99-003933 Bobby C. Billie And Shannon Larsen vs. Hines Interests Limited Partnership And St. Johns River Water Management District Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, December 30, 1999.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

THE SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner,

and

BOBBY C. BILLIE and SHANNON LARSEN,

Intervenors,

vs. DOAH No. 99-1905

SJRWMD No. 99-1907

HINES INTERESTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

and ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT

Respondents.

_______________________________________/

BOBBY C. BILLIE and SHANNON LARSEN,

Petitioners,

vs. DOAH No. 99-3933

SJRWMD No. 99-1949

HINES INTERESTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

and ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT,

Respondents.

_______________________________________/

THE SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioner.

vs. DOAH No. 99-3934

SJRWMD No. 99-1951

HINES INTERESTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

and ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT

Respondents.

_______________________________________/

FINAL ORDER ON CONSUMPTIVE USE PERMIT APPLICATION

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings,

by its duly designated Administrative Law Judge, the Honorable

Stephen F. Dean, held a formal administrative hearing in the

above-styled cases on October 18-22, 1999, in St. Augustine,

Florida.

A. APPEARANCES

For Petitioner The Sierra Club: Peter Belmont, Esquire

102 Fareham Place North

St. Petersburg, FL 33701

Deborah Andrews, Esquire

11 N. Roscoe Blvd.

Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082

For Petitioners/ Intervenors Bobby C. Billie and Shannon Larsen:

Deborah Andrews, Esquire

11 N. Roscoe Blvd.

Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082

For Respondent St. Johns River Water Management District:

Veronika Thiebach, Esquire

Jennifer Springfield, Esquire

P.O. Box 1429

Palatka, FL 32178-1429

For Respondent Hines Interests Limited Partnership:

Marcia Tjoflat, Esquire

Lynne Matson, Esquire

1301 Riverplace Blvd.

Suite 1500

Jacksonville, FL 32207

John Metcalf, Esquire

Tom Jenks, Esquire

200 West Forsyth Street

Suite 1400

Jacksonville, FL 32202

On December 30,1999, the Honorable Stephen F. Dean

("Administrative Law Judge" or " ALJ") submitted to the St. Johns

River Water Management District and all other parties to this

proceeding a Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit "A". This matter then came before the

Governing Board on February, 2000 for final agency action. At

that time, the Governing Board issued a Final Order and Order of

Remand, which approved the applicant's ERP application and

remanded the CUP application back to the ALJ to provide

conclusions of law relating to the issue of whether the CUP

application should be granted. Such conclusions of law were not

included in the December 30,1999 Recommended Order. On April 26,

2000, the ALJ submitted to the St. Johns River Water Management

District and all other parties to this proceeding an Order on

Remand: Additional Conclusions of Law, a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit "B". Thereafter, Hines waived the Chapter

120, Fla. Stat., timeframes for final agency action on the CUP

permit application through June 15, 2000. Petitioners, The

Sierra Club, Bobby C. Billie and Shannon Larsen ("Petitioners"),

timely filed joint exceptions to the ALJ's Order on Remand and

St. Johns River Water Management District ("District") timely

filed exceptions to the ALJ's Order on Remand. Hines did not

file exceptions. The District and Hines timely filed responses

to exceptions. This matter then came before the Governing Board

on June 13, 2000 for final agency action.

B. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This Final Order on Remand involves one issue: whether

Hines' application for an individual consumptive use permit

("CUP") should be approved pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida

Statutes, and Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code. All

issues related to the ERP application were addressed in our

February 10, 2000, Final Order.

C. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The rules regarding an agency's consideration of exceptions

to a Recommended Order are well established. The Governing Board

is prescribed by section 120.57(1)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), in

acting upon a Recommended Order. The Administrative Law Judge

(" ALJ"), not the Governing Board, is the fact finder. Goss v.

Dist. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns County , 601 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA

1992); Heifitz v. Dep't of Bus. Regulation , 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla.

1st DCA 1997). A finding of fact may not be rejected or modified

unless the Governing Board first determines from a review of the

entire record that the findings of fact are not based upon

competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which

the findings or fact were based did not comply with essential

requirements of law. Section 120.57(1)(1), Fla. Stat.; Goss ,

supra . "Competent substantial evidence" is such evidence as is

sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would

accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached. Perdue v.

TJ Palm Associates, Ltd. , 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1399 (Fla. 4th DCA

June 16,1999).

If a finding is supported by any competent substantial

evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred, the

finding cannot be disturbed. Freeze v. Dep't of Business

Regulation , 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Berry v. Dep't of

Envtl. Regulation , 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The

Governing Board may not reweigh evidence admitted in the

proceeding, may not resolve conflicts in the evidence, may not

judge the credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret

evidence anew. Goss , supra ; Heifitz , supra; Brown v. Criminal

Justice Standards & Training Comm'n. , 667 So.2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA

1996). The issue is not whether the record contains evidence

contrary to the findings of fact in the Recommended Order, but

whether the finding is supported by any competent substantial

evidence. Florida Sugar Cane League v. State Siting Bd. , 580

So.2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The term "competent substantial

evidence" relates not to the quality, character, convincing

power, probative value or weight of the evidence, but refers to

the existence of some quantity of evidence as to each essential

element and as to the legality and admissibility of that

evidence. Scholastic Book Fairs v. Unemployment Appeals

Commission , 671 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

The Governing Board in its final order may reject or modify

the conclusions of law over which it has substantive jurisdiction

and interpretations of administrative rules over which it has

substantive jurisdiction, provided the reasons for such rejection

or modification are stated with particularity and the Governing

Board finds that such rejection or modification is as or more

reasonable than the ALJ's conclusion or interpretation. Section

120.57(1)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). Furthermore, the Governing

Board's authority to modify a Recommended Order is not dependent

on the filing of exceptions. Westchester General Hospital v.

Dept. Human Res. Serve , 419 So.2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In

interpreting the "substantive jurisdiction" amendment as it first

appeared in the 1996 changes to the Administrative Procedures

Act, courts have continued to interpret the standard of review as

requiring deference to an agency in interpreting its own statutes

and rules. See , e.g. , State Contracting and Engineering

Corporation v. Department of Transportation , 709 So.2d 607, 608

(Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

D. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS

Petitioners jointly filed 12 exceptions to the ALJ's Order

on Remand. The District filed three exceptions to the ALJ's

Order on Remand. Hines did not file any exceptions to the ALJ's

Order on Remand. The parties' exceptions to the Recommended

Order have been reviewed and are addressed below.

Hereinafter, references to testimony will be made by

identifying the witness by surname followed by transcript page

number (e.g. O'Shea Vol. II: 6). References to exhibits received

by the ALJ will be designated "Petitioners" for Petitioners, The

Sierra Club, Bobby C. Billie and Shannon Larsen; "District" for

Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District; and

"Hines" for Respondent, Hines Interests Limited Partnership,

followed by the exhibit number, then page number, if appropriate

(e.g. Hines 2: 32). Other references to the transcript will be

indicated with a "T" followed by the page number (e.g. T. Vol.

II: 60). References to the December 30,1999 Recommended Order

will be designated by " R.O." followed by the page number (e.g.

R.O.: 28). References to the ALJ's April 26, 2000 Order on

Remand will be designated as "Remand" followed by the page number

(e.g. Remand: 5). Unless otherwise noted, all references to

conclusions of law are to those in the April 26, 2000 Order on

Remand.

RULINGS ON DISTRICT'S EXCEPTIONS

District's Exception No. 1

District staff take exception to an apparent typographical

error in Conclusion of Law No. 2. It appears that the ALJ

transposed the numbers of a section in the District's rules. In

this conclusion of law, the ALJ states that 40C-2.031, F.A.C.,

sets out the conditions for issuance of a CUP. It is obvious

that this is a typographical error. The reference to "Section

40C-2.031, Florida Administrative Code," should read "Section

40C-2.301, Florida Administrative Code." Section 40C-2.031,

Florida Administrative Code ( F.A.C.), deals with the

implementation dates of individual consumptive use permitting

programs within the District, whereas section 40C-2.301, F.A.C.,

entitled Conditions for Issuance of Permits, sets forth the

conditions for issuance of a CUP. Therefore, District staff's

exception number 1 is granted and the reference to "Section 40C-

2.031, Florida Administrative Code," in Conclusion of Law No. 2

is hereby corrected to read "Section 40C-2.301, Florida

Administrative Code."

District Exception No. 2

District staff take exception to Conclusions of Law Nos. 14,

15, 16, and 17 on the basis that the ALJ incorrectly concludes

that subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., does not apply to the

subject CUP application.

Subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., states:

To obtain a consumptive use permit for a use

which will commence after the effective date

of implementation, the applicant must

establish that the proposed use of water:

(a) is a reasonable beneficial use;

(b) and will not interfere with any

presently existing legal use of water; and

(c) is consistent with the public interest.

Paragraph 40C-2.301 (5)(a), F.A.C., states:

A proposed consumptive use does not meet the

criteria for the issuance of a permit set

forth in subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., if

such proposed water use will:

[List of six numbered reasons for denial.]

We agree with staff's analysis. The three-prong test in

subsection 40C-2.301 (23, F.A.C., is the umbrella provision of

the conditions for issuance of a consumptive use permit. This

provision applies to all CUP applications. Subparagraphs 40C-

2.301 (5)(a)1 through 6 are individual grounds for denial of a

CUP application. If one of the six circumstances is present, the

three-prong test in subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., is not met,

but the test nonetheless applies to the application. Subsection

40C-2.301 (2) requires the applicant to establish that its

proposed use meets the three-prong test, and therefore, even if

the grounds for denial in subparagraphs 40C-2.301 (5)(a)1 through

6 are not applicable to an application, the requirement that the

applicant's proposed use of water meets the criteria in

subsection 40C-2.301 (2) is not negated. In fact, paragraph 40C-

2.301 (5)(b) states: "Compliance with the criteria set forth in

subsection (5)(a) above [the six reasons for denial] does not

preclude a finding by the Board that a proposed use fails to

comply with the criteria set forth in Section 40C-2.301 (2) above

[the three-prong test]." In Conclusions of Law Nos. 14,15,16,

and 17, the ALJ mistakenly concludes that the three-prong test in

subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., does not apply if the grounds

for denial do not also apply. The Governing Board has

substantive jurisdiction and the primary responsibility to

interpret its own rules which it is required to enforce. As

explained above, the ALJ erroneously interpreted section 40C-

2.301 (2) and we find that our interpretation is as reasonable,

or more reasonable, than the conclusion of the ALJ. Therefore,

District staff's exception number 2 is granted and the references

to subsection 40C-2.301 (2) as not applying to the subject CUP

application are hereby stricken from Conclusions of Law Nos. 14,

15, 16, and 17.

District Exception No. 3

In their exceptions to the ALJ's December 30,1999

Recommended Order, District staff took exception to Finding of

Fact No. 82 in the December 30,1999 Recommended Order, relating

to the CUP application. In our February 10,2000 Final Order, we

reserved ruling on this exception. Thus, in their exception

number 3 to the Order on Remand, District staff is now

reasserting exception to Finding of Fact No. 82, in which, the

ALJ finds "[a]s an adjunct to the chemical plan, the water in

these shallow wells should be periodically tested to ensure no

chemicals leech [sic] into the surficial water table." To

implement this finding, paragraph 40C-2.301 (5)(b) states:

"Compliance with the criteria set forth in subsection (5)(a)

above [the six reasons for denial] does not preclude a finding by

the Board that a proposed use fails to comply with the criteria

set forth in Section 40C-2.301 (2) above [the three-prong test]."

In Conclusions of Law Nos. 14,15,16, and 17, the ALJ mistakenly

concludes that the three-prong test in subsection 40C-2.301 (2),

F.A.C., does not apply if the grounds for denial do not also

apply. The Governing Board has substantive jurisdiction and the

primary responsibility to interpret its own rules which it is

required to enforce. As explained above, the ALJ erroneously

interpreted section 40C0-2.301 (2) and we find that our

interpretation is as reasonable, or more reasonable, than the

conclusion of the ALJ. Therefore, District staff's exception

number 2 is granted and the references to subsection 40C-2.301

(2) as not applying to the subject CUP application are hereby

stricken from Conclusions of Law Nos. 14, 15, 16, and 17.

District Exception No. 3

In their exceptions to the ALJ's December 30,1999

Recommended Order, District staff took exception to Finding of

Fact No. 82 in the December 30,1999 Recommended Order, relating

to the CUP application. In our February 10,2000 Final Order, we

reserved ruling on this exception. Thus, in their exception

number 3 to the Order on Remand, District staff is now

reasserting exception to Finding of Fact No. 82, in which, the

ALJ finds "[a]s an adjunct to the chemical plan, the water in

these shallow wells should be periodically tested to ensure no

chemicals leech [sic] into the surficial water table." To

implement this finding, District staff recommend the following

language be added as a condition of the CUP permit:

The Permittee must submit a proposal to

periodically monitor the water quality of the

proposed surficial wells for indications that

the chemicals being applied on the golf

course are leaching into the surficial

aquifer. At a minimum, this plan must

include monitoring frequency, parameters, and

duration, well locations and method of

reporting data. The draft plan must be

submitted to the District in conjunction with

the Integrated Pest Management Plan required

to be submitted under ERP no. 4-109-0216.

After receiving written approval from the

District staff of a surficial water quality

monitoring plan, the permittee must implement

the approved plan.

We agree with District staff that the proposed permit condition

is necessary to implement the ALJ's finding. Moreover, in its

Response to Exceptions, Hines has indicated that it agrees with

this proposed permit condition. Thus, District exception number

3 is granted.

RULINGS ON PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS

Petitioners' Exception No. 1

Petitioners take exception to the ALJ's alleged failure to

make findings of fact necessary to determine whether the public

interest test is met. Petitioners appear to be arguing that the

Governing Board's Final Order and Order of Remand required the

ALJ to make additional findings of fact regarding the public

interest test in the Order on Remand. As support, Petitioners

quote from our Final Order and Order of Remand, in which we

stated that "on remand for inclusion of the conclusions of law,

the Administrative Law Judge may find it necessary for additional

findings from the evidence to properly apply the findings to the

requisite law." Petitioners' argument is without merit. In our

previous order, we simply stated that the ALJ may make additional

findings of fact if necessary . Nowhere in that order did we

indicate that the ALJ was required to make additional findings of

fact or that such additional findings were necessary.

Petitioners also cite to section 120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat.,

which provides that "[f] indings of fact, if set forth in a manner

which is no more than mere tracking of statutory language, must

be accompanied by a concise explicit statement of the underlying

facts of record which support the findings" and section 1

20.57(1)(j) that provides that findings of fact shall be based

upon a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioners contend that

the ALJ failed to adhere to these statutory requirements

regarding findings of fact related to the public interest test

and other requirements of the rules. Petitioners do not identify

any specific findings of fact regarding the public interest test

or any other rule requirements that are lacking. Nevertheless, a

review of the ALJ's December 30, 1999 Recommended Order reveals

that the ALJ has made sufficient findings of fact to support a

conclusion of law that the public interest test has been met.

"Public interest" is defined by the District as "those

rights and claims on behalf of people in general." Rule 9.3, CUP

Applicants Handbook. This rule further states that "[I]n

determining the public interest * * *, the Board will consider

whether an existing or proposed use is beneficial or detrimental

to the overall collective well-being of the people or of the

water resources in the area, the District and the State." This

definition has two components which require a determination as to

whether the use is "detrimental" or "beneficial": 1) the overall

collective well being of the people; and 2) the water resource in

the area, the District and the state. William Nassau v. Vernon &

Irene Beckman, et al. , DOAH Case No. 92-0246 (St. Johns River

Water Management District, June 10, 1992). It is within our

purview to make a determination of whether the public interest

test has been met, based on the findings of fact determined by

the ALJ. The ALJ's findings of fact indicate that the proposed

water use will not be detrimental to the water resources of the

area, the District or the State and will not be detrimental to

the overall collective well being of the people. Moreover, the

ALJ's findings indicate that the proposed use will provide some

benefit to the overall collective well-being of the people. The

ALJ's findings of fact that support our conclusion that the

public interest test has been met include the following: (1) the

proposed water use is to serve the needs of people who use a

recreational facility, a sales office and a construction trailer

( R.O.: 7-8; Findings of Fact 4); (ii) irrigation water for the

golf course will primarily be drawn from the storm water

management system, with the Floridan aquifer serving as a

secondary source ( R.O.: 13-14, 33; Findings of Fact 18,19 and

75); (iii) the surface water source is designed so as to minimize

impacts to wetlands ( R.O.: 13; Findings of Fact 18); (iv) the

water source for golf course way stations, the sales center, the

temporary clubhouse, and a construction trailer is surficial

aquifer wells with an anticipated drawdown of only 0.01 feet

( R.O.: 7,14; Findings of Fact 4 and 20); (v) the primary source

of irrigation water, the surface water management system, will

not adversely affect surface waters ( R.O.: 29; Findings of Fact

63); (vi) the surface water management system will comply with

water quality standards ( R.O.: 30-31; Findings of Fact 66-69);

(vii) the allocated quantity of water is consistent with District

Standards and with the allocations for other golf courses in the

area ( R.O.: 32; Findings of Fact 74); (viii) water used for

irrigation is from the lower quality sources (the storm water

pond and the deeper aquifer), saving the more desirable shallow

aquifer for drinking and household uses ( R.O.: 33; Findings of

Fact 75); (ix) extensive water conservation measures have been

implemented ( R.O.: 32; Findings of Fact 76); (x) reclaimed water

will be used for irrigation when it becomes available to the site

( R.O.: 34; Findings of Fact 77); ( xi) the water use is not

expected to cause saline water intrusion ( R.O.: 34-35; Findings

of Fact 78, 80); ( xii) the water use will not adversely affect

existing legal uses of water ( R.O.: 34; Findings of Fact 79);

( xiii) the water use will not lower water levels so as to

adversely affect off-site vegetation ( R.O.: 35; Findings of Fact

81); and ( ivx) additional testing will be undertaken to ensure

that groundwater quality is not adversely affected ( R.O.: 34-35;

Findings of Fact 78 and 82).

Consequently, the ALJ has entered substantial findings to

support a determination under Rule 9.3, A.H. CUP, that the

proposed water use is consistent with the public interest.

Moreover, we note that contrary to the Petitioners' contentions,

the ALJ's findings of fact are not a "mere tracking of the

statutory language", but instead are facts specific to this case

that the ALJ gleaned from the voluminous record in this case.

Thus, this exception is rejected.

Petitioners' Exception No. 2

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 4, in which the ALJ concludes that the proposed use is for

a purpose that is reasonable and in the public interest.

Specifically, Petitioners contend that the ALJ sets forth no

facts or reasoning for drawing this conclusion, but merely tracks

the statutory language. Petitioners maintain that such a bare

statement the rule is met does not comply with section

120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat. First, as was correctly pointed out by

District staff, Petitioners have misstated the ALJ's conclusion

of law and the pertinent rule provision. The ALJ's conclusion of

law number 4 and the District's rule 40C-2.301 (4)(b), F.A.C.,

both state that "[t]he use must be for a purpose that is both

reasonable and consistent with the public interest." (emphasis

provided). Further, it should be noted that section

120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat., applies to "findings of fact."

Petitioners exception number 2 is directed at a "conclusion of

law." Thus, the cited statutory provision is not applicable.

Nevertheless, as described in detail in our holding on

Petitioners exception number 1, the ALJ made numerous factual

findings in the December 30, 1999 Recommended Order from which he

could reasonably conclude that the proposed use is for a purpose

that is both reasonable and in the public interest. Moreover,

contrary to Petitioners' assertions, in conclusion of law number

4, the ALJ expressly stated that the use of stormwater and

groundwater for the purpose of irrigating a golf course and the

use of groundwater for the purpose of temporary household-type

uses, (i.e., drinking water uses at comfort stations,

construction and sales facilities) were reasonable purposes

consistent with the public interest. Thus, Petitioners'

exception number 2 is rejected.

Petitioners' Exception No. 3

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 19, in which the ALJ concludes, among other things, that

the proposed use is consistent with the public interest. Again,

Petitioners maintain that the ALJ sets forth no facts or

reasoning for drawing this conclusion and that such a bare

statement the rule is met does not comply with section

120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat. First, it should be noted that the

ALJ's conclusion of law number 19 is merely a summary of all of

his previous conclusions of law in numbers 1 through 18. It does

not contain any new conclusions not previously drawn by the ALJ

in the Order on Remand. For the reasons stated more fully in our

holdings on Petitioners' exceptions numbers 1 and 2, we find that

the ALJ made sufficient factual findings to reasonably conclude

that the propose use meets the public interest test. Thus,

Petitioners' exception number 3 is rejected.

Petitioners' Exception No. 4

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 6, in which the ALJ concludes that there is no

environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use.

Petitioners argue that Hines failed to conduct an analysis of

surface or groundwater flow, and therefore there is insufficient

basis for the broad conclusion that there will be no

environmental harm caused by the consumptive use. Again,

Petitioners contend that the ALJ sets forth no facts or reasoning

for drawing this conclusion, but merely tracks the statutory

language and that such a bare statement the rule is met does not

comply with section 1 20.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat. Petitioners cite

to portions of the record that they believe support their

position that there is not sufficient data to support the ALJ's

conclusion. Petitioners also contend that the ALJ improperly

referred to a lack of saltwater intrusion and existing legal

users as reasons that this test is met. Petitioners maintain

that the requirements of 40C-2.301 (4)(d) regarding adverse

environmental and economic harm cannot be met by meeting the

saltwater intrusion and existing legal users criteria that are

addressed in other permitting criteria.

Once again, we start by pointing out that section

120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat., applies to factual findings, not to

conclusions of law, such as the one being objected to here.

Next, it appears that in this exception, Petitioners' are

attempting to have us reweigh the evidence and reject the ALJ's

earlier findings of fact in the December 30,1999 Recommended

Order that support this conclusion. We are not at liberty to do

so. In the December 30,1999 Recommended Order, the ALJ made

findings of fact related to the issue of whether the proposed use

would result in environmental or economic harm in findings of

fact numbers 78, 79, 80, 81 and 82. It is not within our purview

to determine whether the record contains evidence contrary to the

Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact, but whether the

finding of fact is supported by competent substantial evidence.

Florida Sugar Cane League v. State Siting Bd. , 580 So.2d 846

(Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Heifetz v. Dept of Business Regulation , 475

So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Notwithstanding that the record

may contain evidence contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's

finding, we are bound by these findings if the record discloses

any competent substantial evidence in support. Bradley , 510

So.2d 1122; West Coast Regional Water Supply Auth. v. Harris , 604

So.2d 892, cause dismissed , 613 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1992). It should

be noted that Petitioners failed to file any exceptions to the

ALJ's findings of fact supporting this conclusion in their

exceptions to the ALJ's December 30, 1999 Recommended Order. Nor

are Petitioners now arguing that the ALJ's findings are not

supported by competent substantial evidence. Instead,

Petitioners appear to be arguing that there are certain specific

tests that Hines should have conducted to support its

application. The District rules do not require any specific test

be conducted to meet the criterion in section 40C-2.301 (4)(d),

F.A.C. The record contains analyses that Hines conducted

regarding surface and groundwater flow. (Hines Exhibits 6, 7 and

25). As evidenced by his findings of fact, the ALJ apparently

determined that the specific types of studies that Petitioners

argue in favor of are not required for him to reach his findings.

We are not free to second guess the ALJ in these factual

determinations. In any event, the record does contain competent

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's factual findings and

conclusion of law. Specifically, the record contains evidence

that, based on Hines' analysis of the potential for saltwater

intrusion in the Floridan aquifer, the potential for water level

drawdowns in the surficial aquifer and/or in adjacent wetlands

and the potential for impacts to ground and surface water

quality, the environmental harm caused by the consumptive use

will be reduced to an acceptable amount. (Silvers Vol. VI: 105).

Hines performed geophysical logging and a step- drawdown test on a

Floridan aquifer well, TW-1, which previously existed on the

site. This test included water quality sampling. (Davidson Vol.

III: 15-16; Hines Ex. 25). The information obtained from the

test was representative of data that exists from other Floridan

aquifer wells in the region, such as the City of St. Augustine's

wellfield, three miles from the project site, and the Dee Dot

Ranch wells. (Davidson Vol. III: 26; Silvers Vol. VI: 108-109).

This information was relied upon by the District's expert to

conclude that the proposed consumptive use will not cause

significant saline water intrusion (to such an extent as to be

inconsistent with the public interest), further aggravate

currently existing saline water intrusion problems, or seriously

harm the water quality of this source of water. (Silvers Vol.

VI: 108-109). As added assurance, District staff recommended a

permit condition that would require Hines to monitor the water

quality in the proposed Floridan aquifer well for indicators that

saltwater intrusion is occurring and to curtail or abate the

saltwater intrusion if it does occur. (Silvers Vol. VI: 109;

District Ex. 4). Moreover, the proposed surficial aquifer wells

will be approximately 70 feet deep. (Silvers Vol. VI: 110).

There are no known sources of saltwater close enough to the

proposed locations of these wells to present a concern regarding

a potential for saltwater intrusion. (Silvers Vol. VI: 110).

Further, the proposed pumping rates are too low to induce

saltwater intrusion. (Silvers Vol. VI: 110). Therefore, the

water quality of this source will not be seriously harmed by the

consumptive use. (Silvers Vol. VI: 110).

Hines performed geologic borings to determine the

characteristics of the surficial aquifer on the project site

property. (Davidson Vol. III: 15). Using the information

obtained from these borings and assuming a pumping rate of

approximately 400 gallons per day from each of the five proposed

surficial aquifer wells, District staff modeled the drawdowns in

the surficial aquifer. (Silvers Vol. VI: 112-113). Even at the

wellhead, the projected drawdown was only approximately one-

hundredth of a foot; this amount of drawdown is too small to be

shown on a map. (Silvers Vol. VI: 112-113). Hines and the

District also evaluated whether the use of surface water to

irrigate the golf course would adversely affect water levels in

Marshall Creek and associated wetlands by reducing the amount of

stormwater runoff going to these areas. ( Frye Vol. V: 25-27;

Miracle Vol.s VI: 142-158, and VII: 38-47). The Marshall Creek

site is Fla. and has sandy soils; these two characteristics

operate to minimize stormwater runoff volumes, and hence surface

flows contribute the smallest component of water to the wetlands

on this site. ( Frye Vol. V: 25, 27, 53-54). As a cautionary

measure, District staff recommended that a condition be placed on

the environmental resource permit for the golf course requiring

Hines to monitor the wetland located adjacent to Pond L ( the

Florida-shaped pond ) for changes resulting from dehydration, and

to mitigate for such changes if they do occur. ( Frye Vol. V: 25,

27). Consequently, the proposed use will not cause the water

table or surface water level to be lowered so that interference

will be caused to existing legal users, nor will stages or

vegetation be adversely and significantly affected on lands other

than those owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by the

applicant. (Silvers Vol. VI: 112-113).

Using the Floridan aquifer characteristics derived from the

geophysical logs and the step- drawdown test, Hines modeled the

drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer based on different pumping

scenarios. (Davidson Vol. III: 16; Hines Ex. 25). The

District's expert reviewed this work and concluded that the

anticipated decline in the potentiometric surface will not

interfere with existing legal users. (Silvers Vol. VI: 114).

Therefore, the proposed use will not cause aquifer potentiometric

surface levels to be lowered so that interference will be caused

to existing legal users. (Silvers Vol. VI: 113).

As to Petitioners' argument that saltwater intrusion should

not be considered in determining whether a proposed use will

result in environmental or economic harm, we disagree. First,

nothing in chapter 373, Fla. Stat., or the District's rules

prohibits such a consideration. Moreover, we believe the ALJ

reasonably interpreted the criteria in 40C-2.301 (4)(d), F.A.C.,

as including a consideration of saltwater intrusion. While

clearly there are other possible environmental and economic

harms, saltwater intrusion is certainly one possible harm that

should be considered in this analysis. The mere fact that other

parts of the District's rules specifically address saltwater

intrusion, does not mean that an ALJ or this Board is prohibited

from considering saltwater intrusion in making its determination

under rule 40C-2.301 (4)(d), F.A.C. Thus, for all of the reasons

described above, Petitioners' exception number 4 is rejected.

Petitioners' Exception No. 5

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 10, in which the AM concludes that the proposed

consumptive use will not cause or contribute to flood damage.

Petitioners assert that the ALJ's finding of fact no. 62 which

addresses flood prevention does not refer to the consumptive use

and that it only refers to off-site flooding. Moreover,

Petitioners conclude that there are insufficient findings of fact

to support the conclusion of law in accordance with section

120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat. Although the ALJ does not reference

any specific findings of fact in conclusion of law no. 10, we

find that there are sufficient findings in the Recommended Order

that support the ALJ's conclusion. Specifically, in finding of

fact number 62 the ALJ found that by not increasing the discharge

rate off-site, the system will not result in off-site flooding

and that to prevent on-site flooding, Hines developed the project

to be flood-free as required by St. Johns County ordinance.

( R.O.: 29) In this finding, the ALJ expressly found that the

construction and operation of the system will not result in on-

site or off-site flooding. Further, finding of fact number 62

expressly found that there would be no on-site flooding.

Moreover, finding of fact number 62 relates to the CUP

application in the sense that it relates to the stormwater

management system, which is the primary source of water for golf

course irrigation and is contained within a section of the

Recommended Order entitled "Water Quantity Considerations," which

is not limited to ERP issues.

In addition, Petitioners contend that the Recommended

Order's Finding of fact number 62 and a statement in our Final

Order and Order of Remand contradict each other. Petitioners are

mistaken. In finding of fact number 62, the ALJ found that by

not increasing the discharge rate off-site, the system does not

cause or contribute to off-site flooding. Our Final Order and

Order of Remand stated that "the post development runoff will

exceed the pre-development runoff and that the increased volumes

of runoff resulting from the placement of impervious surface more

than compensates for the amount used for reuse water to irrigate

the golf course." ( F.O.: 25) These statements are not

contradictory. The ALJ's finding of fact number 62 addresses the

rate of discharge, whereas our finding addresses the volume of

discharge. The rate of discharge and the volume of discharge are

not coterminous. A post-development increase in stormwater

runoff does not necessarily mean that there will be flooding. In

fact, the ALJ made specific findings of fact that addresses how

the increased runoff would be handled ( R.O.: 7-8) and ultimately

found that the system would not result in flooding ( R.O.: 28).

For all of the reasons stated above, Petitioners' exception

number 5 is rejected.

Petitioners Exception No. 6

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 9, in which the ALJ concludes that, with regard to section

40C-2.301 (4)(j), Fla. Stat., "the groundwater sources of water

will not seriously be harmed if the conditions recommended are

met." Petitioners argue that only two water quality samples were

taken from the test well and that these samples showed that the

total dissolved solids parameter is in excess of the 500 mg/l

drinking water standard in section 62-550.320(1), F.A.C.

Petitioners argue that the permit requirement that Hines conduct

tests after the fact does not alleviate Hines' responsibility to

prove that the requirements are met in advance of approval of a

permit. Thus, Petitioners assert that Hines has failed to meet

its burden of proof that the water quality of the source of the

water shall not be seriously harmed by the consumptive use under

section 40C-2.301 (4)a)., F.A.C.

It appears that, by taking exception to conclusion of law

number 9, Petitioners are actually taking exception to the ALJ's

factual findings that support this conclusion. Once again,

Petitioners appear to be arguing that District rules require

certain specified tests to be conducted or a certain specified

number of samples to be taken. Petitioners are mistaken.

District rules do not contain any such requirements. Once again,

Petitioners are attempting to have the Governing Board reweigh

the evidence regarding what types of tests or what numbers of

samples are sufficient. Such a weighing of the evidence is the

job of the ALJ and is beyond our authority. In the December 30,

1999 Recommended Order, the ALJ made numerous findings of fact

which support his conclusion that the "groundwater sources of

water will not be seriously harmed if the conditions are met."

In the Recommended Order, the ALJ made the following

relevant findings: ( i) other similar wells in the area have

pumped for years without inducing saltwater intrusion ( R.O.: 34;

Finding of Fact 78): (ii) tests of an existing on-site well

showed no changes in water quality ( R.O.: 34; Finding of Fact

78); (iii) an additional pump test will be required to

demonstrate that no saltwater intrusion is occurring ( R.O.: 34;

Finding of Fact 78); (iv) water quality data indicate that the

surficial aquifer in the area meets secondary drinking water

standards ( R.O.: 35; Finding of Fact 80); (v) there is no

underlying saline water in the surficial aquifer ( R.O.: 35;

Finding of Fact 80); (vi) the wells are not located near a source

of lateral saline water intrusion ( R.O. 35; Finding of Fact 80);

(vii) the proposed pumping rates are so low, they will not cause

hydraulic pressure changes which would induce saltwater intrusion

( R.O.: 35; Finding of Fact 80); (viii) the low rate of pumping

from the surficial aquifer wells means that off-site vegetation

will not be adversely affected through lowered water levels or

stages ( R.O.: 35; Finding of Fact 81 ); and (ix) water in the

surficial aquifer will be periodically tested to ensure no

chemicals leak into the surficial aquifer ( R.O.: 35; Finding of

Fact 82). Thus, there is ample competent substantial evidence to

support the ALJ's determination that the groundwater sources of

water will not be seriously hammed Petitioners' reliance on

Metropolitan Dade County v. Coscan Flori da, Inc. 609 So.2d 644

(Fla. 3d DCA 1992), is misplaced. In Coscan , the permit

applicant and the agency had conducted no analysis as to whether

the project at issue would meet water quality standards. Id. At

648. The District Court concluded that the agency must make "an

effort to project at [the application] stage what the effects of

the proposed project will be." Id. In the instant case the ALJ

relied upon the District staff's analysis of the proposed effects

to groundwater. In addition to the application materials and

hydrogeological reports of on-site testing (Hines Exhibits 6, 7,

25, 26, 27 and 28), District expert Silvers conducted her own

independent analyses of the effects of the consumptive use.

Silvers testified that further testing was not necessary to

provide reasonable assurances because ( i) the applicant

adequately demonstrated the aquifer characteristics; (ii) the

applicant adequately conducted the analytical modeling; (iii)

Silvers is aware of the saltwater interface based on past

investigations in the area; (iv) there was no potential for "up-

coming" of saltwater due to the shallowness of the wells and the

proposed withdrawal rates; (v) the applicant conducted draw-down

tests on the site; and (vi) the water quality from the tests are

consistent with regional data. (Transcript Volume VI, pages 108-

09, 127 and 132-34). Thus, there is ample evidence at hearing to

support a conclusion that analyses were conducted and reasonable

assurances have been provided

For all of the reasons set forth above, Petitioners'

exception number 6 is rejected.

Petitioners Exception No. 7

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 13, in which the ALJ concludes that the public interest

test contained in paragraph 40C-2.301 (2)(c), F.A.C., is met

because Hines is proposing to use the lowest quality sources of

water available while avoiding adverse impacts to existing legal

users and the water resources. Again, Petitioners argue that the

requirements that the consumptive use utilize the lowest quality

water source and not interfere with existing legal users are

separate tests, which presumably Petitioners believe cannot be

considered in making a public interest determination. Further,

Petitioners contend that the conclusion that the public interest

test is met does not have the supporting corresponding factual

specificity required by section 120.569(2)(m), Fla. Stat.

Nothing in chapter 373, Fla. Stat., or the District's rules

prohibits a consideration of the lowest quality source of water

or potential effects on existing legal users as part of the

public interest analysis. Petitioners appear to be arguing that

the ALJ cannot rely on the same finding of fact to support more

than one conclusion of law. We disagree. We believe the ALJ

reasonably interpreted the criteria in 40C-2.301 (2)(c), F.A.C.,

as including a consideration of the quality of the source of

water used and potential impacts to existing legal users. While

clearly there are other possible considerations that could factor

into a public interest determination, the quality of the water

source and the impact on existing legal users certainly are

factors that should be considered in this analysis. The mere

fact that other parts of the District's rules also address these

matters does not mean that an ALJ or this Board is prohibited

from considering these matters in making its public interest

determination under rule 40C-2.301 (2)(c), F.A.C.

As to Petitioners' argument regarding the factual support

for the ALJ's conclusions of law that the public interest test is

met, we have addressed that issue in our rulings on Petitioners'

exceptions 1 and 2, above. Thus, for all of the reasons

described above, Petitioners' exception number 7 is rejected.

Petitioners Exception No. 8

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 14, in which the ALJ concludes that "In addition, none of

the six specific reasons for denial listed in Subsection 40C-

2.301 (5), [ F.A.C.], must be applicable to the applicant."

Apparently Petitioners read this sentence as meaning that the ALJ

"exempted" Hines from this section of the rule. We believe that

Petitioners have misinterpreted the ALJ's statement. A careful

reading of the ALJ's Order on Remand indicates that this sentence

merely introduces his treatment of rule 40C-2.301(5), F.A.C., in

the balance of conclusion of law number 14 and conclusions of law

numbers 15 through 18. In each of these conclusions, the ALJ

explains how the facts of this case do not invoke the reasons for

denial in this rule. In other words, contrary to the

Petitioners' assertion, the ALJ is not "exempting" Hines from the

reasons for denial in the rule. Instead, the ALJ is saying that

for the permit to be issued, none of these six reasons for denial

must be invoked. The ALJ then explains why they are not invoked

under the facts of this case. Thus, this portion of Petitioners'

exception number 8 is rejected.

Further in this exception, Petitioners also express concern

with the ALJ's statement that subparagraphs 40C-2.301 (5)(a)1 and

40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., do not apply. We agree with Petitioners

with regard to 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C.. We have already addressed

this issue in our ruling granting the District's exception number

2. As to 40C-2.301 (5)(a)1, however, Petitioners are mistaken.

In his conclusion of law number 14, the ALJ analyzed rule 40C-

2.301 (5)(a)1, F.A.C. and found that based on the specific facts

of this case, it does not apply -- i.e., the proposed use of

water will not significantly induce saline water encroachment in

this case. Thus, Petitioners' exception 8 is accepted in part

and rejected in part.

Petitioners Exception No. 9

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 15, in which the ALJ concludes that subparagraph 40C-2.301

(5)(a)2 and subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., do not apply.

Petitioners contend that these sections do apply and that because

Hines failed to conduct an analysis of surface or groundwater

flow, there was no factual basis for any conclusion that surface

water levels will not be lowered so that stages or vegetation

will be adversely and significantly affected on lands other than

those owned, leased or otherwise controlled by the applicant.

Petitioners make factual arguments, citing to various expert

witness testimony from the transcript, that they believe are

contrary to the ALJ's conclusion.

First, we agree with Petitioners that rule 40C-2.301 (2),

F.A.C., does apply in this case. We addressed this issue in our

ruling on the District's exception number 2 above. As to the

applicability of rule 40C-2.301 (5)(a)2, F.A.C., the ALJ did not

exempt Hines from this rule. The ALJ analyzed rule 40C-2.301

(5)(a)2, F.A.C., and determined that based on the specific facts

of this case, that rule Does not apply" -- i.e., the proposed use

will not cause the water table or surface water level to be

lowered so that stages or vegetation will be adversely and

significantly affected on lands other than those owned, leased or

otherwise controlled by the applicant.

As to Petitioners' arguments regarding the factual

underpinnings for these conclusions, we find that the ALJ did

provide sufficient findings of facts to reach the conclusion that

rule 40C-2.301 (5)(a)2, F.A.C., is not invoked in this case.

Specifically, the ALJ's findings of fact number 81 ( R.O.: 35) in

the December 30, 1999 Recommended Order states that maximum

drawdown from the surficial aquifer withdrawals will be

approximately 0.01 feet.

The remainder of Petitioners' exception number 9 is nothing

more than a rearguing of the evidence. As described more fully

above in our ruling on Petitioners exception 4, we are not free

to reweigh the evidence. Thus, Petitioners' exception number 9

is accepted in part and rejected in part.

Petitioners Exception No. 10

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 16, in which the ALJ concludes that subparagraph 40C-2.301

(5)(a)3 and subsection 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., do not apply.

Again, we agree with Petitioners that 40C-2.301 (2), F.A.C., is

applicable. We addressed this issue in our ruling on District

exception number 2. As to the applicability of rule 40C-2.301

(5)(a)3, F.A.C., the ALJ did not exempt Hines from this rule.

The ALJ analyzed rule 40C-2.301 (5)(a)3, F.A.C., and determined

that based on the specific facts of this case, that rule does not

apply -- i.e., the proposed use will not cause the water table or

aquifer potentiometric surface level to be lowered so that

significant and adverse impacts will affect existing legal users.

In the remainder of this exception, Petitioners once again

reargue the weight of the evidence. We are not free to reweigh

the evidence in this Final Order. In addition, Petitioners

assert that the applicant has not provided reasonable assurance

that the proposed consumptive use will not interfere with

existing legal uses because a "full-blown pump test" will not be

performed until after the permit is issued and the proposed well

is constructed. The applicant must provide "reasonable

assurance" that the applicable requirements of sections 40C-

2.301, Fla. Admin. Code, have been met. This standard has been

deemed not to require an absolute guarantee that a violation of a

rule is a scientific impossibility, only that its non-occurrence

is reasonably assured by accounting for foreseeable

contingencies. Manasota 88 v. Agrico , 12 FALR 1319, 1325 ( DER

1990) aff'd 576 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). See also , Adams v.

Resort Village Utility , 18 FALR 1682, 1701 ( DEP 1996).

(applicant required to show a substantial likelihood that the

project will be successfully implemented in accordance with the

rules, but not to provide an absolute guarantee that the project

will comply with all the rules). The ALJ determined that the

groundwater modeling provided sufficient reasonable assurances.

See R.O.: 33, Finding of Fact 79 and Order on Remand: 6,

Conclusion of Law 16. For these reasons, Petitioners' exception

no. 10 is accepted in part and rejected in part.

Petitioners Exception No. 11

Petitioners take exception to recommended conclusion of law

number 17, in which the ALJ concludes that subsection 40C-2.301

(2), F.A.C., does not apply. We agree with Petitioners. We have

already addressed this issue in our ruling on the District's

exception 2. Thus, Petitioners' exception 11 is accepted.

Petitioners Exception No. 12

Petitioners take exception to the ALJ's recommended

conclusion of law number 19. Conclusion of law number 19

contains the ALJ's ultimate conclusion that the proposed water

use complies with the District's criteria for permit issuance.

Petitioners do not provide any specific reasons for this

exception. Petitioners merely state that the exception is "as

addressed more specifically above." Without a more specific

statement for the basis of these two exceptions, it is difficult

to address these exceptions in detail. We find that the ALJ made

sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support

this ultimate conclusion. Petitioners' arguments "addressed more

specifically above" exception number 12 have been addressed above

in this Final Order. Thus, Petitioners' exception number 12 is

rejected.

FINAL ORDER

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

The portions of the Recommended Order dated December 30,

1999, attached hereto, relating to the CUP application as well as

the Order on Remand dated April 26, 2000 are adopted in their

entirety except as modified by the final action of the Governing

Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District in the

rulings on Petitioners' Exceptions 8, 9, 10 and 11 and District's

Exceptions 1, 2, and 3. Hines' application number 50827 for an

individual consumptive use permit is hereby granted under the

terms and conditions contained in the District's proposed agency

action as set forth in the Technical Staff Report dated October

19, 1999, attached hereto, with the addition of the following

condition:

1) The Permittee must submit a proposal to

periodically monitor the water quality of the

proposed surficial wells for indications that

the chemicals being applied on the golf

course are leaching into the surficial

aquifer. At a minimum, this plan must

include monitoring frequency, parameters, and

duration, well locations and method of

reporting data. The draft plan must be

submitted to the District in conjunction with

the Integrated Pest Management Plan required

to be submitted under ERP no. 4-109-0216.

After receiving written approval from the

District staff of a surficial water quality

monitoring plan, the permittee must implement

the approved plan.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of June, 2000, in Palatka,

Florida.

ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

BY:________________________

WILLIAM W. KERR CHAIRMAN

RENDERED this 15th day of June, 2000.

BY:________________________

SANDRA BERTRAM

DISTRICT CLERK

Copies to:

Deborah J. Andrews, Esquire

11 N. Roscoe Blvd.

Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082

Peter Belmont, Esquire

102 Fareham Place, North

St. Petersburg, Florida 33701

Marsha P. Tjoflat, Esquire

Lynne Matson, Esquire

Rogers, Towers, Bailey,

Jones & Gay, P.A.

1301 Riverplace Blvd.

Suite 1500

Jacksonville, FL 32207

John G. Metcalf, Esquire

Tom Jenks, Esquire

Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks, Miller

& Reisch

200 W. Forsyth Street

Suite 1400

Jacksonville, FL 32202

Veronika Thiebach, Esquire

Jennifer Springfield, Esquire

St. Johns River Water Management

District

P. O. Box 1429

Palatka, FL 32178-1429

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

1. Any substantially affected person who claims that final

action of the District constitutes an unconstitutional taking of

property without just compensation may seek review of the action

in circuit court pursuant to Section 373.617, Florida Statutes,

and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedures, by filing an action

within 90 days of rendering of the final District action.

2. Pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, a party

who is adversely affected by final District action may seek

review of the action in the district court of appeal by filing a

notice of appeal pursuant to Fla.R.App. 9.110 within 30 days of

the rendering of the final District action.

3. A party to the proceeding who claims that a District

order is inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of Chapter

373, Florida Statutes, may seek review of the order pursuant to

Section 373.114, Florida Statutes, by the Land and Water

Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) by filing a request for

review with the Commission and serving a copy on the Department

of Environmental Protection and any person named in the order

within 20 days of adoption of a rule or the rendering of the

District order.

4. A District action or order is considered "rendered"

after it is signed by the Chairman of the Governing Board on

behalf of the District and is filed by the District Clerk.

5. Failure to observe the relevant time frames for filing a

petition for judicial review as described in paragraphs #1 or #2

or for Commission review as described in paragraph #3 will result

in waiver of that right to review.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF

RIGHTS has been furnished by United States Mail to:

Deborah J. Andrews, Esquire

11 North Roscoe Blvd

Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082

At 4:00 P.M. this 15th day of June, 2000.

CERTIFIED MAIL # Z 229 564 559

____________________________

SANDRA L. BERTRAM

DISTRICT CLERK

St. Johns River Water

Management District

Post Office Box 1429

Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

1. Any substantially affected person who claims that final

action of the District constitutes an unconstitutional taking of

property without just compensation may seek review of the action

in circuit court pursuant to Section 373.617, Florida Statutes,

and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedures, by filing an action

within 90 days of rendering of the final District action.

2. Pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, a party

who is adversely affected by final District action may seek

review of the action in the district court of appeal by filing a

notice of appeal pursuant to Fla.R.App. 9.110 within 30 days of

the rendering of the final District action.

3. A party to the proceeding who claims that a District

order is inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of Chapter

373, Florida Statutes, may seek review of the order pursuant to

Section 373.114, Florida Statutes, by the Land and Water

Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) by filing a request for

review with the Commission and serving a copy on the Department

of Environmental Protection and any person named in the order

within 20 days of adoption of a rule or the rendering of the

District order.

4. A District action or order is considered "rendered"

after it is signed by the Chairman of the Governing Board on

behalf of the District and is filed by the District Clerk.

5. Failure to observe the relevant time frames for filing a

petition for judicial review as described in paragraphs #1 or #2

or for Commission review as described in paragraph #3 will result

in waiver of that right to review.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF

RIGHTS has been furnished by United States Mail to:

Peter Belmont, Esquire

102 Fareham Place North

St Petersburg, FL 33701

At 4:00 P.M. this 15th day of June, 2000.

CERTIFIED MAIL # Z 229 564 562

____________________________

SANDRA L. BERTRAM

DISTRICT CLERK

St. Johns River Water

Management District

Post Office Box 1429

Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

1. Any substantially affected person who claims that final

action of the District constitutes an unconstitutional taking of

property without just compensation may seek review of the action

in circuit court pursuant to Section 373.617, Florida Statutes,

and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedures, by filing an action

within 90 days of rendering of the final District action.

2. Pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, a party

who is adversely affected by final District action may seek

review of the action in the district court of appeal by filing a

notice of appeal pursuant to Fla.R.App. 9.110 within 30 days of

the rendering of the final District action.

3. A party to the proceeding who claims that a District

order is inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of Chapter

373, Florida Statutes, may seek review of the order pursuant to

Section 373.114, Florida Statutes, by the Land and Water

Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) by filing a request for

review with the Commission and serving a copy on the Department

of Environmental Protection and any person named in the order

within 20 days of adoption of a rule or the rendering of the

District order.

4. A District action or order is considered "rendered"

after it is signed by the Chairman of the Governing Board on

behalf of the District and is filed by the District Clerk.

5. Failure to observe the relevant time frames for filing a

petition for judicial review as described in paragraphs #1 or #2

or for Commission review as described in paragraph #3 will result

in waiver of that right to review.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF

RIGHTS has been furnished by United States Mail to:

Marsha P. Tjoflat, Esquire

1301 Riverplace Boulevard

Suite 1500

Jacksonville, FL 32207

At 4:00 P.M. this 15th day of June, 2000.

CERTIFIED MAIL # Z 229 564 560

____________________________

SANDRA L. BERTRAM

DISTRICT CLERK

St. Johns River Water

Management District

Post Office Box 1429

Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

1. Any substantially affected person who claims that final

action of the District constitutes an unconstitutional taking of

property without just compensation may seek review of the action

in circuit court pursuant to Section 373.617, Florida Statutes,

and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedures, by filing an action

within 90 days of rendering of the final District action.

2. Pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, a party

who is adversely affected by final District action may seek

review of the action in the district court of appeal by filing a

notice of appeal pursuant to Fla.R.App. 9.110 within 30 days of

the rendering of the final District action.

3. A party to the proceeding who claims that a District

order is inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of Chapter

373, Florida Statutes, may seek review of the order pursuant to

Section 373.114, Florida Statutes, by the Land and Water

Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) by filing a request for

review with the Commission and serving a copy on the Department

of Environmental Protection and any person named in the order

within 20 days of adoption of a rule or the rendering of the

District order.

4. A District action or order is considered "rendered"

after it is signed by the Chairman of the Governing Board on

behalf of the District and is filed by the District Clerk.

5. Failure to observe the relevant time frames for filing a

petition for judicial review as described in paragraphs #1 or #2

or for Commission review as described in paragraph #3 will result

in waiver of that right to review.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF

RIGHTS has been furnished by United States Mail to:

John G. Metcalf, Esquire

Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks, Miller & Reisch

200 W. Forsyth Street

Suite 1400

Jacksonville, FL 32202

At 4:00 P.M. this 15th day of June, 2000.

CERTIFIED MAIL # Z 229 564 561

____________________________

SANDRA L. BERTRAM

DISTRICT CLERK

St. Johns River Water

Management District

Post Office Box 1429

Palatka, Florida 32178-1429