94-000294
Stephanie Luke vs.
Pic N' Save Drug Company, Inc.
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Thursday, August 25, 1994.
Recommended Order on Thursday, August 25, 1994.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8STEPHANIE LUKE, )
11)
12Petitioner, )
14)
15vs. ) CASE NO. 94-0294
20)
21PIC N' SAVE DRUG COMPANY, INC., )
28)
29Respondent. )
31__________________________________)
32RECOMMENDED ORDER
34Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on June 24, 1994 in
49Ocala, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned hearing officer of
62the Division of Administrative Hearings.
67APPEARANCES
68For Petitioner: Stephanie E. Luke, pro se
751218 North West 6th Avenue
80Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311
84For Respondent: William H. Andrews, Esquire
90Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A.
96Post Office Box 40089
100Jacksonville, Florida 32203
103STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
107Whether or not Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice by
118discrimination in employment by termination of Petitioner due to her race,
129black, or due to her protest of an unlawful employment practice.
140PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
142Petitioner Stephanie E. Luke filed a Charge of Discrimination against
152Respondent Pic N' Save Drug Company, Inc. on April 6, 1993, alleging that she
166was discriminated against because of her race. The allegations of
176discrimination were investigated by the Florida Commission on Human Relations,
186and on November 15, 1993, the Commission issued its Determination finding "no
198cause."
199After receiving an extension of time, Ms. Luke filed her Petition for
211Relief on January 12, 1994, which added the charge that she had been terminated
225for opposing unlawful employment practices. On January 13, 1994, she filed a
237document styled "Amended Charge of Discrimination as to Particulars," claiming
247for the first time that she also had been discriminated against because of a
261handicap.
262On February 4, 1994, Respondent filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses
273to the Petition for Relief and its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Charge. A
287telephonic hearing resulted in the determination that resolution of the issue
298raised by the Motion to Dismiss would require evidence or stipulated facts, and
311ruling on the motion was deferred until the formal hearing.
321At the commencement of formal hearing, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the
332Amended Charge of Discrimination was argued, and facts with regard thereto were
344either stipulated or established by evidence.
350Respondent did not move to strike or dismiss the portion of the January 12,
3641994 Petition for Relief newly alleging discrimination by retaliatory
373termination for opposition to an unlawful employment practice and these new
384allegations were not struck or dismissed.
390Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination filed April 6, 1993 originally only
400charged Respondent with discrimination upon the basis of Petitioner's race,
410black. Although some of the language therein alluded peripherally to
420Petitioner's on-the-job injury and to the employer requiring Petitioner to work
431while recovering, the overall allegations of the Charge of Discrimination were
442clearly based upon alleged discrimination by race. In fact, Petitioner had the
454opportunity to charge discrimination by handicap simply by checking the
464appropriate box therefor on the Commission's form and did not. She only checked
477the box marked "race." All of her allegations of discrimination contained in
489her April 6, 1993 Charge of Discrimination related to her termination on January
50210, 1993 and the employer's actions prior to her termination.
512The Commission's investigation and its November 15, 1993 Determination: No
522Cause was therefore directed only to issues of racial discrimination. Her
533Petition for Relief was required by rule to be filed within 30 days.
546Petitioner applied for, and received from, the Commission a December 30,
5571993 Order granting an extension of time for filing her Petition for Relief.
570The Petition for Relief was timely filed, pursuant to that order extending time,
583on January 12, 1994. However, attached thereto was an "Amended Charge of
595Discrimination as to Particulars" (hereafter referred-to as "the amended
604petition for relief") which, for the first time, charged Respondent-employer
615with discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap. All the
627allegations contained in the amended petition related to a period of time prior
640to her January 10, 1993 termination. Therefore, it is clear that no new factual
654allegations were added. If the Commission had been made aware of the handicap
667issue in the original Charge of Discrimination it could have investigated,
678considered, and entered proposed final agency action thereon in the form of a
"691Determination: Cause or No Cause." Under the facts and evidence as argued, it
704is clear that the Commission never had that opportunity.
713Although Petitioner's January 12, 1994 Petition for Relief upon racial
723discrimination grounds is deemed timely upon the foregoing argument and
733evidence, the "Amended Charge of Discrimination as to Particulars" filed January
74413, 1994 is not.
748The better practice is to file a new Charge of Discrimination if subsequent
761facts of discrimination unfold. However, amendments to an original charge of
772discrimination or petition for relief are sometimes possible, usually only up to
784the filing of the Commission's Determination or Redetermination. See, Rules
79460Y-4.009, 60Y-4.017, 60Y-5.001(2)(4) and (7)(c) F.A.C. The purpose of the
804rules permitting amended petitions, wherein new or partially new grounds may be
816alleged is to permit supplemental pleadings of new or unfolding facts, not new
829theories of law upon the same old facts, and the rules require specifice
842permission from the Commission. 1/ However, this case does not fit such a
855scenario. Here the Commission's December 30, 1993 Order only extended the time
867for filing. It says nothing about permission to amend the charges.
878In this case, Petitioner raised no issue of handicap in her Charge of
891Discrimination. In her amendments, the facts and time frame of alleged
902discrimination had not changed, only the legal theory. Petitioner and
912Respondent have not been interactive since her January 10, 1992 termination.
923Consequently, the Respondent had no clear notice it should investigate and
934defend against those handicap charges at the Commission level and the Commission
946had no opportunity to investigate and review those new charges before referring
958the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Therefore, the charges
969of discrimination by handicap should be dismissed or struck upon authority of
981Austin v. Florida Power Corporation DOAH Case No. 90-5137 (RO entered 6/20/91,
993FO entered 10/24/91, filed 10/30/91).
998Effective October 1, 1992, the statute of limitations for filing initial
1009Charges of Discrimination was expanded from 180 to 365 days. See, Section
1021760.11(1) F.S. [1992]. Since the new charges contained in the amended petition
1033for relief were filed beyond the 365 days for filing new charges of
1046discrimination, Petitioner's new charge of handicap was also time-barred by the
1057statute 365 days after January 10, 1993. See, St. Petersburg Motor Club v.
1070Cook, 567 So. 2d. 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
1079Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss was granted only as to Petitioner's
1090January 13, 1994 amended petition based on "handicap."
1098However, by an oral order in limine, the ruling was made that evidence of
1112Petitioner's on-the-job injury and recovery and the employer's requirements of
1122Petitioner in relationship to her injury and recovery would be admissible either
1134for purposes of proving racial discrimination by Respondent-employer (i.e.
1143disparate treatment of Petitioner from non-black employees) and for purposes of
1154proving or refuting as pretextual, Respondent-employer's defense of termination
1163for insubordination.
1165Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Derrick Proctor and Standley
1175Gillings and testified on her own behalf. Petitioner also had thirteen exhibits
1187marked for identification, of which nine exhibits (numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,
12029, and 11 ) were admitted in evidence.
1210At the close of Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent moved to dismiss for
1223failure to establish a prima facie case, which motion was denied.
1234Respondent presented the oral testimony of Patrick Fekula and John Sasse.
1245Seven of its eleven identified exhibits were admitted in evidence. Respondent's
1256Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11 were admitted in evidence. Exhibit 9 was
1272admitted only pursuant to Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S.
1279At the close of all evidence, Respondent moved for summary judgment (sic:
1291summary recommended order). The motion was denied, subject to revisitation in
1302this recommended order.
1305No transcript of the proceedings was provided. All proposed findings of
1316fact filed on or before July 25, 1995, have been ruled upon in the appendix to
1332this recommended order, pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S.
1340FINDINGS OF FACT
13431. Petitioner is a black female.
13492. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent
1359corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida.
13713. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John
1383Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department.
13964. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day
1408probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the
1418foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show
1430that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However,
1442she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time
1456frame than is material here.
14615. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back
1474and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance,
1488and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She
1501was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury"
1513as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and
1525began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses.
15316. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a
1544marginal employee.
15467. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of
1559November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a
1573doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties.
15838. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11,
15971992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated.
16099. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers'
1620compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical
1631care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the
1646employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical
1659facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One,
1669where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work
1681the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor.
169310. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured
1703in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she
1717returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while
1728testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the
1740circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it
1752very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that
1764Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room
1777conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's
1789mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first
1804place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an
1814unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with
1824these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a
1835nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no
1846evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled
1855her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black.
186611. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided:
1876Restricted
18771. Employee should avoid movements of the
1884upper body and neck that would place undue
1892stress on the neck, such as strenuous
1899pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and
1905working above the shoulders.
19092. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds,
1917avoid frequent bending and twisting of the
1924back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling.
193112. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks
1941consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions,
1950as modified over time by subsequent information.
195713. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the
1970soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in
1983the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach
1997above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner
2010complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due
2022to her physical condition.
202614. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The
2038employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There
2051was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner
2064or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical
2075care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course
2085authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and
2095magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis.
210215. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend,
2112presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by
2126Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the
2138time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer.
2151Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of
2162the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns
2173and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common
2185disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical
2195care delivery system.
219816. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the
2209employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner-
2218employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On
2227December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report
2241on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This
2254conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to
2267the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being
2277withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a
2289reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to
2301her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could
2314return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr.
2327Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of
2341December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to
2355get" her.
235717. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner
2366complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping
2376supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform.
238618. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25,
23981992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting
2411items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed
2423her restrictions to the following:
24281. Restricted.
2430Employee should avoid movements of the
2436upper body and neck that would place undue
2444stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing
2452and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above
2459the shoulders.
246119. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department,
2473hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some
2484nights.
248520. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be
2496discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft
2509goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had
2523been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place.
253221. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's
2544evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season,
2557and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she
2571could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's
2582accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the
2593accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November
260423, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a
2617daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to
2632and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey
2646or Petitioner.
264822. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the
2661evening shift, not race.
266523. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992,
2679Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight
2691training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client
2704because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that
2715she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is
2726clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she
2738could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of
2752Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the
2765weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input.
277524. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical
2784limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in
2796Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under
2807it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she
2823was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up
2839single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and
2852return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of
2868clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors
2883for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while
2897they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly
2910padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's
2922instructions to do so.
292625. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer
2939when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the
2954sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room.
2967Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for
2979long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time
2995she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told
3009her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the
3023customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor
3038where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work,
3053until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which
3071she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods.
3083Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations
3094and to constitute "physical abuse."
309926. Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could
3111recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for
3125medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this
3135condition imposed by management to be "abusive."
314227. Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6,
31551992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her
3168request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the
3182public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner
3195referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful
3208employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination.
321728. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended
3228that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the
3244evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no
3256accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose.
326429. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's
3277approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home
3291afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as
3303sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992.
331430. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner
3324refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed
3339that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her.
335131. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and
3365she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor.
337932. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her
3392limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft
3404goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner.
3417Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with
3431Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo.
344433. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written
3456up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an
3471argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around
3485the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some
3497tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what
3509Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours.
351834. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime.
353035. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of
3541reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were,
3555in her opinion, "grudgeful."
355936. Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One
3572doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective
3584December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously
3596received by the employer read:
3601Please note employee's current duty status is
3608as follows:
36101. Regular
3612May return to normal work activities full
3619time.
362037. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing
3631some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she
3645do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and
3659take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never
3674knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed
3687her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing
3701a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when
3717talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider
3730Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was
3743working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was
3756actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr.
3768Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of
3781getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another
3792department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and
3801described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling
3816mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony,
3825Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive
3835treatment."
383638. After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical
3849restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management.
3857Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had
3868released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still
3883refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse
3900and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993.
390739. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform
3917even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before
3929her ninety days' probationary period ended.
393540. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in
39461993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment
3959compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or
3970testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect
3981that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral
3993decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by,
4006Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment
4015that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after
4027reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do
4039the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her.
405041. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In
4062fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to
4075Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on
4089January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately
4101following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female
4112with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the
4125soft goods department.
412842. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after
4140Petitioner's termination.
414243. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees
4152were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department.
416444. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in
4175another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted
4187with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been
4202fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also
4215black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor
4226until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.
4234CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
423745. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the
4247parties and subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S.
425946. Under the provisions of Section 760.10 F.S. it is an unlawful
4271employment practice for an employer:
4276(1) (a) ...to discharge or to fail or refuse
4285to hire an individual, or otherwise to
4292discriminate against any individual with
4297respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
4302or privileges of employment, because of such
4309individual's race, color, religion, sex,
4314national origin, age, handicap, or marital
4320status.
4321(7) ...to discriminate against any person
4327because that person has opposed any practice
4334which is an unlawful employment practice under
4341this section, or because that person has made
4349a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
4355in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
4362or hearing under this section.
436747. The United States Supreme Court set forth the procedure essential for
4379establishing claims of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
4390U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), which was then revisited in
4407detail in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.
4421Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). Pursuant to the Burdine formula, the
4435employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
4447intentional discrimination, which once established raises a presumption that the
4457employer discriminated against the employee. The preeminent case at the present
4468time in Florida is still Department of Corrections v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183
4482(Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
448648. When an individual alleges he has been subjected to "disparate
4497treatment," the standards of proof require that the Petitioner show the
4508existence of "actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such
4522actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions
4535were "based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act." See, McCosh
4547v. City of Grand Forks, 628 F. 2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1980), and Furnco Const. Co. v.
4564Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1978), citing Teamsters
4580v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396
4597(1977). Once a Petitioner establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts
4609to the employer to rebut the adverse inference by articulating "some legitimate
4621nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." See, McCosh v. City of
4632Grand Forks and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, both supra. But even if the
4646employer meets this burden, the complaining party is given the opportunity to
4658show that the proffered evidence is merely a pretext for discrimination, Id. at
4671804-05, 93 S. Ct. at 1025. See, generally, Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613
4685F. 2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980).
469149. Petitioner has established a prima facie case in that she is a member
4705of the black race, one of the statutorily protected classes, and that she was
4719terminated. However, Respondent has articulated and substantiated
4726nondiscriminatory, non-racial reasons for her termination. Petitioner has
4734failed to show that these reasons are pretextual. She has not established a
4747prima facie case as to her allegations of discrimination based upon opposition
4759to an unlawful employment practice.
476450. Whatever Petitioner thought was dangerous about Respondent's stock
4773room was never spelled out in this record, but assuming, arguendo, that
4785Respondent was responsible for the October 31, 1992 accident, Petitioner's legal
4796recourse was the workers' compensation process established under Chapter 440
4806F.S. or a state or federal OSHA complaint. Disputes about clutter, even when
4819they rise to the level of creating on-the-job accidents, are not the type of
4833activity protected by Section 760.10(7) F.S. Nor do Petitioner's complaints
4843about pain or bona fide job requirements rise to the level of statutorily
4856protected "opposition to an unlawful employment practice."
486351. This employer and employee clearly had communication problems, and
4873some tasks assigned Petitioner may have been assigned to her before she was
4886informed by her doctors that she could safely do the assigned work. Petitioner
4899mistrusted her supervisors' oral communications of her doctors' orders. To that
4910minimal extent, the employer's perceptions of insubordination and reprimands for
4920insubordination through December 22, 1992, may have been unjust. They were not,
4932however, discriminatory on the basis of race.
493952. Regardless of what was actually said between Mr. Sasse and the
4951doctors, Mr. Sasse's interpretations of the doctor's written instructions was
4961reasonable and credible at each stage without any further oral interpretation.
4972Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Sasse interpreted the
4983doctors' written work restrictions based upon Petitioner's race, black.
4992Requiring a doctor's certificate as a condition for time off with pay is a
5006common and reasonable requirement of most employers. Ms. Gardner's and Ms.
5017Audrey's situations are not comparable to Petitioner's and do not demonstrate
5028racial discrimination. Mr. Gillings' testimony is not probative of anything in
5039the relevant time frame. It certainly does not support a finding of
5051discrimination, and, if anything, shows only that Respondent promoted, demoted,
5061and transferred blacks on an equal basis with other employees nine months after
5074Petitioner was terminated.
507753. All Petitioner's supervisors genuinely believed Petitioner was being
5086insubordinate in refusing to do the tasks they safely knew she could do.
5099Whether or not the supervisors' perceptions and reprimands for insubordination
5109through December 22, 1992, were minimally unjust or not is not legally
5121significant since their actions were not discriminatory. "An employer may fire
5132an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts,
5147or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory
5163reason." See, Nix v. WLCY Radio Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d. 1181 at 1187
5176(11th Cir. 1984). See also, Loeb v. Textron Inc. 1600 F.2d. 1003 (1st Cir.
51901979). It is a particularly clear application of that premise where, as here,
5203the employee has not successfully completed even a probationary period. See,
5214Baucham v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, DOAH Case No. 89-0712
5225(RO entered 11/3/89; FO entered 1/11/90 and filed 1/16/90).
523454. After December 22, 1992, there is no question at all that Petitioner
5247refused to do tasks she knew she was medically capable of doing. Her temporary
5261disability with some residual pain clearly does not meet the case law
5273definitions of "handicap," and even if it did, this employer made reasonable
5285accommodation therefor. Respondent's termination of Petitioner on January 10,
52941993 for insubordination was neither discriminatory nor unreasonable.
5302RECOMMENDATION
5303Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
5315RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order
5326dismissing the Petition for Relief.
5331RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida.
5341___________________________________
5342ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer
5348Division of Administrative Hearings
5352The De Soto Building
53561230 Apalachee Parkway
5359Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
5362(904) 488-9675
5364Filed with the Clerk of the
5370Division of Administrative Hearings
5374this 25th day of August, 1994.
5380ENDNOTE
53811/ For instance, an amendment might be possible to allege additional dates of
5394unremitting racial discrimination after the last date listed in the original
5405charge of discrimination, or alleging retaliatory termination for filing the
5415original charge of discrimination, or alleging intimidation during the
5424Commission's investigatory phase. Such amendments, however, require Commission
5432permission and are dependent upon the case-by-case circumstances and applicable
5442case law, and presumably the added allegations would have to be merely
5454supplemental allegations that could not reasonably have been made in the
5465original charge of discrimination.
5469APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-0294
5474The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S.,
5483upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF).
5492Petitioner's PFOF:
54941 Accepted only that Petitioner was hurt on the job. Respondent's
5505negligence was not proven. Covered in FOF 10.
55132 Accepted, except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative
5521material has not been utilized.
55263-7 Rejected as findings of fact and as not proven. Otherwise rejected
5538as a conclusion of law. Moreover, the issue of "medical discrimination" was
5550truncated by ruling on the motion to dismiss (See, "Preliminary Statement") and
5563no charge of retaliatory discharge was ever filed.
5571Respondent's PFOF:
55731-6 Accepted, except for date of January 16, 1993 which is contrary to
5586all testimony and only appears on Exhibit R-11 filled in after termination.
55987 Covered in FOF 40. Spelling corrected.
56058-18 Accepted, except that unnecessary, subordinate, cumulative
5612material and/or mere legal argument was not utilized. Also, anything that
5623depends exclusively upon hearsay outside of the parameters of Section
5633120.58(1)(a) F.S. has not been utilized, and spelling and gender have been
5645corrected pursuant to the record evidence.
5651COPIES FURNISHED:
5653Ms. Stephanie Luke
56561218 N.W. 6th Avenue
5660Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33311
5664William Andrews, Esquire
5667Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Crogan
5672Post Office Box 40089
5676Jacksonville, FL 32202
5679Sharon Moultry, Clerk
5682Human Relations Commission
5685325 John Knox Road
5689Building F, Suite 240
5693Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
5696Dana Baird
5698General Counsel
5700Human Relations Commission
5703325 John Knox Road
5707Building F, Suite 240
5711Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
5714NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
5720All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended
5732Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit
5746written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit
5758written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final
5770order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions
5783to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be
5795filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
![](/images/view_pdf.png)
- Date
- Proceedings
- Date: 12/12/1995
- Proceedings: Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- Date: 07/25/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Final Order Granting Petition for Relief for Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- Date: 07/20/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent Pic N` Save Proposed Recommended Order filed.
- Date: 07/15/1994
- Proceedings: CC Letter to Stephanie Luke from William H. Andrews (no enclosures) filed.
- Date: 07/05/1994
- Proceedings: Cover Letter to S. Luke from Marguerite Lockard (with enclosed money order #14238117 for $3.00 sent back) sent out.
- Date: 06/27/1994
- Proceedings: Post Hearing Order sent out.
- Date: 06/24/1994
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- Date: 06/23/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Amended Pre-Hearing Statement filed.
- Date: 06/22/1994
- Proceedings: Subpoena Duces Tecum (3); Cover Letter filed.
- Date: 06/22/1994
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Motion to Accept Telephonic Testimony; Cover Letter filed.
- Date: 06/17/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Amended Pre-Hearing Statement filed.
- Date: 06/16/1994
- Proceedings: Request Copies of Documents & Cover Letter from S. Luke (w/encl. $3.00 check for copying services) filed.
- Date: 06/16/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Amended Pre-Hearing Statement w/attached Answer filed.
- Date: 06/15/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Pre-Hearing Statement filed.
- Date: 06/09/1994
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (parties are granted until 6/17/94 to file statements)
- Date: 06/06/1994
- Proceedings: Joint Pre-Hearing Statement filed.
- Date: 06/06/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner/pleading w/no title) Reasons of Disagreement to Respondent`s Joint Pre-Hearing Statement (drafted May 11, 1994) filed.
- Date: 06/06/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to Stephanie Luke from William H. Andrews (re: exhibits) filed.
- Date: 05/31/1994
- Proceedings: Petitioner) Separate Prehearing Statement filed.
- Date: 05/25/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to SLS from S. Luke (RE: Notice of address change); Letter (response to prehearing statement) filed.
- Date: 05/25/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to EJD from S. Luke (RE: Request for Subpoenas) filed.
- Date: 05/13/1994
- Proceedings: CC: Letter to S. Luke from W. Andrews (RE: joint prehearing stipulation) filed.
- Date: 05/13/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to Stephanie Luke from William H. Andrews (no enclosures) filed.
- Date: 05/05/1994
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (Petitioner`s Motion to Request Pre-Trial Conference Denied)
- Date: 05/04/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent PIC N` Save Drug Company, Inc`s Answer to Petitioner`s Motion to Produce Documents; Motion to Request Pre-Trial Hearing Conference W/Cover Letter filed.
- Date: 05/04/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to EJD from W. Andrews (request for subpoenas) filed.
- Date: 04/29/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion to Request Pre-trial Hearing Conference filed.
- Date: 04/18/1994
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion to Produce Documents filed.
- Date: 03/22/1994
- Proceedings: Order of Continuance to Date Certain sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 6-24-94; 10:30am; Ocala)
- Date: 03/11/1994
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Motion to Continue Hearing filed.
- Date: 02/18/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to Parties of Record from EPD sent out.
- Date: 02/09/1994
- Proceedings: Letter to FL Commission on Human Relation from Stephanie Luke (re: statement) filed.
- Date: 02/08/1994
- Proceedings: Order of Prehearing Instructions sent out.
- Date: 02/08/1994
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 6/15/94; 10:30am; Ocala)
- Date: 02/07/1994
- Proceedings: Respondent Pic N` Save Drug Company, Inc`s Motion to Dismiss; Respondent Pic N` Save Drug Company, Inc`s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Petition for Relief filed.
- Date: 01/24/1994
- Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
- Date: 01/19/1994
- Proceedings: Transmittal of Petition; Charge of Discrimination; Notice of Determination: No Cause; Determination: No Cause; Petition for Relief; Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
- Date Filed:
- 01/19/1994
- Date Assignment:
- 01/24/1994
- Last Docket Entry:
- 12/12/1995
- Location:
- Ocala, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO