Recommended Order Exhibits A through K are not a
7618part of this ACCESS document but are available for
7627review in the Division's Clerk's Office.
7633APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-2530
7638The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S.,
7647upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF).
7656Petitioner's PFOF:
7658The Petitioner's "I. Stipulations" and "Findings of Facts" are all treated as
7670proposed findings of fact for purposes of this appendix. "I. Stipulations"
76811 Rejected as legal argument, not a proposed finding of
7691fact.
76922-3 Accepted but unnecessary material was not adopted.
77004 Accepted but not dispositive. Covered under
7707appearances and throughout the findings of facts.
"7714Findings of Facts"
77175-7 Accepted except that dates were not specified in the
7727Petitioner's testimony and therefore cannot be adopted.
77348-10 Covered in Findings of Fact 38-40 as proven at formal
7745hearing. The portions proposed which were not
7752utilized in the recommended order were not proven or
7761were unnecessary.
7763Respondent's PFOF:
77651-7 Accepted, except that legal arguments and irrelevant,
7773unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material
7778have not been utilized in the findings of fact. The
7788legal arguments have been discussed in the Conclusions
7796of Law.
7798COPIES FURNISHED:
7800K. E. Donald
7803Route 5 Box 205-L
7807Quincy, FL 32351
7810Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.
7814Kenneth G. Mall
7817Post Office Box B
7821Jacksonville, FL 32203-0297
7824Terry Miller
7826Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.
78301608 West Jefferson Street
7834Quincy, FL 32351
7837W. E. Carroll
7840Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.
78441000 W. Tharpe Street
7848Tallahassee, FL 32329
7851Sharon Moultry, Clerk
7854Human Relations Commission
7857325 John Knox Road
7861Building F, Suite 240
7865Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
7868Dana Baird, General Counsel
7872Human Relations Commission
7875325 John Knox Road
7879Building F, Suite 240
7883NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
7889All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended
7901Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit
7915written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit
7927written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final
7939order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions
7952to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be
7964filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
7977=================================================================
7978AGENCY FINAL ORDER
7981=================================================================
7982STATE OF FLORIDA
7985COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
7989K. E. DONALD,
7992Petitioner, EEOC Case No. 15D92049
7997FCHR Case No. 92-6248
8001vs. DOAH Case No. 93-2530
8006FCHR Order No. 95-057
8010WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC.,
8013Respondent.
8014___________________________/
8015FINAL ORDER AWARDING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
8020FROM AN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
8025Preliminary Matters
8027Petitioner K. E. Donald filed a complaint of discrimination pursuant to the
8039Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, Section 760.01 - 760.10, Florida Statutes
8052(1991), alleging that Respondent Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., committed an unlawful
8062employment practice by refusing to promote him from part-time to full-time
8073employment because of his race (black).
8079The allegations set forth in the complaint were investigated and, on
8090March, 23, 1993, the Executive Director issued his determination, finding that
8101no reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had
8113occurred.
8114Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment
8124Practice, received by the Commission on April 28, 1993, and the case was
8137transferred `to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a
8149formal proceeding.
8151A formal administrative hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on June
816213, 1994-, before Hearing Officer Ella Jane P. Davis.
8171Hearing Officer Davis issued a Recommended Order, finding that an unlawful
8182employment practice had occurred, dated August 15, 1994.
8190Pursuant to notice, public deliberations were held on October 12, 1995, in
8202Tallahassee, Florida, before this panel of Commissioners, at which deliberations
8212the panel determined the action to be taken upon the Petition for Relief.
8225FINDINGS OF FACT
8228Neither party filed a transcript of the proceeding before the Hearing
8239Officer.
8240Since a Hearing Officer's finding of whether discrimination occurred is a
8251finding of fact, the Commission may overturn such a finding only if, after
8264reviewing the complete record of the case, the Commission determines that the
8276finding is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record or that
8289the proceeding leading to the determination did not comply with the essential
8301requirements of law. See Florida Department of Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586
8313So.2d 1205, at 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In the absence of a transcript of the
8329proceeding before the Hearing Officer, the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order
8339is the only evidence for the Commission to consider. See National Industries,
8351Inc. v. Commission on Human Relations, et al., 527 So.2d 894, at 897, 898-(Fla.
83655th DCA 1988).
8368We adopt the Hearing Officer's findings of fact.
8376CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
8379We find the Hearing Officer's application of the law to be a correct
8392disposition of the case. With the addition indicated in the Award of
8404Affirmative Relief section of this Order, infra, we adopt the Hearing Officer's
8416conclusions of law.
8419Exceptions
8420Respondent filed two, numbered, written exceptions to the Recommended
8429Order.
8430Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave to Excuse Filing of Transcript,
8442requesting the Commission to consider its exceptions without the filing of a
8454transcript, arguing that its exceptions are to conclusions of law as opposed to
8467findings of fact. In the Motion, Respondent indicates that if the Motion were
8480to be denied, it is willing to bear the burden of providing a transcript, and
8495requests reasonable time to be allowed to do that.
8504Respondent excepts to: (1) the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law denying
8515Respondent's motion to dismiss on the basis that Petitioner's Petition for
8526Relief was not timely filed (Recommended Order, 53); and (2) the Hearing
8538Officer's conclusion of law finding that the period for filing a Petition for
8551Relief from Unlawful Employment Practices can be tolled where Respondent suffers
8562no prejudice to the Petition (Recommended Order, 48 and [ 49).
8573Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-4.027(1) requires a party who files exceptions to
8585the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order to provide the Commission with a
8596verbatim, written transcript of all testimony, if no verbatim, written
8606transcript has been previously furnished by any other party.
8615The Commission routinely "strikes" exceptions to Recommended Orders when
8624the party filing the exceptions fails to provide the required transcript, and a
8637transcript has not otherwise been provided. See, e.g., Ebeh v. Consumer Credit
8649Counseling Service of the Tampa Bay Area, Inc., 16 F.A.L.R. 2149 (FCHR 1994).
8662With regard to the timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Relief, the
8676Hearing Officer found that Petitioner filed the Petition for Relief six days
8688late. Recommended Order, 46. The Hearing Officer also found that this late-
8700filing did not result in prejudice to Respondent. Recommended Order, I 52.
8712Arnold v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 16 F.A.L.R.
8722576 (FCHR 1993), presents a situation in which Petitioner filed his Petition for
8735Relief four days late. In conclusions of law adopted by the Commission, the
8748Hearing Officer indicated that it was unnecessary to consider the excuse offered
8760by Petitioner for the late-filing, since he failed in his burden of proof on the
8775substantive issues, but noted that, "[Petitioner's] filing was four days late,
8786but tee [Respondent] was not prejudiced by that brief late filing. In similar
8799situations appellate courts have been reluctant to consider the filing deadline
8810as jurisdictional [cite omitted]." Arnold, supra, at 582.
8818We conclude that, under the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, it is
8832within the discretion of the Hearing Officer to deny a motion to dismiss for
8846failure of the Petition for Relief to be timely filed, if the late-filing has
8860not resulted in prejudice to the Respondent.
8867Based on the foregoing, we deny Respondent's Motion for Leave to Excuse
8879Filing of Transcript, but find that even if the Motion were granted, Respondent
8892s exceptions to the Recommended Order would be denied.
8901Award of Affirmative Relief
8905The Hearing Officer recommended that Respondent be ordered to employ
8915Petitioner in a full-time position, and we so ORDER.
8924Further, we hereby ORDER Respondent to cease and desist form engaging in
8936the unlawful employment practice found to have occurred in this case.
8947The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The
8960Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive a notice of
8973appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the
8989Commission. Explanation of the right to appeal is found in Section 120.68,
9001Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110.
9012DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1995.
9021FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS:
9028___________________________________
9029Commissioner Whitfield Jenkins,
9032Panel Chairperson;
9034Commissioner Clarethea Brooks; and
9038Commissioner Ronald Townsend
9041Filed this 11th day of December, 1995,
9048in Tallahassee, Florida.
9051___________________________________
9052Sharon Moultry
9054Clerk of the Commission
9058NOTICE TO COMPLAINANT/PETITIONER
9061As your complaint was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
90751964, which is enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
9086(EEOC), you have the right to request EEOC to review this Commission's final
9099agency action. To secure a "substantial weight review" by EEOC, you must request
9112it in writing within 15 days of your receipt of this Order. Send your request to
9128Miami District Office (EEOC), One Biscayne Tower, 2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite
91402700, 27th Floor, Miami, FL 331 31
9147Copies furnished to:
9150K. E. Donald
9153Route 5 Box 205-L
9157Quincy, Florida 32351
9160Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esquire
9164Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A.
9172P.O. Box 190
9175Tallahassee, Florida 32302
9178John P. McAdams, Esquire
9182Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A.
9190P.O. Box 3239
9193Tampa, Florida 33601
9196James Mallue, Legal Advisor for Commission Panel
9203Ella Jane P. Davis, DOAH Hearing Officer
![](/images/view_pdf.png)
- Date
- Proceedings
- Date: 12/13/1995
- Proceedings: Final Order Awarding Affirmative Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- Date: 09/06/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Exceptions to Recommended Order; Motion for Leave to Excuse Filing of Transcript w/cover ltr filed.
- Date: 07/12/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law filed.
- Date: 07/08/1994
- Proceedings: Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law filed.
- Date: 06/15/1994
- Proceedings: Post-Hearing Order sent out.
- Date: 04/21/1994
- Proceedings: Order Limiting Scope of Formal Hearing sent out.
- Date: 04/21/1994
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 6/15/30; at 10:30am; in Tallahassee)
- Date: 03/14/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to Parties of Record from EJPD sent out (Re: correspondence)
- Date: 03/10/1994
- Proceedings: CC Telephone Bill w/cover ltr filed. (From K. E. Donald)
- Date: 03/04/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to EJD from K. Mall (re: follow-up of hearing; statement) filed.
- Date: 02/03/1994
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (Re: hearing on presentation of evidence set for 3/1/94; 10:00am; Tallahassee)
- Date: 01/18/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to Parties of Record from EJD sent out.
- Date: 01/13/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Pleading Motions filed.
- Date: 12/14/1993
- Proceedings: Order to Show Cause sent out.
- Date: 12/14/1993
- Proceedings: Ltr. to EJD from Petitioner re: request for scheduling of hearing filed.
- Date: 10/12/1993
- Proceedings: Order Continuing Hearing sent out. (hearing date to be rescheduled at a later date; parties to file prehearing stipulation within 45 days)
- Date: 10/01/1993
- Proceedings: Letter to EJD from K. E. Donald (re: response to initial Order) filed.
- Date: 05/27/1993
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 10/18/93; 9:30am; Tallahassee)
- Date: 05/27/1993
- Proceedings: Order of Prehearing Instructions sent out.
- Date: 05/27/1993
- Proceedings: Letter to Kenneth G. Mall from EJD sent out. (Re: Ex Parte communication)
- Date: 05/24/1993
- Proceedings: Ltr. to DOAH from K. E. Donald re: Reply to Initial Order filed.
- Date: 05/11/1993
- Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
- Date: 05/06/1993
- Proceedings: Transmittal of Petition; Complaint; Notice of Determination; Petition for Relief; Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
- Date Filed:
- 05/06/1993
- Date Assignment:
- 05/11/1993
- Last Docket Entry:
- 12/13/1995
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO