16-005778 Jose A. Ramirez vs. Gca Service Group Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, April 26, 2017.

Summary: Pet. failed to prove that Resp. terminated his employment based on race & did not identify similarly situated coworkers who were not discharged or were treated more favorably. Resp. presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

JOSE A. RAMIREZ,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 5778

GCA SERVICE GROUP,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The final hearing in this matter was conducte d before

J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and

120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2016), 1/ on December 8, 2016, in

Orlando, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Jose Ramirez , pr o se

1525 Ravana Drive

Orlando, Florida 32822

For Respondent: Grissel T. Seijo, Esquire

Littler Mendelson, PC

Wells Fargo Center, Suite 2700

333 Southeast 2nd Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner, Jose A. Ramirez, was subject to an

unlawful employment practice by Respondent, GCA Service Group,

based on his race, color, or national origin in violation of the

Florida Civi l Rights Act.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(the ÐCommissionÑ) alleging that Respondent, GCA Service Group

(ÐGCAÑ), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, by discriminating

against him based on his race, color, and national origin.

The Commission failed to determine whether there was

reasonable cause for PetitionerÓs complaint within 180 days of

the filing of the complaint in accordance with section 760.11(8 ) ,

Florida Statutes . Therefore, on June 16, 2016, the Commission

issued a Notice of Dismissal to allow Petitioner to proceed with

an action under section 760.11(4).

Petitioner elected to request an administrative hearing

under section 760.11(4)(b). The reafter, on September 16, 2016,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission

alleging a discriminatory employment practice against GCA. On

October 5, 2016, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the

Division of Administrative Hearings (Ð DOAHÑ) to conduct a

c hapter 120 evidentiary hearing.

The final hearing was held on December 8, 2016. At the

final hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf.

Petitioner did not present exhibits or witnesses. GCA presented

the testimony of Jorge Ri vera, Reina Bermudez, and Thomas Pugh.

GCA Exhibits 1 through 6 were admitted into evidence.

A one - volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with

DOAH on February 23, 2017. At the close of the hearing, the

parties were advised of a ten - day timefra me following receipt of

the hearing transcript at DOAH to file post - hearing submittals.

Following GCAÓs request, the parties agreed to a deadline for

filing post - hearing submissions more than ten days a fter the

filing of the hearing t ranscript. Petitione r filed a ÐSummaryÑ

statement which was considered in preparing this Recommended

Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. Petitioner is a former route driver for GCA. Petitioner

began working for GCA in June 2012.

2. Generally, GCA contracts with rental car companies , such

as Avis, Budget, and Enterprise, to move and transfer vehicles

between rental car facilities and locations.

3. In 2015, Petitioner supported the GCA services contract

at the Avis rental car facility at the Orlando International

Airport. The Avis - O rlando location employed between 60 to 100

route drivers. The majority of these drivers were Hispanic.

4. On August 15, 2015, Petitioner requested 30 days off

from work as personal leave. Petitioner submitted the

appropriate Time Off Request Form to his immediate supervisor

seeking a leave of absence from August 16, 2015, through

September 15, 2015. Petitioner recorded that the reason for his

leave was a personal/family situation.

5. Thomas Pugh, GCAÓs account m anager for the Avis

contr act, authorized PetitionerÓs 30 - day leave of absence.

Mr. Pugh was also responsible for scheduling the route drivers

for the Avis - Orlando location. Based on PetitionerÓs return date

of September 15, 2015, Mr. Pugh scheduled Petitioner for work on

September 20 through 2 2, 2015.

6. Petitioner did not return to work on September 20, 2015.

Neither did Petitioner report to GCA on September 21 or 22, 2015.

No evidence shows that Petitioner attempted to communicate with

GCA, Mr. Pugh, or any of his supervisors between Septe mber 15 and

September 24, 2015 (the date Petitioner was officially

terminated).

7. According to GCA company policy, an employee who is a

Ðno call, no showÑ for three consecutive shifts is automatica lly

terminated. Consequently, w hen Petitioner failed to report to

work on September 20, 21, and 22, 2015, Mr. Pugh determined that

Petitioner should be fired. On September 24, 2015, GCA

officially terminated PetitionerÓs employment. The GCA

employment document notating PetitionerÓs termination date

records Ðt erm because exceeded 30 days.Ñ

8. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that on

September 24, 2015, he called Reina Bermudez, the assistant to

the ac count manager, to request a ten - day extension of his

personal leave. 2/ Petitioner claimed that durin g that phone call,

Ms. Bermudez authorized him to remain on leave until October 15,

2015.

9. Petitioner finally appeared at the Avis - Orlando work

site on October 13, 2015. There, he requested to meet with

Mr . Pugh and Jorge Rivera, GCAÓs h uman r esources m anager.

However, neither Mr. Pugh nor Mr. Rivera were available to see

Petitioner.

10. Mr. Rivera called Petitioner the following day.

Mr. Rivera testified that Petitioner told him that he had not

returned to GCA on September 15, 2015, because he had gone to

Cuba to handle family personal issues. When Mr. Rivera responded

that GCA would not reconsider its decision to terminate him,

Petitioner became upset and threatened to file a discrimination

lawsuit against GCA.

11. On March 7, 2016, Petitioner d id, in fact, initiate a

claim alleging discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil

Rights Act (ÐFCRAÑ). Petitioner asserts that GCA discriminated

against him based on his race, color, and national origin.

Petitioner is black and Hispanic. He repres ents that he is from

Cuba. Petitioner identifies Mr. Pugh as the individual who

discriminated against him.

12. At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that GCAÓs

discrimination actually began in May 2015. That month, GCA

significantly reduced his work hours. Petitioner complained that

GCA (Mr. Pugh) scheduled more work days for drivers with less

seniority that him. Petitioner also claimed that GCA (Mr. Pugh)

scheduled non - minority drivers for more work assignments than

him. Specifically, Petitioner identified a former co - worker

named William Genao , who worked more days than Petitioner.

13. In addition to the scheduling disparity, Petitioner

charged GCA with wrongfully denying him leave authorized under

the Family and Medical Leave Act (ÐFMLAÑ). Pet itioner insisted

that GCA should have allowed him to take FMLA leave after

September 15, 2015. 3/ Petitioner provided the name of Hector

Prieto, a white employee, who used FMLA while working for GCA.

14. Petitioner also declared that GCA discouraged him f rom

joining a union. Petitioner stated that GCA issued several memos

opposing union membership. In light of this material, Petitioner

feared GCA would fire him if he joined the local union. In

support of his position, Petitioner identified two non - white co -

workers who m Petitioner alleged , GCA fired because they were

union delegates.

15. Finally, Petitioner accused GCA of promoting white

employees over him. Petitioner identified a co - worker named

Samuel Rojas , who m GCA treated differently. 4/

16. Mr. Pu gh testified at the final hearing on behalf of

GCA. As the GCA a ccount m anager for the Avis/Budget account,

Mr. Pugh relayed that he is in charge of GCAÓs overall operations

for the Avis contract at the Orlando International Airport. His

responsibilitie s include scheduling route drivers.

17. Mr. Pugh stated that GCA terminated Petitioner based on

Ðjob abandonment.Ñ Petitioner did not return to work after his

30 days for personal leave ended on September 15, 2015.

Therefore, GCA fired him.

18. Mr. Pug h personally approved PetitionerÓs leave request

on August 15, 2015, and authorized Petitioner to take 30 days of

personal leave through September 15, 2015. Mr. Pugh stated that

GCA company policy allows the location manager to approve

personal leave up t o 30 days. Mr. Pugh relayed that he did not

speak to Petitioner when he submitted his leave request.

Petitioner had already left work by the time Mr. Pugh reviewed

his Time Off Request Form. Mr. Pugh was under the impression

that Petitioner requested le ave so that he could travel to Cuba

due to a family situation.

19. Regarding PetitionerÓs complaint of reduced work hours

in May 2015, Mr. Pugh explained that driversÓ schedules are based

on customer demand. In May 2015, Avis needed fewer cars moved to

a nd from its airport location. Therefore, the Avis account

required less drivers. Consequently, almost every route driver

transferring Avis vehicles saw their work days reduced. Mr. Pugh

normally tried to schedule drivers to work approximately three

days a week. Because of the lower demand in May 2015, Mr. Pugh

was forced to cut the driversÓ schedules to only two days a week.

Mr. Pugh explained that he schedules drivers based on hire date.

All the drivers he scheduled in May 2015 had comparable seniori ty

to Petitioner.

20. Jorje Rivera testified regarding GCAÓs decision to

terminate Petitioner. Mr. Rivera explained that GCA allows its

employees to take up to 30 days of personal leave (not including

FMLA). Mr. Rivera confirmed that Mr. Pugh only had a uthority to

approve leave up to 30 days. GCA upper management approval is

required if an employee requests more than 30 days leave.

21. Ms. Bermudez testified that she recalled receiving a

phone call from Petitioner on or about September 24, 2015. She

r emembered that Petitioner requested an extension of his leave so

that he could assist a sick family member. Ms. Bermudez

recounted that she advised Petitioner that she did not have the

authority to approve his leave extension. Therefore, she told

him tha t she would forward his request up to the appropriate

manager.

22. Thereafter, Ms. Bermudez contacted Jackie Rivera in GCA

management to relay PetitionerÓs request to extend his time off.

Ms. Rivera, however, informed Ms. Bermudez that PetitionerÓs

leave extension request would not be granted because he had been

off the driver schedule for over 28 days. Ms. Bermudez then

called Petitioner several times to try and convey the message

that GCA did not approve his leave request. However, she could

not reach him.

23. Mr. Pugh and Mr. Rivera testified that neither

PetitionerÓs race nor national origin had any bearing on GCAÓs

decision to terminate his employment. GCAÓs decision was based

solely on PetitionerÓs failure to return to work following his

30 - day l eave of absence.

24. In response to the testimony from Mr. Pugh and

Mr. Rivera, Petition er denied that he told them he went to Cuba

in September or October 2015. Instead, Petitioner produced

evidence that he was sworn in as a United States citizen on

No vember 18, 2015.

25. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the

record , the preponderance of the evide nce does not establish that

GCA discriminated against Petitioner based on race, color, or

national origin. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to mee t his

burden of proving that GCA discriminated against him in violation

of the FCRA.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

26. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

cause pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57 (1), and 760.11(4)(b)

and (6), Florida Statutes. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y -

4.016.

27. Petitioner brings this matter alleging that GCA

discriminated against him based on his race, color, and national

origin in violation of the FCRA. The FCRA prote cts individuals

from discrimination in the workplace. See §§ 760.10 and 760.11,

Fla. Stat. Section 760.10 states, in pertinent part:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

for an employer:

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

hire any individua l, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with

respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such

individualÓs race, color, religion, sex,

pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or

marital status.

28. Section 760.11(8) states that if the Commission Ðfails

to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on

any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of

the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under [section

760.11(

reasonable cause.Ñ Section 760.11(4)(b) permits a party , for

who m the Commission determines there is reasonable cause to

believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred , to request

an administrative hearing before DOAH. Following an

administrative hearing, if the Administrative Law Judge (ÐALJÑ)

finds that a violation of the FCRA has occurred, the ALJ Ðshall

issue an appropriate recommended order in accordance with chapter

120 prohibiting the practic e and providing affirmative relief

from the effects of the practice, including back pay.Ñ See

§ 760.11(6), Fla. Stat.

29. The burden of proof in an administrative proceeding,

absent a statutory directive to the contrary, is on the party

asserting the af firmative of the issue. DepÓt of Transp. v.

J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also DepÓt of

Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern &

Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996)(ÐThe general rule is that a

party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of

presenting evidence as to that issue.Ñ). The preponderance of the

evidence standard is applicable to this matter. See

§ 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

30. The FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil

Right s Act of 1964, as amended. Accordingly, Florida courts hold

that federal decisions construing Title VII are applicable when

considering claims under the FCRA. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't

Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Valenzuela v.

GlobeGr ound N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); and

Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923, 925 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA

1996).

31. Discrimination may be proven by direct, statistical, or

circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22. Direct

evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence

of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without

any inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d

1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); and Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d

1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have held that ÐÒonly the

most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate . . .Ó will constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.Ñ Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. ,

196 F.3d 1354, 1358 - 59 (11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted).

32. Petitioner presented no direct evidence of race, color,

or national origin discrimination on the part of GCA. Similarly,

the record in this proceeding contains no statistical evidence of

discriminat ion by GCA in its decision affecting Petitioner.

33. In the absence of direct or statistical evidence of

discriminatory intent, Petitioner must rely on circumstantial

evidence of discrimination to prove his case. For discrimination

claims involving circu mstantial evidence, Florida courts follow

the three - part, burden - shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.

2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. See also Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d

at 21 - 22; and St. Lou is v. Fla. Int'l Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455, 458

(Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

34. In a race discrimination action, a petitioner bears the

initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a

prima faci e case, the petitioner must show that: (1) he belongs

to a protected class (race, class, or national origin); (2) he

was qualified for his position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse

employment action; and (4) his employer treated similarly - situated

empl oyees outside of his protected class more favorably than he

was treated. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 - 04; Burke -

Fowler v. Orange Cnty. , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

35. Demonstrating a prima facie case is not difficult, but

rather only requires the petitioner Ðto establish facts adequate

to permit an inference of discrimination.Ñ Holifield , 115 F.3d

at 1562.

36. If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case, he

creates a presumption of discrimination. At that point, the

burden shi fts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action. See

Valenzuela , supra , at 22. The reason for the employerÓs decision

should be clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence.

See DepÓt of Corr . v. Chandler , 582 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1991). The employer has the burden of production, not the

burden of persuasion, to demonstrate to the finder of fact that

the decision was non - discriminatory. See Flowers v. Troup C n ty.

803 F.3d 1327, 13 36 (11th Cir. 2015) . This burden of production

is Ðexceedingly light.Ñ Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1564. The

employer only needs to produce evidence of a reason for its

decision. It is not required to persuade the trier of fact that

its decision was actuall y motivated by the reason given. See

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1993).

37. If the employer meets its burden, the presumption of

discrimination disappears. The burden then shifts back to the

petitioner to prove that the employerÓ s proffered reason was not

the true reason but merely a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. See

Combs v. Plantation Patterns , 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir.

1997); Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 25.

38. In order to satisfy this final step of the process, the

petitio ner must show Ðdirectly that a discriminatory reason more

likely than not motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing

that the proffered reason for the . . . decision is not worthy of

belief.Ñ Chandler , 582 So. 2d at 1186 (citing Tex. Dep't of

Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252 - 256 (1981)). The

proffered explanation is unworthy of belief if the petitioner

demonstrates "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered

legitimate rea sons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

could find them unworthy of credence.Ñ Combs , 106 F.3d at 1538;

see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133,

143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). The petitioner

must prove t hat the reasons articulated were false and that the

discrimination was the real reason for the action. City of Miami

v. Hervis , 65 So. 3d 1110, 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)(citing

St. Mary's Honor Ctr . , 509 U.S. at 515)("[A] reason cannot be

proved to be 'a p retext for discrimination ' unless it is shown

both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the

real reason.").

39. Despite the shifting burdens of proof, Ðthe ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

times with the plaintiff.Ñ Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct.

at 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207; Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22.

40. Applying the burden - shifting analysis to the facts

found in this matter, Petiti oner did not meet his burden of

proving that GCA discriminated against him based on his race,

color, or national origin. Petitioner presented sufficient

evidence to establish the first three prongs of the prima facie

case in that he proved that he belongs to a protected class, was

qualified to perform as a route driver, and was subject to an

adverse employment action (termination). However, Petitioner

failed to establish that GCA treated similarly situated, non -

minority employees differently.

41. In dete rmining whether employees are similarly situated

for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Ð[w]hen

comparing similarly situated individuals to raise an inference of

discriminatory motivation, these individuals must be similarly

situated in all relev ant respects.Ñ Jackson v. BellSouth

Telecomm. , 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (l1th Cir. 2004). The standard is

a Ðfairly rigorous one.Ñ Rioux v. City of Atlanta , 520 F.3d

1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008); Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1562. "The

quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be

nearly identical to prevent courts from second - guessing employers'

reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges."

McCann v. Tillman , 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 - 74 (11th Cir. 2008); see

also Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Co mmc'ns , 738 F.2d 1181, 1185

(11th Cir. 1984)("[T]he misconduct for which [the petitioner] was

discharged [must be] nearly identical to that engaged in by an

employee outside the protected class whom the employer

retained.").

42. At the final hearing, Pet itioner did not present

evidence or testimony identifying a non - minority route driver,

Ðsimilarly situated in all relevant respects,Ñ who was not

terminated for failing to report to work following 30 days of

leave. Although Petitioner offered the names of several co -

workers who GCA allegedly treated differently, Petitioner did not

show that any of these individuals were not fired for Ðjob

abandonmentÑ and/or missing three consecutive work shifts.

Accordingly, the competent substantial evidence in the reco rd

does not support PetitionerÓs allegation that GCA treated him

differently than other similarly situated employees based on his

race, color, or national origin. Therefore, Petitioner failed to

prove a prima facie case of discrimination by circumstantial

evidence.

43. Assuming, a rguendo , that Petitioner did establish a

prima facie case of discrimination, GCA articulated a legitimate,

non - discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner. GCAÓs

burden to refute PetitionerÓs prima facie case is light. GCA met

this burden by providing credible testimony that its decision to

fire Petitioner was based on Ðjob abandonment.Ñ

44. Completing the McDonnell Douglas burden - shifting

analysis (again, assuming that Petitioner made a prima facie

showing of discriminati on), Petitioner did not prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that GCAÓs stated reasons for

terminating him were not its true reasons, but were merely a

ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. The evidentiary record in this

proceeding does not support a findin g or conclusion that GCAÓs

proffered explanation for firing Petitioner was false or not

worthy of credence. Petitioner indisputably did not appear for

work after his 30 days of personal leave ended on September 15,

2015. Neither did he report to GCA on S eptember 20, 21, or 22,

2015. As credibly represented by Mr. Pugh, GCA company policy

was to terminate a Ðno call, no showÑ employee who was absent

three consecutive work days. Accordingly, the facts found in

this matter do not support a finding that GCA Ós proffered reason

for terminating PetitionerÓs employment was a pretext for

discrimination.

45. At the final hearing, Petitioner expressed frustration

with GCAÓs decision to fire him instead of extending his leave by

30 days. It should be noted, howeve r, that in a proceeding under

the FCRA, the court is Ðnot in the business of adjudging whether

employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, [the courtÓs]

sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates

a challenged employment decisi on.Ñ Damon , 196 F.3d at 1361. Not

everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable

adverse action. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla. , 245 F.3d 1232,

1238 (11th Cir. 2001). For example, an employer may fire an

employee Ðfor a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on

erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action

is not for a discriminatory reason.Ñ Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall

CommcÓns , 738 F.2d at 1187. An employee cannot succeed by simply

quarreling with the wisdom of the em ployer's reasons. Chapman v.

AI Transp. , 229 F.3d 1012 (l1th Cir. 2000); see also Alexander v.

Fulton Cnty., Ga . , 207 F .3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (Ð[I]t is

not the court's role to second - guess the wisdom of an employer's

decisions as long as the decis ions are not racially motivated.Ñ).

46. In sum, the evidence on record does not support

PetitionerÓs claim that GCA discriminated against him based on

his race, color, or national origin. Further, no credible

evidence shows that GCA treated similarly sit uated non - minority

members differently or that GCAÓs stated reason for terminating

Petitioner was a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. Because

Petitioner failed to put forth sufficient evidence that GCA had

some discriminatory animus motivating its decision, h is Petition

for Relief must be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final o rder finding that Respondent, GC A

Service Group, did no t commit any unlawful employment practice

against Petitioner and dismiss ing his Petition for Relief from an

unlawful employment practice.

DONE AND ENTERED this 26 th day of April, 2017 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

J. BRUCE CULPEPPER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Divi sion of Administrative Hearings

this 26 th day of April, 2017 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2016),

unless otherwise noted.

2 / The evidence does not indicate whether Petitioner contacted

Ms. Bermudez before or after GCA officially terminated

Petitioner, or whether Petitioner was aware of GCAÓs decision at

the time of his phone call.

3 / No evidence indicates that Petitioner requested FMLA leave

prior to his termination.

4 / The parties did not present evidence of Mr. R ojasÓ race.

However, Petitioner stated that Mr. Rojas did not speak English.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Grissel T. Seijo, Esqui re

Littler Mendelson, PC

Wells Fargo Center, Suite 2700

333 Southeast 2nd Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

(eServed)

Will Dunn

GCA Service Group

Suite 1500

1350 Euclid Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Jose Ramirez

1525 Ravana Drive

Orlando, Florida 32822

Che yanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.