95-001179RX
John&Apos;S Island Club, Inc. vs.
Department Of Revenue
Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Thursday, June 15, 1995.
DOAH Final Order on Thursday, June 15, 1995.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8JOHN'S ISLAND CLUB, INC., )
13)
14Petitioner, )
16)
17vs. ) CASE NO. 95-1179RX
22)
23DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )
27)
28Respondent. )
30__________________________)
31FINAL ORDER
33Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of
45Administrative Hearings, by its assigned Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander,
55on April 10, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida.
62APPEARANCES
63For Petitioner: Richard A. Lotspeich, Esquire
69Post Office Box 271
73Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0271
76For Respondent: James F. McAuley, Esquire
82Lisa M. Raleigh, Esquire
86Department of Legal Affairs
90The Capitol, Tax Section
94Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
97STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
101The issue is whether existing Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b., Florida
109Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority
119as alleged by petitioner.
123PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
125This case began on March 10, 1995, when petitioner, John's Island Club,
137Inc., filed a petition challenging the validity of Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b.,
147Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by respondent, Department of
157Revenue. As grounds, petitioner generally alleged that the rule constitutes an
168invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the agency exceeded
178its rulemaking authority and the rule conflicts with the law implemented. After
190being reviewed for legal sufficiency, the petition was assigned to the
201undersigned Hearing Officer on March 14, 1995.
208By notice of hearing dated March 15, 1995, the final hearing was scheduled
221on April 10, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. At final hearing, petitioner
232presented the testimony of Wayne Miller, its business manager; Andrea Thurn, a
244certified public accountant and accepted as an expert in tax accounting; Melton
256H. McKown, III, a Department of Revenue tax audit specialist supervisor; and
268Kathy Henley, a Department of Revenue assistant bureau chief in the division of
281ad valorem tax. Also, it offered petitioner's exhibits 1-8. All exhibits were
293received in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Melton H. McKown,
304III, and Kathy Henley. Also, it offered respondent's exhibit 1 which was
316received in evidence.
319The transcript of hearing was filed on April 14, 1995. Proposed findings
331of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the parties on May 17, 1995. A
347ruling on each proposed findings has been made in the Appendix attached to this
361Final Order.
363FINDINGS OF FACT
366Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are
378determined:
379A. Background
3811. Petitioner, John's Island Club, Inc. (petitioner or the club), is a
393not-for-profit corporation which owns and operates a private country club
403facility in the John's Island residential development in Indian River County,
414Florida. It provides a variety of recreational facilities to its members.
425Among the amenities are three golf courses, nineteen tennis courts, a tennis
437building, a beach club, a club house, a swimming pool, and dining facilities.
4502. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is a statutorily created
460agency charged with the administration of the state revenue laws, including
471Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated thereunder. As a result of
483an amendment made in 1991 to Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, DOR is
495authorized by law to impose an admissions tax on "dues and fees" paid to private
510membership clubs providing recreational facilities. As a private membership
519club, petitioner is subject to this tax.
5263. Beginning on July 1, 1994, petitioner made an assessment on each member
539to raise capital for the purpose of repairing and replacing many of its physical
553facilities. During the six month period ending December 31, 1994, $10,441,897
566was collected from the members and made available to the club. Rule 12A-
5791.005(d)1.b., Florida Administrative Code, which was adopted by DOR in December
5901991 to implement the admissions tax on dues and fees, imposes a tax on "(a)ny
605periodic assessment (additional paid-in capital) required to be paid by members
616of an equity or non-equity club for capital improvements." Under the authority
628of that rule, DOR required that petitioner pay the applicable sales tax on the
642assessment collected through December 31, 1994, or $730,932.79, and that it
654continue to pay the tax as other similar assessments are made in the future.
6684. Claiming that the rule exceeds DOR's grant of rulemaking authority, and
680it modifies, enlarges, and contravenes the law implemented, petitioner filed a
691petition for administrative determination of invalidity of existing rule. DOR
701denies all allegations and asks that the validity of its rule be upheld.
714B. The Club and the Assessment
720a. The composition of the club
7265. The club began operation in 1969 but was purchased by its members in
7401986. It is an equity private membership club but issues no stock.
7526. The club has two types of memberships: golf and sports social.
764Currently, the cost of a golf equity membership is $85,000 while the cost of a
780sports social membership is $30,000. After payment of these fees, the member
793receives a membership certificate, which represents his or her equity ownership
804interest in the club. At the present time, there are 1125 golf memberships and
818257 sports social memberships. Of the 1125 golf memberships, the original
829developer still owns 67.
8337. In addition to having to purchase a membership, members must also pay
846annual dues. A golf member pays $4,875 in annual dues while a sports social
861member pays $2,760 in annual dues. A sales tax is also collected on these dues.
877The dues are used to cover operating expenses such as insurance, administrative
889costs, staff salaries, and maintenance costs. In addition, members pay fees for
901additional services such as golf cart use, golf bag storage, locker room use,
914and golf and tennis lessons.
9198. When a member decides to resign or retire from the club, he or she may
935resell the membership to the club (but not a third party) and receive the
949greater of (a) the initial amount paid by the retiring member, or (b) 80 percent
964of the current membership cost (with the remaining 20 percent retained by the
977club in a separate capital improvement account).
984b. The assessment
9879. In 1992, the club began studying the feasibility of repairing and
999replacing many of its physical facilities. The total cost of the proposed work
1012was set at $16,372,000. By majority vote taken in the spring of 1994, the
1028members decided to raise capital for the work by imposing a capital assessment
1041on each current member. It was agreed that the capital contribution would be
1054$12,000 from each golf member and $11,150 from each sports social member.
1068However, the payment of the capital contribution was not intended to, and did
1081not result in any, decrease in the dues which members were required to pay for
1096the use of the club's facilities. A failure to pay the assessment would result
1110in suspension from the club.
111510. Three different options were made available to the members for the
1127manner of payment of the capital contribution. The options included (a) a
1139single payment, (b) payment over a three-year period, or (c) payment of interest
1152only until such time as the member either sold the membership or left the club.
1167After making payment in full, the member would be issued a certificate of
1180capital contribution. It is noted that the developer was required to pay the
1193capital contribution for his 67 golf memberships. Further, any person joining
1204the club after the imposition of the assessment would likewise be required to
1217pay the assessment.
122011. Beginning in July 1994, the club began collecting the capital
1231contribution from its members. From July through December 1994, some
1241$10,441,897 was collected. A total sales tax of $730,932.79 has been paid on
1257those collections. Shortly thereafter, petitioner opted to file this rule
1267challenge.
1268C. The Rule and its Origin
127412. Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b. provides as follows:
1280(d)1. Effective July 1, 1991, the following
1287fees paid to private clubs or membership clubs
1295as a condition precedent to, in conjunction
1302with, or for the use of the club's recreational
1311or physical fitness facilities are subject to
1318tax.
1319* * *
1322b. Any periodic assessments (additional paid in
1329capital) required to be paid by members of an
1338equity or non equity club for capital improvements
1346or other operating costs, unless the periodic
1353assessment meets the criteria of a refundable
1360deposit as provided in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below.
1367* * *
1370Under the terms of the rule, the capital contri-
1379bution assessed by the club does not qualify as
1388a refundable deposit. This is because any
1395difference between the amount collected by the
1402club upon the sale of a membership to a new member,
1413and the amount which was paid to the retiring
1422member, is retained by the club.
142813. Because Rule 12A-1.005, Florida Administrative Code, covers a wide
1438array of items subject to taxation, the DOR cites Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2),
1450and 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the
1461rule, and Sections 212.02(1), 212.031, 212.04, 212.08(6) and (7), 240.533(4)(c),
1471and 616.260, Florida Statutes, as the law implemented. There is no dispute
1483between the parties, however, that in adopting sub-subparagraph 1.b., which
1493contains the challenged language, the agency was relying principally on
1503Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. That
1513subsection defines the term "admissions" for sales tax purposes. Although the
1524parties did not specifically say so, DOR relies on Section 212.17(6), Florida
1536Statutes, as its source of authority for adopting the rule. That subsection
1548authorizes DOR to "make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations
1559not inconsistent with this chapter . . . for the enforcement of the provisions
1573of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder."
158214. For the purpose of assisting DOR in administering the Florida Revenue
1594Act of 1949, which imposes a sales and use tax on various transactions, Section
1608212.02, Florida Statutes, provides definitions of various terms used in the
1619chapter, including the term "admissions." Prior to the 1991 legislative
1629session, subsection 212.02(1) read in pertinent part as follows:
1638(1) The term "admissions" means and includes
1645. . . all dues . . . paid to private clubs and
1658membership clubs providing recreational or
1663physical fitness facilities, including, but not
1669limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting,
1675boating, athletic, exercise, and fitness facilities.
168115. During the 1991 legislative session, the definition of the term
"1692admissions" was expanded by the addition of the following underscored language:
1703(1) The term "admissions" means and includes
1710. . . all dues and fees . . . paid to private
1723clubs and membership clubs providing recreational
1729or physical fitness facilities, including, but
1735not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting,
1742boating, athletic, excercise, and fitness
1747facilities.
1748Thus, the legislature added the term "fees" to the term "dues" for those amounts
"1762paid to any private clubs and membership clubs" which would be subject to the
1776admissions tax.
177816. Prior to the above change in substantive law, rule 12A-1.005(5), as it
1791then existed, provided that dues paid to athletic clubs which provided
1802recreational facilities were taxable. However, subparagraph (5)(c) of the rule
1812also provided that
1815(c) Capital contributions or assessments to an
1822organization by its members are not taxable as
1830charges for admissions when they are in the
1838nature of payments made by the member of his
1847or her share of capital costs, not charges
1855for admission to use the organization's
1861recreational or physical fitness facilities
1866or equipment, and when they are clearly shown
1874as capital contributions on the organization's
1880records. Contributions and assessments will
1885be considered taxable when their payment results
1892in a decrease in periodic dues or user fees
1901required of the payor to use the organization's
1909recreational or physical fitness facilities or
1915equipment.
1916Therefore, capital contributions were not taxable unless they resulted in
1926decreased dues. That is to say, if a club levied an assessment on members and
1941concurrently lowered its monthly dues, the assessment would be deemed to be
1953taxable and in contravention of the rule. Thus, the effect of the rule was to
1968prevent a club from renaming "dues" as "capital contributions" or "assessments"
1979in order to avoid paying a tax on the dues.
198917. After the change in substantive law, the DOR staff began preparing
2001numerous drafts of an amendment to its rule to comply with the new statutory
2015language. At one stage of the drafting process, a DOR staffer recommended that,
2028because the legislature had not provided a definition of the term "fee," the DOR
2042should adopt a rule which provided that capital contributions be "not taxable if
2055assessed under an equitable membership."
206018. Relying on what it says is the legislative intent, the DOR eventually
2073proposed, and later adopted, the rule in its present form. In doing so, the DOR
2088relied upon the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees" which
2099are found in certain legislative history documents pertaining to the new
2110legislation.
2111D. Legislative History of the Law Implemented
211819. Although a number of bills related to the subject of a sales tax on
2133admissions, the bill enacted into law was identified as Committee Substitute for
2145House Bill 2523 (CS/HB 2523). The legislative history of the various bills
2157relating to this subject has been received in evidence and considered by the
2170undersigned.
217120. In early 1991, the House and Senate considered bills which addressed
2183amendments to the sales tax on admissions. The first time the issue was
2196addressed was at a meeting on February 21, 1991, of the Subcommittee on Sales
2210Tax of the House Committee on Finance and Taxation. The discussion at the
2223meeting indicated that the intent of the bill was to close a loophole that
2237allowed physical fitness facilities to change their pricing structure to charge
2248a higher initiation fee, which was not taxable, and thereby reduce their monthly
2261dues, which were taxable, so as to reduce the revenue below that originally
2274anticipated by this tax on admissions.
228021. This is corroborated by the bill analysis of the proposed committee
2292bill that was offered, PCB FT 91-3A, which summarized the problem and solution
2305as follows:
2307Section 212.02(1), F. S. was amended during
2314the 1990 Legislative Session to include in
2321the definition of admissions those "dues"
2327of "membership clubs" providing "physical
2332fitness" facilities. Some clubs have attempted
2338to avoid the tax (on dues) by shifting a
2347substantial portion of the members' payments
2353from "dues" to "initiation fees."
2358Section 212.02(1), F. S., is amended to include
"2366fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of
2375admissions. All fees, including initiation fees
2381and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs
2388and membership clubs providing recreational or
2394physical fitness facilities would be subject to
2401the sales tax on admissions.
240622. It is unclear, but likely, that PCB FT 91-3A became House Bill 2417
2420(HB 2417). The bill analysis and economic impact statement on HB 2417, which
2433was prepared by the House Committee on Appropriations, contained identical
2443language to that in the bill analysis on PCB FT 91-3A.
245423. At the same time, the Senate was considering Senate Bill 1128, which
2467later became Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1128 (CS/SB 1128). On March
247914, 1991, a staff analysis and economic impact statement on CS/SB 1128 was
2492prepared by the Senate Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. It provided
2504that:
2505Section 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines
"2510admissions" for sales and use tax purposes.
2517Monthly fees of clubs with major facilities
2524such as tennis courts, a swimming pool or a
2533golf course have always been subject to the
2541sales tax. During the 1990 Legislative Session
2548this statute was amended to include dues on
2556membership clubs providing physical fitness
2561facilities, and not having these other major
2568facilities.
2569According to the DOR, such clubs have attempted
2577to avoid payment of this tax by shifting a
2586substantial portion of the members payments
2592from dues to initiation fees which are not taxed.
2601Accordingly, the purpose of the proposed statutory
2608amendment was "to include initiation fees as well
2616as dues in the definition of admissions."
262324. HB 2417 was passed by the House on April 17, 1991, and was sent to the
2640Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims.
2653HB 2417 died in that Committee. CS/SB 1128 was passed by the Senate on April 4,
26691991, and was sent to the House, where it died in messages.
268125. A separate bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523, which
2692addressed similar issues to those addressed in HB 2417 and CS/SB 1128, was
2705passed by the House on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the Senate where it was
2722passed with amendments. The Bill was then returned to the House where further
2735amendments were adopted. The Bill was again sent to the Senate with a request
2749for the Senate to concur with the House amendments. The Senate refused to
2762concur and the Bill was sent to a conference committee.
277226. The conference committee on finance and taxation met on April 19,
27841991. The entirety of the discussion of the committee on this issue is as
2798follows:
2799Senator Jenne: The - - going down to number 21,
2809admissions, initiation fees. The House includes
2815capitalization fees.
2817Representative Abrams: Which is this?
2822Mr. Weiss: The Senate bill just states initiation
2830fees are additionally included. The House bill,
2837I believe, says that it's just all fees, which
2846would include whether they called them initiation
2853fees or capital facility fees or whatever.
2860Representative Abrams: Because we are using
2866something other than initiation - -
2872Mr. Weiss: It's a fee that is going to be included.
2883Representative Abrams: Yes, they were using - -
2891they were breaking down categories of fees to
2899avoid the tax, I think is what the deal was there.
2910That gets us how much?
2915Senator Jenne: Okay, well, it doesn't matter,
2922because you can do it.
2927Representative Abrams: Okay, good.
2931Although the terms "capital facility fees" and "capitalization fees" were used
2942during the discussion, contrary to DOR's assertion, it is far from clear that
2955the intent of the amendment was to make taxable all capital contributions and
2968assessments paid by members of private clubs providing recreational facilities.
2978When placed in context with the prior debate before the committees and their
2991staff analyses, it is much more likely that the intent was to close a loophole
3006then used by physical fitness clubs who were renaming dues as fees in order to
3021avoid taxes.
302327. The report of the conference committee was received by both houses on
3036April 30, and CS/HB 2523 was passed by both houses the same day. The conference
3051committee report for the bill contains only the following language describing
3062the sales tax on admissions/initiation fees:
3068Includes all recreational or physical fitness
3074facility fees in the definition as admissions.
3081The official conference committee report contains no reference to the terms
"3092capitalization fees" or "capital facility fees." Neither does it make
3102reference to the terms "assessment" or "paid in capital," which are the terms
3115used by DOR in its rule.
312128. In the final bill analysis and economic impact statement prepared by
3133the House Committee on Finance and Taxation for CS/HB 2523 on June 12, 1991, or
314843 days after the bill was passed, the analysis states that subsection 212.02(1)
3161was amended to include:
"3165fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of
3174admissions. All fees, including initiation
3179fees and capitalization fees, paid to private
3186clubs and membership clubs providing recreational
3192or physical fitness facilities would be subject
3199to the sales tax on admissions . . . This
3209amendment should also limit further attempts
3215to avoid taxation by renaming the fees collected
3223from members.
3225The staff analysis was obviously not available to members of the House or Senate
3239when they voted on the bill on April 30, 1991.
324929. Although the final bill analysis used the term "capitalization fees,"
3260no where in any of the legislative history is there evidence of any legislative
3274consideration of what was actually meant by that term. This is also true of the
3289term "capital facility fees" which surfaced on one occasion prior to the passage
3302of the bill.
3305E. Capitalization Fees and Their Significance
331130. The sole basis for the DOR including the tax on assessments for
3324capital improvements was the appearance in the legislative history of the terms
"3336capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees." Neither term has any meaning
3347to tax accountants. However, the accounting witnesses for both parties agreed
3358that, from an accounting perspective, the phrase "capital facilities" would be
3369understood to be assets having a life longer than one year.
338031. A capital contribution is typically a one time payment for the
3392purchase of assets. It does not entitle the member to use the club. It is an
3408equity transaction, not an income transaction, and it represents an intent to
3420make an investment to improve the value of the membership assets separate and
3433apart from the payment of annual expenses for the receipt of some service.
344632. "Dues" are a member's contribution to the operating costs of a club.
3459They are assessed over an annual period and they are recurring. They also
3472represent the payment that a member pays for admission to the organization. A
3485capital contribution paid by a member of an equity membership club is not
"3498dues."
349933. "Fees" as applied to a club are user charges. They are voluntary so
3513that a member can decide whether or not to incur the charge based on whether the
3529member uses the particular service to which it relates. A capital contribution
3541is not a "fee."
3545CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
354834. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the
3558subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Sections 120.56 and 120.57(1),
3570Florida Statutes.
357235. As the party challenging the rule, petitioner has the burden of
3584proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged rule is an
3597invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Agrico Chemical Company v.
3607Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
361936. Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, defines an invalid exercise of
3629delegated legislative authority as follows:
3634Invalid exercise of delegated legislative
3639authority means action which goes beyond the
3646powers, functions, and duties delegated by
3652the legislature.
3654The same statute goes on to provide in pertinent part that a proposed rule is
3669invalid if:
3671* * *
3674(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of rule-
3683making authority, citation to which is required
3690by s. 120.54(7);
3693(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes
3700the specific provisions of law implemented,
3706citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);
3714* * *
371737. As grounds for invalidating the rule, petitioner contends that the
3728rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it
3739exceeds the DOR's rulemaking authority in Subsection 212.17(6), Florida
3748Statutes, and the rule enlarges, modifies and contravenes the provisions of
3759Sections 212.02(1) and 212.04, Florida Statutes.
376538. Section 212.04, Florida Statutes, imposes a six percent sales tax on
3777admissions. More specifically, subsection (1)(a) thereof provides that:
3785(a) It is hereby declared to be the legislative
3794intent that every person is exercising a taxable
3802privilege who sells or receives anything of value
3810by way of admissions.
3814Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines the term "admissions" in
3823relevant part as follows:
3827(1) The term "admissions" means and includes . . .
3837all dues and fees paid to any private clubs and
3847membership clubs providing recreational or physical
3853fitness facilities . . .
3858Therefore, the two statutes, when read together, clearly authorize an admissions
3869tax on "dues and fees" paid to private membership clubs providing recreational
3881facilities.
388239. Following the legislature's amendment of the definition of
"3891admissions," which added the phrase "and fees" after the word "dues," the DOR
3904promulgated an amendment to Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b., Florida Administrative
3912Code, with the intention of implementing the legislative intent of the statutory
3924amendment. As amended, the challenged rule makes the following "fees" paid to
3936private clubs or membership clubs as a condition precedent to their use of the
3950club's recreational or physical fitness facilities subject to tax:
3959b. Any periodic assessments (additional paid in
3966capital) required to be paid by members of an
3975equity or non equity club for capital improvements
3983or other operating costs, unless the periodic
3990assessment meets the criteria of a refundable
3997deposit as provided in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below.
400440. The terms "dues" and "fees" are not defined by statute, and the
4017statute does not specifically authorize an admissions tax on any type of
"4029assessment" or any form of "paid in capital." Thus, in order for the rule to
4044be valid, the terms "assessment" and "paid in capital" must be included within
4057the meaning of the term "dues and fees."
406541. Petitioner contends that its position must be upheld for two reasons.
4077First, it argues that when the words "dues," "fees" and "assessment" are given
4090their plain and ordinary meaning, it is clear that each has a separate and
4104distinct meaning, and that in no way can dues or fees be reasonably construed to
4119include an assessment. Second, even if one looks beyond the usual and ordinary
4132meaning of the terms and examines the legislative intent, the legislature simply
4144intended to close a loophole used by health fitness clubs, and it did not intend
4159to impose a tax on a private membership club's capital contribution.
417042. In its proposed final order, DOR first contends that its construction
4182of the term "fees" as being inclusive of a capital contribution or assessment is
4196reasonable, and under the well-established principle that an agency's
4205construction of a statute is entitled to great deference, its interpretation
4216should not be overturned unless shown to be clearly erroneous or unreasonable.
4228Second, DOR suggests that the legislative intent supports the premise that the
4240term "fees" is an inclusive term for a variety of charges, including the capital
4254contribution assessed by petitioner.
425843. Because a taxing statute forms the source of authority for the rule,
4271several broad principles are applicable. First, statutes imposing taxes must be
4282clear and specific. Thus, a taxing statute may not be construed to impose a tax
4297unless its terms definitely so provide. See, e. g., State v. Green, 101 So.2d
4311805, 808 (Fla. 1958). Second, statutes conferring the authority to impose taxes
4323must be strictly construed against the taxing power, and any ambiguity in the
4336provisions of the statute should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Maas
4349Brothers, Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So.2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1967). Accordingly, if
4361taxing statutes are drawn so that the legislative intent is in doubt, they must
4375be construed most strongly against the government and liberally in favor of the
4388taxpayer. See, e. g., The Department of Revenue v. Brookwood Associates, Ltd.,
4400324 So.2d 184, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Therefore, where a taxing statute is
4414susceptible to two meanings, that meaning most favorable to the taxpayer must be
4427adopted. Walgreen Drug Stores Co. v. Lee, 28 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. 1946).
444044. Because the words "dues" and "fees" are not defined by statute, and
4453are words of common usage, both parties urge that they be construed in their
4467plain and ordinary sense. See Humana, Inc. v. Department of Banking and
4479Finance, 603 So.2d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(in absence of an express
4492statutory definition, a word of common useage should be accorded its common and
4505ordinary meaning). Standard dictionary definitions are reliable sources for
4514plain and ordinary language definitions. Sims v. State, 510 So.2d 1045, 1047
4526(Fla. 1st DCA 1987). However, "where the agency urges a construction based on
4539common, ordinary meanings, this mitigates, if it does not entirely eliminate,
4550the rule calling upon the court to accord 'great deference' to the agency's
4563interpretation of the statute." Schoettle v. Dept. of Administration, 513 So.2d
45741299, 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); State Dept. of Insurance v. Insurance Services
4587Office, 434 So.2d 908, 912 n. 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
459845. Although the parties have cited different sources for their dictionary
4609definition of the term "fees," both sources define a "fee" as a "fixed charge."
4623Webster's Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary at 426 (1993); American Heritage
4633Dictionary, New College Edition (year and page number not cited by respondent).
4645At the same time, the term "assessment" is defined in Webster's as "the act or
4660an instance of assessing" while the term "assess" is defined as meaning "to
4673impose (as a tax) according to an established rate" or "to subject to a tax,
4688charge, or levy." Id. at 69. The word "dues" is defined in Black's Law
4702Dictionary at 450 (5th Ed. 1976) as "certain payments; rates or taxes" and "(a)s
4716applied to clubs or other membership organizations, refers to sums paid toward
4728support and maintenance of same as a requisite to retain membership." Finally,
4740the term "paid in capital" is defined in Black's as "money or property given to
4755a corporation in exchange for the corporation's stock." Id. at 999.
476646. From these definitions, it is clear that each term, "dues," "fees,"
"4778assessment" and "paid in capital," has a separate and distinct meaning. In no
4791case is either the word "dues" or "fees" defined to include the terms
"4804assessment" or "paid in capital."
480947. Early case law, albeit from other jurisdictions, also recogizes the
4820distinction between the terms. In Thompson v. Wyandach Club, 127 N.Y.S. 195,
4832200 (N. Y. 1911), the court held as follows:
4841Every man experienced in business recognizes
4847the meaning of "assessment" as distinguished
4853from "fees" and "dues." Fees are the amount
4861paid for a privilege. They are not an obli-
4870gation as the payment is voluntary. Such is
4878an initiation fee of a club. With reference
4886to clubs and other membership corporations the
4893meaning of the word "dues" is settled. It
4901means the obligation into which the members
4908enter to pay a sum to be fixed, usually by the
4919by-laws, at recurring intervals for the main-
4926tenance of the organization. . . . An assessment
4935. . . is different. It is not a fee. It is
4947not dues. (Emphasis added)
4951In a later case, Garden City Golf Club v. Corwin, 57 F.2d 283, 286 (E.D.N.Y.
49661932), the court agreed with this distinction and held that:
4976It must be conceded that there is a difference
4985between the term "dues" and the term "assessment."
4993Dues refer to the stated amounts which the members
5002must pay periodically for the continuing privilege
5009of membership. . . . (A)n "assessment" by a club
5019may be a specific demand or request by the club
5029upon its membership, as a whole or as a class,
5039for a certain sum of money; the proportion to be
5049paid by each member being stated. (Emphasis added)
505748. Under the foregoing principles, several conclusions of law can be
5068drawn. First, DOR has asked that a construction of the word "fees" be based on
5083its common, ordinary meaning. As such, the rule calling for DOR to be accorded
"5097great deference" in its interpretation of a statute is mitigated, if not
5109eliminated altogether. Schoettle at 1301. Second, the common, ordinary meaning
5119of the term "fees" does not include an assessment, capital contribution or paid-
5132in capital. Indeed, in the context of a private membership club, such as John's
5146Island Club, the term "fees" is commonly understood to mean a fixed sum
5159voluntarily paid towards support and maintenance of the club as a requisite to
5172membership. Conversely, an assessment is an involuntary charge levied on each
5183member for a special purpose, and not recurring on a regular basis as in the
5198case of dues or fees. Third, the distinction between the terms "dues and fees"
5212and "assessment" has been recognized in the few judicial cases addressing this
5224issue. See, e. g., N. L. R. B. v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir.
52421962)(an "assessment" is a charge levied on each member in the nature of a tax
5257or some other burden for a special purpose); Wyandach Club, supra; Garden City
5270Golf Club, supra; Rainbow Falls Fish and Game Club, Inc. v. Clute, 29 N.Y.S.2d
5284948, 950 (1941)("fees" are voluntary payments for particular privileges).
5294Therefore, respondent's contention that the word "fees" is inclusive of "any
5305fixed charge for capital improvements" is rejected as being contrary to the
5317plain and ordinary meaning of the term. Finally, given the principles governing
5329taxing statutes described in paragraph 43, subsection 212.02(1) should be
5339strictly construed against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer.
5351This is especially true here since DOR proposes to tax the investments made by
5365the owners of the club for capital improvements, and for which the owners
5378receive nothing of "value by way of admissions."
538649. Next, by looking at the available legislative history regarding the
53971991 amendment to subsection 212.02(1), it is much more likely that the
5409legislature intended to close a loophole that was then used by physical fitness
5422clubs to avoid paying taxes on members' dues. More specifically, some clubs
5434were avoiding the tax on "dues" by shifting a part of the member's payments from
"5449dues" and renaming them "initiation fees." This is evidenced by discussions
5460in, and bill analyses prepared for, the House and Senate committees in February
5473and March 1991, as more fully discussed in findings of fact 20 and 23. While
5488admittedly a different numbered bill was finally passed by the legislature on
5500April 30, 1991, it contained the same substantive amendment as did earlier
5512versions of the legislation, and there is no clear indication that the
5524legislature's original intent had changed.
552950. Even if there is some doubt as to what the legislature intended, as
5543there may arguably be here, case law instructs us that if this occurs, the
5557statute should be construed in a manner most favorable to the taxpayer. Green;
5570Brookwood Associates; Walgreen Drug Stores, supra.
557651. Finally, prior to the 1991 amendment, there was no loophole for
5588renaming "dues" as "capital contributions" in order to avoid the tax on "dues."
5601This is because such action was specifically prohibited by then existing Rule
561312A-1.005(5)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, it may be presumed
5622that when the legislature was considering amending subsection 212.02(1) to close
5633a loophole, its purpose in doing so was not to include assessments and capital
5647contributions within the term "fees."
565252. In summary, DOR has adopted a rule which conflicts with the law
5665implemented, namely, subsection 212.02(1), and thus it is an invalid exercise of
5677delegated legislative authority. Because the rule is inconsistent with the
5687provisions of chapter 212, it also exceeds the agency's rulemaking mandate in
5699subsection 212.17(6) that it "make . . . rules and regulations not inconsistent
5712with this chapter."
5715Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
5728ORDERED that Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b., Florida Administra-tive Code, is
5736determined to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the
5748grounds it exceeds the agency's rulemaking authority and conflicts with the law
5760implemented.
5761DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida.
5773___________________________________
5774DONALD R. ALEXANDER
5777Hearing Officer
5779Division of Administrative Hearings
5783The DeSoto Building
57861230 Apalachee Parkway
5789Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
5792(904) 488-9675
5794Filed with the Clerk of the
5800Division of Administrative Hearings
5804this 15th day of June, 1995.
5810APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER
5814Petitioner:
58151. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2.
58232-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1.
58314-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5.
58396. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1.
58477. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6.
58558. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8.
58639-10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7.
587111. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.
587912. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9 and 10.
588913. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13.
589714. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 10.
590715. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11.
591516. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.
592317. Rejected as being unnecessary.
592818. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12.
593619. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 15.
594620. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20.
595421. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21.
596222. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22.
597023. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23.
597824-25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24.
598626. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25.
599427. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26.
600228-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27.
601030-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28.
601832. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29.
602633. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2.
603434. Rejected as being unnecessary.
603935. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16.
604736-44. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17.
605545-46. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30.
606347. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31.
607148. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32.
607949. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33.
6087Respondent:
60881. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1.
60962. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 6.
61063. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6.
61144. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7.
61225. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8.
61306. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.
61387. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11.
61488-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.
615610. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11.
616611. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2.
617412-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15.
618214. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14 and 15.
619215. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19.
620016-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26.
620818. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21.
621619-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12.
6224NOTE: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has
6236been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, irrelevant,
6248cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law.
6260COPIES FURNISHED:
6262V. Carroll Webb, Director
6266Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
6270Holland Building, Room 120
6274Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
6277Liz Cloud, Chief
6280Bureau of Laws and Administrative Code
6286The Capitol, Room 1802
6290Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
6293Richard A. Lotspeich, Esquire
6297Post Office Box 271
6301Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0271
6304James F. McAuley, Esquire
6308Lisa M. Raleigh, Esquire
6312Department of Legal Affairs
6316The Capitol, Tax Section
6320Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
6323NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
6329A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial
6343review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are
6353governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are
6364commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the agency clerk of the
6380Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing
6391fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or
6404with the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the party
6417resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the
6432order to be reviewed.
6436=================================================================
6437DISTRICT COURT OPINION
6440=================================================================
6441IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
6447FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
6452DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
6461FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
6466Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.
6471v. CASE NO. 95-2652
6475DOAH CASE NO. 95-1179RX
6479JOHN'S ISLAND CLUB, INC.,
6483Appellee.
6484___________________________/
6485Opinion filed March 27, 1996.
6490An appeal from an order of Division of Abdministrative Hearings.
6500Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and James McAuley, Assistant Attorney
6510General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
6514Richard A. Lotspeich, John T. Lavia, III, and Fred McCormack, of Landers &
6527Parsons, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
6531BARFIELD, J.
6533The Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals a final order determining Rule 12A-
65451.005(5)(d)1.b., Florida Administrative Code, to be an invalid exercise of
6555delegated legislative authority. We affirm.
6560In 1949, the legislature first imposed a tax on "admissions." Prior to
65721990, the definition of "admissions" included "all dues paid to private clubs
6584providing recreational facilities." The definition of "admissions" was amended
6593during the 1990 legislative session to include in the definition those "dues" of
6606membership clubs providing physical fitness facilities. In 1991, the
6615legislature again amended the definition of "admissions" by inserting "and
6625fees." The definition, as amended, provided:
6631(1) The term "admissions" means and includes
6638the net sum of money after deduction of
6646any federal taxes for admitting a person
6653or vehicle or persons to any place of
6661amusement, sport, or recreation or for the
6668privilege of entering or staying in any place
6676of amusement, sport, or recreation, including,
6682but not limited to, all dues and fees paid to
6692private clubs and membership clubs providing
6698recreational or physical fitness facilities. .
6704Prior to the above change in substantive law, rule 12A- 1, .005 (5)
6717provided that dues paid to athletic clubs which provided recreational facilities
6728were taxable. However, sub-paragraph (5)(c) of the rule also provided that:
6739Capital contributions or assessments to an
6745organization by its members are not taxable
6752as charges for admissions when they are in
6760the nature of payments made by the member of
6769his or her share of capital costs, not charges
6778for admission to use the organization's
6784recreational or physical fitness facilities or
6790equipment, and when they are clearly shown as
6798capital contributions on the organization's
6803records. Contributions and assessments will be
6809considered taxable when their payment results
6815in a decrease in periodic dues or user fees
6824required of the payor to use the organization's
6832recreational or physical fitness facilities or
6838equipment.
6839After the substantive amendment to section 212.02(1), DOR adopted rule 12A-
68501.005(5)(d)1.b., which provides:
6853(d)1. Effective July 1, 1991, the following
6860fees paid to private clubs or membership clubs
6868as a condition precedent to, in conjunction
6875with, or for the use of the club's recreation-
6884al or physical fitness facilities are subject
6891to tax.
6893b. Any periodic assessments (additional
6898paid in capital) required to be paid by mem-
6907bers of an equity or non equity club for
6916capital improvements or other operating costs,
6922unless the periodic assessment meets the
6928criteria of a refundable deposit as provided
6935in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below.
6939John's Island Club, Inc. (club) is a not-for-profit corporation which owns
6950and operates a country club facility, providing recreational facilities to its
6961members. Each member must purchase a membership. The cost of the membership is
6974not subject to sales tax. A member who resigns is entitled to return of the
6989greater of: (a) the initial amount paid or (b) 80 percent of the current
7003membership cost. In addition to the membership charge, members pay annual dues.
7015Beginning on July 1, 1994, the club made an assessment on each member to raise
7030capital for the purpose of repairing and replacing many of its physical
7042facilities. Any person joining the club after the imposition of the assessment
7054would also be required to pay the assessment. The value of the contribution
7067decreased in value 10 percent each year. If a member retained membership
7079privileges for a period of ten years, the contribution had no redemptive value.
7092A member who resigned earlier would receive a portion of the contribution in
7105return. The club paid sales tax on the contributions pursuant to rule 12A-
71181.005(5)(d)l.b.
7119The club filed a petition challenging the validity of rule 12A-
71301.005(5)(d)1.b. The club argued the rule exceeded DOR's grant of rulemaking
7141authority, and modified, enlarged, and contravened the law implemented. DOR
7151asserted that the rule implemented the legislative intent, specifically relying
7161upon the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees" which are found
7173in certain' legislative history documents pertaining to the new legislation.
7183When reviewing a hearing officer's determination arising out of a section
7194120.56 quasi-judicial rule challenge proceeding, the appellate court's standard
7203of review is whether the hearing officer's findings are supported by competent,
7215substantial evidence. Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of
7224Environmental Regulation, 553 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The hearing
7235officer's findings in the present case are supported by competent, substantial
7246evidence. We agree with the hearing officer that the rule is an invalid
7259exercise of delegated legislative authority.
7264DOR correctly asserts that the legislative history supports the
7273unmistakable intention of the legislature to prevent evasion of the tax imposed
7285on dues. As noted by the hearing officer, a February 21, 1991, discussion of
7299the Subcommittee on Sales Tax of the House Committee on Finance and Taxation
7312indicated that the intent of the amendment was to close a loophole that allowed
7326physical fitness facilities to change their pricing structure to charge a higher
7338initiation fee, which was not taxable, and thereby reduce their monthly dues,
7350which were taxable. The result was a reduction of revenue below that originally
7363anticipated by the amendment taxing dues of physical fitness facilities.
7373DOR argues that the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees"
7384are also used throughout the legislative history and that the hearing officer
7396gave, no effect to use of the terms. DOR emphasizes a discussion of the
7410conference committee on finance and taxation which occurred on April 19, 1991.
7422The entirety of the discussion of the committee on this issue is as follows:
7436Senator Jenne: The - - going down to number
744521, admissions, initiation fees. The House
7451includes capitalization fees.
7454Representative Abrams: Which is this?
7459Mr. Weiss: The Senate bill just states
7466initial fees are additionally included.
7471The House bill, I believe, says that it's
7479just all fees, which would include whether
7486they called them initiation fees or capital
7493facility fees or whatever.
7497Representative Abrams: Because we are using
7503something other than initiation
7507Mr. Weiss: It's a fee that is going to be
7517included.
7518Representative Abrams: Yes, they were using
7524- - they were breaking down categories of fees
7533to avoid the tax, I think is what the deal was
7544there. That gets us how much?
7550Senator Jenne: Okay, well, it doesn't matter,
7557because you can do it.
7562Representative Abrams: Okay, good.
7566As noted by the hearing officer, although the terms "capital facility fees"
7578and "capitalization fees" were used during the discussion, it is far from clear
7591that the intent of the amendment was to make taxable all capital contributions
7604and assessments paid by members of private clubs providing recreational
7614facilities. As noted above, the various discussions contained in the
7624legislative history indicate the intent of the amendment was to close a loophole
7637then used by physical fitness clubs who were renaming dues as fees in order to
7652avoid taxes. There is no indication in the legislative history that the
,7664legislature intended to make taxable a completely different type of transaction
7675which up until that point had been specifically excluded from taxation by rule.
7688We agree with the hearing officer that additional paid in capital does not
7701fall within the generally understood definition of "dues" or "fees" as applied
7713to a club. The terms "dues" and "fees" are not defined by statute, and the
7728statute does not specifically authorize an admissions tax on any type of paid in
7742capital. In the absence of clearer legislative consideration of what was meant
7754by the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees", we conclude the
7766hearing officer correctly determined that the rule at issue was inconsistent
7777with the provisions of chapter 212.
7783Not only does the absence of clear legislative intent inure to the benefit
7796of the taxpayer, but the position of DOR is contrary to accepted principles of
7810accounting from which common understanding of terms such as "capitalization" may
7821be derived as clearly disclosed in the record of these proceedings.
7832Accordingly, the order on appeal is affirmed.
7839KAHN, J., CONCURS. ALLEN, J., CONCURS IN RESULT WITH OPINION.
7849ALLEN , J., concurring in result.
7854I agree with the result reached by the majority. I do so because of the
7869generally understood meaning of the term "fees." Even if a strained
7880interpretation of the term might arguably encompass the contributions to capital
7891involved herein, I would be dissuaded from accepting such interpretation by the
7903canons of statutory construction which counsel that a strained interpretation of
7914a statute should not be adopted over a more reasonable interpretation, and that
7927an ambiguous tax statute is to be construed in favor of the taxpayer.
7940I do not join in the majority's reliance upon tidbits of legislative
7952history to discern "legislative intent." In my view, the law means what its text
7966most appropriately conveys, and we should content ourselves with reading it
7977rather than psychoanalyzing a few of the many who enacted it. See Bank One
7991Chicago N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. 5362, 5366 (U.S.
8007Jan. 17, 1996)(Scalia, J., concurring in part) United States v. Public Util.
8019Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)(Jackson, J., concurring).
8029MANDATE
8030From
8031DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
8037FIRST DISTRICT
8039To the Honorable Donald R. Alexander, Hearing Officer
8047Division of Administrative Hearings
8051WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:
8061JOHN'S ISLAND CLUB, INC.
8065v. CASE NO. 95-2652
8069DOAH CASE NO. 95-1179RX
8073DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
8076The attached opinion was rendered on March 27, 1996.
8085YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said
8098opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.
8112WITNESS the Honorable E. Earle Zehmer
8118Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and
8131the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 12th day of April,
81461996.
8147___________________________________________
8148(seal) Jon S. Wheeler
8152Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida,
8159First District
![](/images/view_pdf.png)
- Date
- Proceedings
- Date: 04/15/1996
- Proceedings: Opinion and Mandate filed.
- Date: 03/28/1996
- Proceedings: Opinion from the First DCA filed.
- Date: 12/26/1995
- Proceedings: Supplemental Index, Record, Certificate of Record sent out.
- Date: 12/11/1995
- Proceedings: Appellant`s unopposed motion for extension of time to serve its reply brief filed.
- Date: 12/01/1995
- Proceedings: Index, Record, Certificate of Record sent out.
- Date: 11/30/1995
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT (motion to supplement the record granted by First DCA) filed.
- Date: 11/27/1995
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT (notice of filing) filed.
- Date: 09/29/1995
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT (Appellant`s motion for extension of time is granted) filed.
- Date: 09/08/1995
- Proceedings: Index & Statement of Service sent out.
- Date: 08/03/1995
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT (Appellant is directed to file within 10 day conformed copies of the lower tribunal order) filed.
- Date: 08/03/1995
- Proceedings: Letter to DOAH from DCA filed. DCA Case No. 1-95-2652.
- Date: 07/20/1995
- Proceedings: Notice of Appeal filed.
- Date: 07/20/1995
- Proceedings: Certificate of Notice of Appeal sent out.
- Date: 05/17/1995
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Filing; Department of Revenue Proposed Final Order (for HO signature) filed.
- Date: 05/17/1995
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Proposed Final Order filed.
- Date: 04/27/1995
- Proceedings: Letter to Richard A. Lotspeich from James McAuley (cc: HO) Re: Confirming time to file proposed final orders has been extended to May 19th filed.
- Date: 04/14/1995
- Proceedings: Transcript filed.
- Date: 04/10/1995
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- Date: 04/07/1995
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing Transcripts (Deposition of Wayne Miller) filed.
- Date: 04/03/1995
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Answer to Complaint filed.
- Date: 04/03/1995
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
- Date: 04/03/1995
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Serving Answers to First Interrogatories filed.
- Date: 04/03/1995
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
- Date: 03/31/1995
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Notice of Serving Answers to Respondent, Department of Revenue`s First Set of Interrogatories filed.
- Date: 03/23/1995
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Notice of Serving First Set of Interrogatories filed.
- Date: 03/20/1995
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (leave is granted to take depositions at any time prior to final hearing)
- Date: 03/20/1995
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Appearance filed.
- Date: 03/16/1995
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion for Expedited Discovery filed.
- Date: 03/15/1995
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 4/10/95; 9:00am; Talla)
- Date: 03/14/1995
- Proceedings: Order of Assignment sent out.
- Date: 03/13/1995
- Proceedings: Letter to Liz Cloud & Carroll Webb from Marguerite Lockard w/cc: Agency General Counsel sent out.
- Date: 03/10/1995
- Proceedings: Petition for Administrative Determination of Invalidity of Existing Rule filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- D. R. ALEXANDER
- Date Filed:
- 03/10/1995
- Date Assignment:
- 03/14/1995
- Last Docket Entry:
- 04/15/1996
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- Department of Revenue
- Suffix:
- RX