95-003844 Department Of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards And Training Commission vs. Mary J. Byrd
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, January 29, 1996.


View Dockets  
Summary: Pet proved fail to maint good moral char bec did'nt follow Law re: husbands marijuana on marital premises; construet poss exten circums, so less penalty

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, )

13CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS )

17AND TRAINING COMMISSION, )

21)

22Petitioner, )

24)

25vs. ) CASE NO. 95-3844

30)

31MARY J. BYRD, )

35)

36Respondent. )

38_________________________________)

39RECOMMENDED ORDER

41Pursuant to notice, this cause came on for formal hearing before P. Michael

54Ruff, duly-designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative

63Hearings, on October 19, 1995, in Perry, Florida.

71APPEARANCES

72For Petitioner: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire

79Department of Law Enforcement

83Post Office Box 1489

87Tallahassee, Florida 32302

90For Respondent: Robert J. Schramm, Esquire

96Post Office Box 29

100Perry, Florida 32347-0029

103STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

107The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent

119has violated Section 943.1395(6),(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-

12927.0011(4)(a) and (c), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to maintain the

140qualifications established in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, concerning

148good moral character.

151PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

153This cause arose upon the filing of an Administrative Complaint against the

165Respondent by the Petitioner agency on February 21, 1993. The Complaint charges

177that on or about July 29, 1992, the Respondent was guilty of knowingly and

191unlawfully possessing more than 20 grams of a controlled substance, to wit:

203cannabis. On or about March 24, 1993, the Respondent elected to request an

216administrative proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The

225case thereafter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and

236ultimately the undersigned Hearing Officer on July 27, 1995.

245The cause came on for hearing as noticed. The Petitioner adduced the

257testimony of two witnesses at hearing and had Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 admitted into

272evidence. The Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was identified but later withdrawn and not

284offered. The Respondent adduced the testimony of one witness, the Respondent

295herself, and the Respondent's Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence.

305The parties were afforded the opportunity to submit proposed findings of

316fact and conclusions of law in the form of proposed recommended orders.

328Subsequent to the hearing, the Petitioner filed a Proposed Recommended Order,

339but none has been filed by the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact

352submitted by the Petitioner are addressed herein and specifically ruled upon in

364the Appendix attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

373FINDINGS OF FACT

3761. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged under

389Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and related rules, with regulating the licensure

400status, including determination of entitlement to licensure, of law enforcement

410and correctional officers in the State of Florida. The agency is also charged

423by the Legislature with regulating and enforcing the practice standards for

434certified law enforcement officers, including correctional officers, embodied in

443Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and related rules.

4502. The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and

461Training Commission (Commission) on or about March 7, 1991. She was issued

473corrections certification number 45-90-502-11. From March of 1991 through July

48331, 1992, the Respondent was employed as a corrections officer for the Taylor

496County Sheriff's Office. She has no criminal record and no record of

508administrative discipline of any sort.

5133. During the course of her training to be a corrections officer, the

526Respondent received classroom training in the identification of controlled

535substances, including cannabis (marijuana). This training included the viewing

544of actual cannabis in the classroom but did not include training in recognizing

557it as a growing plant in the field.

5654. Charles R. "Chuck" Morgan is an employee of the Perry Lumber Company.

578On or about July 29, 1992, and until sometime in February of 1995, he was

593employed by the Taylor County Sheriff's Office. Danny Williams is an

604investigator with the Taylor County Sheriff's Office and has been employed in

616that capacity since January of 1990. Investigator Williams has had training in

628the aerial detection, and other means of identification, of marijuana. He

639participates in four to eight flights per year in aircraft searching for

651marijuana plants, essentially in rural areas of Taylor County.

6605. On July 29, 1992, Investigator Williams was the passenger in a

672helicopter, provided to the Taylor County Sheriff's Office by an unknown agency,

684participating in an aerial search for marijuana plants. During this search, he

696noticed what appeared to be marijuana plants growing in or adjacent to the

709backyard of a residence which proved to be the Respondent's residence.

720Investigator Williams, upon being landed at the airport, entered his patrol

731vehicle and drove to the residence of the Respondent and her husband, James

744Byrd.

7456. On route to that location, Investigator Williams, presumably by radio

756communication, summoned other law enforcement officers of the Taylor County

766Sheriff's Office. He was, therefore, met at the front gate of the residence

779premises in question by Captain Worsham and Sheriff Deputy Chuck Morgan and

791others. The front gate was on the portion of the premises immediately adjacent

804to the public thoroughfare by which the premises are normally entered by

816vehicles. The residence premises contained a wood-frame house on a well-

827landscaped yard of a fairly-open character with few or no trees. The rearward

840portion of the premises, analogous to the "backyard", was that portion of the

853premises most distant from the public highway (toward which the house faces).

865It is observable by an observer looking in the opposite direction or away from

879the public highway upon which the premises fronts. In this rearward portion of

892the premises, in a rearward corner of the backyard, there was a dog pen, located

907approximately 75-100 feet from the northwest corner of the rear portion of the

920house.

9217. Investigator Williams and Deputy Morgan observed an individual, who

931proved to be James Byrd, the Respondent's husband, recognized by Investigator

942Williams, standing behind the dog pen. They observed him in that location

954attempting to cut down several plants which were growing there. Deputy Morgan

966stopped Mr. Byrd from cutting any other plants and removed him from the

979immediate area. He was ultimately taken into custody that day. The plants he

992was attempting to cut down proved to be cannabis plants.

10028. Investigator Williams and Deputy Morgan observed 13 cannabis plants

1012growing in that location behind the dog pen. Most of the plants were

1025approximately 10-12 feet tall. Investigator Williams took samples from the

1035grown plants, and a laboratory analysis proved the plants to be cannabis and

1048that the samples taken totaled 27.3 grams of cannabis.

10579. The cannabis plants were in plain view from the residence. They were

1070tall enough to be observed over the top of the dog pen, which lay between the

1086back wall and back door of the residence, the site where the plants were growing

1101and immediately adjacent to it. Deputy Morgan described the area where the

1113cannabis was located as being in a clear, open area with grass but no high weeds

1129which would conceal the cannabis from the plain view from the rear portion of

1143the residence.

114510. Investigator Williams has received some training in the growth rate of

1157cannabis plants so that he could make a somewhat educated estimate of the age of

1172the plants found behind the dog pen. He estimates that they could have grown to

1187a height of 10-12 feet in approximately 60 days, depending upon climatic

1199conditions, care and maintenance, and the amount of fertilization they received.

121011. The mature plants, as well as the small plants, discovered growing

1222adjacent to the dog pen, would in Investigator Williams' experience, produce

1233something in excess of 13 pounds of cannabis leaf.

124212. Investigator Williams and Deputy Morgan also observed a bucket and

1253flowerpot in the backyard containing several smaller cannabis plants. These

1263containers and plants were in plain sight from the rear portion of the

1276residence.

127713. Deputy Morgan escorted Mr. Byrd to the residence and obtained his

1289consent to search it for cannabis. Deputy Morgan, with Mr. Byrd's cooperation,

1301discovered a partially-smoked cannabis cigarette in a desk drawer in the family

1313room of the residence and also found rolling papers and marijuana-smoking

1324paraphernalia in the desk, as well.

133014. Deputy Morgan then proceeded to the bedroom shared by Mr. Byrd and his

1344wife, the Respondent. In the bedroom closet, he located approximately one-half

1355pound of marijuana in a grocery bag on the floor in the middle of the closet.

1371In the closet were both male and female clothing, with each spouse having a

1385designated side of the closet for their personal clothing and other items. The

1398middle of the closet contained a filing cabinet, which was for the Respondent's

1411use. A laboratory analysis determined that the bag found on the closet floor

1424contained approximately 118 grams of cannabis.

143015. Mr. Byrd admitted to Investigator Williams and Deputy Morgan that the

1442cannabis found belonged to him and that smoking cannabis was a bad habit he

1456acquired during his service in the Vietnam War. He stated to them that he grew

1471the cannabis for personal consumption and was not engaged in the sale or

1484distribution of it. He stated that he smoked cannabis but that his wife, the

1498Respondent, did not. He never stated to law enforcement officers that the

1510Respondent had knowledge of the cannabis in the residence and on the surrounding

1523curtilage.

152416. The Respondent was not present at the residence that day when the

1537officers seized the cannabis and arrested Mr. Byrd. She was at Moody Air Force

1551Base in Valdosta, Georgia, at the time and only learned of her husband's arrest

1565and the incident when she returned late that afternoon. She learned of it from

1579her father or daughter, who also resided on the premises. There is a separate

1593mobile-home residence on the same parcel of property as the house in which the

1607Respondent and her husband reside. Although the officers, on the day in

1619question, interviewed Mr. Moore, the Respondent's father, who resided in the

1630mobile home, they never questioned the Respondent and charged no one other than

1643James Byrd.

164517. The Respondent was terminated from her position with the sheriff's

1656office on approximately July 31, 1992 because of the above-described incident.

1667After her termination from her job with the sheriff's office, the charges

1679against her husband, James Byrd, were "nol prossed".

168818. The Respondent and Mr. Byrd have been married for approximately 35

1700years. They have resided in Taylor County since November 1, 1979 and have

1713resided in the same residence where the cannabis was found and shared the

1726bedroom and closet where some of it was found since that time, including on and

1741around the date in question. The Respondent was not a record title holder of

1755the premises on which the cannabis was found but considered herself as having a

1769practical ownership interest in the residence.

177519. Despite his statement to law enforcement authorities that he had had

1787the habit of smoking cannabis since returning from the Vietnam War, the

1799Respondent denied knowledge of her husband's cannabis habit. Although they had

1810been married for 35 years and resided in the same residence, including at the

1824times when the marijuana in question was placed in the residence and grown in

1838the backyard of the residence, the Respondent maintains that she had no

1850knowledge of its presence on the premises. She maintains that she had no

1863knowledge of her husband's cultivation and use of marijuana.

187220. Neither the Respondent's husband nor any other witness testified in

1883corroboration of the Respondent's denial of knowledge of the presence of

1894cannabis on the subject premises. Although, as the Respondent stated, Mr. Byrd

1906commonly cared for the dogs which are normally kept in the dog pen, and the

1921Respondent seldom went to that vicinity of the backyard, the marijuana plants

1933growing adjacent to the dog pen were in plain view from the rear portion of the

1949house itself.

195121. The Respondent's testimony is the sole testimony that is exculpatory.

1962She is an "interested witness" testifying on her own behalf, in a proceeding

1975where she can potentially lose the valuable right to practice her livelihood.

1987In consideration of the totality of the evidentiary circumstances and the

1998demeanor of the witnesses, it is found that, indeed, she knew of the presence of

2013the growing marijuana on the premises and the marijuana which was found inside

2026the residence. It simply strains credulity beyond acceptance that she could

2037live with her husband in the same residence, in the same bedroom and use the

2052same closet for a substantial period of years and not know of the marijuana

2066smoking habit he freely admitted to and his activities involved in growing

2078marijuana in plain sight on their marital premises.

208622. In addition to the Respondent having no record of any criminal or

2099administrative offense, the above-found misconduct was not facilitated by the

2109Respondent's official authority nor did it occur while she was performing her

2121duties. There was no damage or danger caused to others by her conduct. The

2135Respondent gained no pecuniary benefit from the misconduct and its effects,

2146through penalties, can obviously damage her livelihood, which is already the

2157case. Finally, her employing agency has already imposed the discipline of

2168termination approximately three and one-half years ago. Rule 11B-27.005(6)(a-

2177v), Florida Administrative Code.

2181CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

218423. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the

2194subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida

2205Statutes.

220624. Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, establishes the minimum

2214qualifications for certification as a law enforcement officer in Florida, as

2225pertinent hereto, at Subsection (7):

2230(7) Have a good moral character as determined

2238by a background investigation and the procedures

2245established by the commission.

224925. Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, establishes the penalties which

2258may be imposed against an officer for violating the "good moral character"

2270standard embodied in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. That paragraph

2279provides that upon a finding by the Commission that a certified officer has not

2293maintained good moral character, as defined in rules adopted by the Commission,

2305establishing statewide standards, then an order may be entered imposing the

2316penalties of revocation, or suspension for a period not to exceed two years, or

2330placement on probationary status subject to terms and conditions imposed by the

2342Commission.

234326. Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides that any of

2353the penalties enumerated in Subsection 943.1395(6) or (7), Florida Statutes, may

2364be imposed for a certified officer's failure to maintain good moral character.

"2376Good moral character" is defined as the perpetration of an act which would

2389constitute any felony offense, whether criminally prosecuted or not, or the

2400perpetration by the officer of an act which would constitute certain

2411misdemeanors or criminal offenses, whether criminally prosecuted or not,

2420enumerated in Subparagraph (b) of this rule, including Sections 893.13(1)(a)3.,

2430(1)(d)3., (1)(g), (2)(a)3., (3), (5)(c), (6)(b), (7)(b), which relate to

2440possession of a controlled substance. Thus, the rule defines failure to

2451maintain good moral character in terms of the possession of a controlled

2463substance, as defined in Section 893.13, as well as Rule 11B-27.00225, Florida

2475Administrative Code. Specifically, Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes,

2482prohibits the unlawful possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis and states

2495that any person in violation of Section 893.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes, commits

2506a felony of the third degree. Thus, the possession of more than 20 grams of

2521cannabis in the subject situation, which was proven, constitutes an act which

2533would be a felony of the third degree, whether or not it is prosecuted, as

2548envisioned in the definition of "good moral character" in the above Rule 11B-

256127.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code.

256527. In the case of Zemour, Inc. v. Division of Beverage, 347 So.2d 1102

2579(Fla. 1st DCA 1977), a beverage-license applicant was denied a license after a

2592finding that the owner of the establishment was not of good moral character.

2605The definition of moral character enunciated by the court is significant and

2617applicable to this case:

2621Moral character as used in this statute, means

2629not only the ability to distinguish between

2636right and wrong, but the character to observe

2644the difference; the observance of the rules of

2652right conduct, and conduct which indicates and

2659establishes the quality generally acceptable

2664to the populace for positions of trust and

2672confidence.

267328. Similarly, in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So.2d

2685454 (Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court of Florida stated:

2694In our view a finding of a lack of 'good moral

2705character' should not be restricted to those

2712acts that reflect moral turpitude. A more

2719appropriate definition of the phrase requires

2725an inclusion of acts and conduct which would

2733cause a reasonable man to have substantial

2740doubts about an individual's honesty,

2745fairness, and respect for the rights of

2752others and for the laws of the state and nation.

2762See also White v. Beary, 237 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).

277429. In Brown v. State, 412 So.2d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), in facts similar

2789to the instant case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction

2802of a defendant who was convicted of possession of more than five grams of

2816marijuana. The Court stated the general rule concerning the necessary proof of

2828knowledge of a defendant, stating:

2833If the area in which a contraband substance

2841is found is within the exclusive possession

2848of the accused, his knowledge of its presence,

2856and his ability to maintain control over it,

2864may be inferred. If the area is only in his

2874joint possession, his knowledge of the pre-

2881sence of the contraband on the premises and

2889his ability to maintain control over it will

2897not be inferred but must be established by

2905other proof. This proof may consist of

2912circumstantial evidence from which a jury

2918might properly infer that the accused had

2925knowledge of the presence of the contraband

2932and an ability to control it.

293830. In Brown, a court determined that a jury could reasonably infer that

2951the defendant had dominion and control over the controlled substances where the

2963defendant was the owner of the house and that the defendant lived literally in

2977the midst of all of the seized drugs and paraphernalia.

298731. The Florida Supreme Court, in affirming Brown, went further in

2998determining that the trier of fact could reasonably determine constructive

3008possession. The Court stated:

3012In the instant case the knowledge element

3019is met because the contraband was in plain

3027view in common areas throughout the house.

3034The dominion and control element is met be-

3042cause Brown, as resident owner of his home,

3050had control over the common areas. Therefore,

3057the elements of knowledge and control have

3064been satisfied, and, as the district court

3071found, the facts presented at trial were

3078sufficient to create a jury question as to

3086constructive possession.

308832. In the instant situation, although the Respondent was not present when

3100the contraband was found, the cannabis plants found in the backyard had clearly

3113been there at least two months, judging from the size they had obtained. It is

3128reasonable to infer that they were there at the same time as the Respondent,

3142since she was a permanent inhabitant of the premises and had only left the

3156premises that morning.

315933. The evidence presented by the Respondent in the form of her own

3172testimony that she had no knowledge of the presence of cannabis is wholly

3185insufficient to advance her case in that respect. The Respondent is facing the

3198revocation of her certificate, which is the valuable right to practice her

3210livelihood. This revocation would preclude her from being employed within the

3221field permanently. This raises such an interest in the outcome of the instant

3234action as to bring into issue the credibility of the Respondent as a witness

3248when she testifies in this uncorroborated manner, in the face of contrary

3260circumstantial evidence. It is noteworthy that no other person was advanced to

3272testify in corroboration of her lack of knowledge of the presence of the

3285contraband and lack of knowledge of her husband's use of it. Although her

3298husband stated to law enforcement officers that on the date of his arrest, the

3312substance in question was his and that his wife did not use it, he did not

3328testify at the hearing that she had no knowledge of the existence of the

3342substance on the premises, including in her own closet. See, Colbert v. State,

3355320 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Pittman v. State, 41 So. 385 (Fla. 1906).

337034. Here, the evidence shows, in a clear and convincing way, that the

3383Respondent was in knowing, actual or constructive possession of more than 20

3395grams of cannabis. The evidence and above findings showed that the cannabis

3407plants were discovered approximately 75-100 feet from the Respondent's residence

3417in plain view, towering 12 feet over a dog pen enclosing the Respondent's

3430husband's hunting dogs. There were also two containers containing approximately

344023 smaller plants located in the middle of the yard, closer to the house, in

3455plain view. There was a large quantity of cannabis found in a paper bag in the

3471Respondent's closet which she shared with her husband, on the floor, in the

3484middle of the closet, next to her own file cabinet. There were rolling papers,

3498clippers, and partially-smoked cannabis cigarettes in the desk drawer found in

3509the family room.

351235. The Respondent's husband admitted to the law enforcement officers at

3523the scene that he owned the cannabis plants and the other contraband and

3536cultivated them for his personal use. He stated that he had been using the

3550substance since he returned from the Vietnam War. He was married to the

3563Respondent for all that period of time, approximately 35 years, and had lived in

3577the same home with her for that period of time, including their present

3590residence since 1979. The Respondent had received some training in the

3601identification of controlled substances, including cannabis, although she may

3610not have actually had training in recognizing it growing in the field. However,

3623some of it was found in her closet in the type of harvested form which she

3639clearly had been shown in her training course. It is reasonable under these

3652circumstances to conclude that she had knowledge of the presence of the cannabis

3665on the premises she shared jointly with her husband and had knowledge of his use

3680of it. She "literally lived in the midst of it all". Brown, supra. There is

3696sufficient evidence to infer that the Respondent had dominion and control over

3708the jointly-occupied premises, as well.

371336. Accordingly, clear and convincing has been advanced which establishes

3723that the Respondent committed misconduct which, under the cited statutes, the

3734applicable case law and the above-cited administrative rules, establishes

3743conduct within the definition of lack of good moral character. The position of

3756a law enforcement officer, including correction officer, is one of great public

3768trust. There is no more basic public expectation than that those who are

3781charged with enforcing and upholding the law must themselves obey the law. City

3794of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

380637. The Respondent's misconduct is of a serious nature. Pursuant to

3817Section 11B-27.005(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the penalty guideline for

3826this offense can include revocation. Because of her previously unblemished

3836record and her understandable, if inexcusable, reluctance to report her husband

3847of 35 years, as well as the mitigating factors found in paragraph 22 above, some

3862mitigation of penalty is warranted.

3867RECOMMENDATION

3868Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the

3879evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is

3892RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good

3904moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that

3915her certification be suspended for one year, with one additional year of

3927probation, as well as such career development training or re-training as the

3939Commission shall deem appropriate.

3943DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.

3955___________________________________

3956P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer

3961Division of Administrative Hearings

3965The DeSoto Building

39681230 Apalachee Parkway

3971Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

3974(904) 488-9675

3976Filed with the Clerk of the

3982Division of Administrative Hearings

3986this 29th day of January, 1996.

3992APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3844

3999Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact

40041-20. Accepted.

4006COPIES FURNISHED:

4008Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire

4013Department of Law Enforcement

4017Post Office Box 1489

4021Tallahassee, Florida 32302

4024Robert J. Schramm, Esquire

4028Post Office Box 29

4032Perry, Florida 32347-0029

4035A. Leon Lowry, II, Director

4040Department of Law Enforcement

4044Division of Criminal Justice Standards

4049and Training Commission

4052P. O. Box 1489

4056Tallahassee, Florida 32302

4059Michael Ramage, General Counsel

4063Department of Law Enforcement

4067P. O. Box 1489

4071Tallahassee, Florida 32302

4074NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

4080All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended

4092Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit

4106written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit

4118written exceptions. You Should contact the agency that will issue the final

4130order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions

4143to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be

4155filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

4168=================================================================

4169AGENCY FINAL ORDER

4172=================================================================

4173STATE OF FLORIDA

4176CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING

4181COMMISSION

4182CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

4185AND TRAINING COMMISSION,

4188Petitioner,

4189vs. CASE NUMBER: C-2496

4193DOAH NUMBER: 95-3844

4196MARY J. BYRD,

4199Certificate No.: 37015

4202Respondent.

4203___________________________/

4204FINAL ORDER

4206This matter came before the Criminal Justice Standards and Training

4216Commission (the Commission) at a public meeting on April 19, 1996, at Altamonte

4229Springs, Florida. It was Alleged by Administrative Complaint that the

4239Respondent had violated specified sections of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and

4250Chapter 11B-27, Florida Administrative Code. In accordance with  1 2 0 . 5 7 ( 1 ) ,

4268Florida Statutes, a formal hearing was held on this matter, and a Recommended

4281Order was submitted by a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative

4293Hearings (DOAH) to the Commission for consideration. Petitioner filed

4302exceptions to the Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached and

4314incorporated herein by reference.

4318The Commission has reviewed the Administrative Complaint, the Recommended

4327Order, the exceptions filed by Petitioner, the documentary evidence introduced

4337at the formal hearing, and other pertinent documents in the case file; has heard

4351arguments of counsel; and is otherwise fully advised in the matter. The

4363Commission finds as follows:

4367I. Standards for Review

4371Under s 120.57(1)(b)10, Florida Statutes, the Commission may reject or

4381modify the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law and interpretations of

4391administrative rules in the Recommended Order. The Commission, however, may not

4402reject or modify the Hearing Officer's findings of fact unless the Commission

4414determines from a review of the complete record that 1) those findings of fact

4428were not based on competent substantial evidence or 2) the proceedings on which

4441the findings of fact were based did not comply with the essential requirements

4454of the law.

4457The Florida Supreme Court, in De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912, 916

4470(Fla. 1957), defined "competent substantial evidence" to be evidence that is

"4481sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as

4493adequate to support the conclusion reached.

4499Additionally, the Commission may not reweigh the evidence, resolve

4508conflicts in the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses or otherwise

4519interpret the evidence anew simply to fit its desired conclusion. Heifetz v.

4531Department of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

4542Nor may the Commission reduce or increase the recommended penalty in the

4554Recommended Order without first reviewing the complete record. s

4563120.57(1)(b)10, Florida Statutes.

4566II. Rulings on Exceptions

45701. The Commission accepts Petitioner's first exception and rejects the

4580Hearing Officer's mixed question of fact and law presented in paragraph 22 of

4593the Recommended Order. The findings and conclusions in this paragraph do not

4605address the primary factual dispute raised in this proceeding, that is, whether

4617the Respondent was in actual or constructive possession of the marijuana plants

4629found growing on her and her husband's homestead property. Rather, paragraph 22

4641addresses the Hearing Officer's recommended penalty, which the Commission

4650rejects under the authority of Criminal Justice Standards and Training

4660Commission v. Bradley, 596 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1992).

46682. Likewise, the Commission accepts Petitioner's second exception and

4677rejects the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law in paragraph 37 as well as the

4691Hearing Officer's recommended penalty.

4695III. Findings of Fact

4699The Hearing Officer's findings of fact in paragraphs 1-21 of the

4710Recommended Order are approved, adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

4720IV. Conclusions of Law

4724The Hearing Officer's conclusions of law in paragraphs 23-36 of the

4735Recommended Order are approved, adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

4745Regarding the appropriate penalty for the Respondent, the Commission

4754emphasizes that its penalty guidelines in 1 1B-27.005(5), F.A.C., call for a

4766revocation of an officer's criminal justice certification when that officer has

4777committed the act of illegal possession of a controlled substance -- the offense

4790at issue in this matter. For many years now, the Commission has taken a "zero-

4805tolerance" position regarding those officers who violate the controlled

4814substances laws in chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Officers who admit or who are

4827found to have violated the controlled substances laws have uniformly had their

4839criminal justice certifications revoked.

4843The Commission agrees with Petitioner that the following aggravating

4852circumstances outweigh those mitigating circumstances found by the Hearing

4861Officer: 1) the severity of the Respondent's misconduct, 2) the danger to the

4874public caused by Respondent's conduct and 3) the deterrent effect to other

4886criminal justice officers of maintaining the Commission's "zero- tolerance"

4895policy with regard to illegal use or abuse of controlled substances. See 1 1B-

490927.005(6), F.A.C.

4911The Commission, therefore, chooses to substitute its collective

4919professional judgment regarding the severity of the Respondent's misconduct and

4929what constitutes an appropriate penalty for the Hearing Officer's recommended

4939penalty in the Recommended Order. Criminal Justice Standards and Training

4949Commission v. Bradley, 596 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1992). The Commission agrees with

4961Petitioner that the penalty called for in the penalty guidelines -- revocation

4973of certification -- is indeed the appropriate penalty in this matter. See 1 1B-

498727.005(5), F.A.C.

4989It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Respondent's above-referenced

4999criminal justice certification is hereby REVOKED.

5005This Final Order will become effective upon filing with the Clerk of the

5018Department of Law Enforcement.

5022SO ORDERED this 13th day of June,1996.

5030CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

5033AND TRAINING COMMISSION

5036_________________________

5037WILLIAM A. LIQUORI

5040CHAIRMAN

5041NOTICE

5042THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION. ANY PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED

5054BY THIS ORDER HAS THE RIGHT TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SECTION 120.68,

5067FLORIDA STATUTES, BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE CLERK OF THE

5083DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, P.O. BOX 1489, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302-1489,

5093AND BY FILING A SECOND COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE APPROPRIATE

5107DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 9. 110, FLORIDA RULES OF

5120APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE

5134DATE THIS ORDER IS RENDERED.

5139CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5142I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was

5155furnished to Robert J. Schrainm. Esquire, P.O. Box 29 Perry, Florida 32347 by

5168U.S. Mail on or before 5:00 P.M., this 13th day of June, 1996.

5181___________________

5182Brenda S. Miller

5185cc: Taylor County Sheriff's Office

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
PDF
Date
Proceedings
Date: 06/17/1996
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/13/1996
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 01/29/1996
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 01/29/1996
Proceedings: Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 10/19/95.
Date: 11/02/1995
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Date: 10/19/1995
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
Date: 09/19/1995
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 10/19/95; 10:30am; Perry)
Date: 08/08/1995
Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
Date: 08/01/1995
Proceedings: Agency referral letter; Administrative Complaint; Election of Rights filed.

Case Information

Judge:
P. MICHAEL RUFF
Date Filed:
08/01/1995
Date Assignment:
08/08/1995
Last Docket Entry:
06/17/1996
Location:
Perry, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN PART OR MODIFIED
 

Related DOAH Cases(s) (1):

Related Florida Statute(s) (6):

Related Florida Rule(s) (3):