01-000322PL Department Of Health, Board Of Massage Therapy vs. Deborah Lynn Keys Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, September 4, 2001.

Summary: Department of Health failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that licensee was guilty of sexual misconduct in the practice of massage therapy.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF )

MASSAGE THERAPY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 01-0322PL

)

DEBORAH LYNN KEYS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The parties having been provided proper notice,

Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham of the Division

of Administrative Hearings convened a formal hearing of this

matter by video teleconference on May 22, 2001. The parties and

witnesses appeared in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the

Administrative Law Judge presided in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner : Gary L. Asbell, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration

2727 Mahan Drive

Building Three, Mail Station 39

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

For Respondent : John G. George, Esquire

Law Offices of John G. George, P.A.

409 Southeast 7th Street

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether, on December 29, 1997,

Respondent, a licensed massage therapist, engaged or offered to

engage a client in sexual activity while practicing massage

therapy, in violation of Section 480.0485, Florida Statutes, and

Rule 61G11-30.001(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code (1997).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On June 28, 1999, Petitioner Department of Health (the

"Department"), through the Agency for Health Care Administration

(the "Agency"), which is under contract with the Department to

perform prosecutorial services for, among other boards within

the Department's jurisdiction, the Board of Massage Therapy (the

"Board"), brought an Administrative Complaint against Respondent

Deborah Lynn Keys ("Keys"), charging her with one count of

engaging or offering to engage a client in sexual activity while

practicing massage therapy.

Keys timely requested a formal hearing. On January 23,

2001, the Agency referred this matter to the Division of

Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. After the case

was assigned to the undersigned, a final hearing was scheduled

for May 22, 2001.

At the hearing, the Department called four w itnesses :

Detectives Edward Domako and Steven Drum of the Broward

Sheriff's Office; Officer Jimmy Ho, City of Lauderhill Police

Department; and Louis Garriga, an Agency employee. In addition,

the Department introduced seven exhibits into evidence, numbered

1 through 7; Petitioner's Exhibit 8 was rejected.

Keys, who appeared through counsel and was not physically

present at the hearing, called no witnesses and offered two

exhibits, numbered 1 and 2, which were received.

The Department timely filed a proposed recommended order,

which was considered in the preparation of this Recommended

Order. Keys did not submit any post-hearing papers.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence presented at final hearing established the

facts that follow.

The Parties

1. Keys is a Florida-licensed massage therapist. Her

license, numbered MA 19097, was issued on March 27, 1995. She

is subject to the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of

the Board.

2. At all times material, Keys worked at Shogun Health

Spa, Inc. ("Shogun"), which was located in Lauderhill, Florida.

The Charge

3. The Department has charged Keys with one count of

engaging or offering to engage a client in sexual activity, in

violation of Rule 61G11-30.001(1)(d), Florida Administrative

Code (1997). 1 The incident is alleged to have occurred at Shogun

on December 29, 1997. The "client," allegedly, was an

undercover sheriff's detective.

Ultimate Factual Determination

4. The Department proved that on December 29, 1997, on the

premises of Shogun, a white, brown-haired masseuse using the

name "Debbie" offered sexual services to an undercover detective

who was posing as a client in connection with an investigation

of suspicions that Shogun was a bordello. Based on the evidence

in the record, however, the factfinder is unable to form a firm

belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that "Debbie" was, in

fact, Keys. Therefore, Keys is not guilty of the offense

charged.

5. It will be seen that the foregoing factual

determination, which is dispositive, does not constitute an

affirmative finding about what Keys did on the date in question.

Nor is a finding made here regarding who "Debbie" actually was——

or that "Debbie" was not Keys. Although Keys argued that she

was not at work on December 29, 1997, being instead, she

claimed, on vacation, she adduced no evidence that she was

someplace else that day, and so no affirmative finding can be

made in this regard.

6. The Department's failure to prove, clearly and

convincingly, that "Debbie" and Keys were one and the same

person necessarily renders all of the other evidence irrelevant,

because it is immaterial that someone besides Keys engaged in

misconduct. Understanding, however, that it may be enlightening

to explicate what the evidence showed as a means of explaining

how the evidence fell short of establishing the wrongdoer's

identity by the requisite quantum of proof, the following

summary of the pertinent proof, as viewed by the factfinder, is

offered. 2

Keys' Physical Description and

Identifying Information : A Baseline

7. According to the Application for Licensure that Keys

submitted in January 1995, Keys is five feet, three inches tall

with blue eyes. Her weight, at that time, was 131 pounds. She

was born on November 25, 1956. Keys' social security number is

disclosed in the application.

8. A photograph of Keys was attached to the application.

The original was probably a color picture, but the copies

introduced in evidence (four copies are included in Petitioner's

Exhibit 1) are black and white. The photograph is grainy from

being reproduced more than a few times. Nevertheless, the image

of a woman's face is sufficiently visible that anyone familiar

with Keys' appearance should be able to tell that it is her. To

everyone else, the photograph depicts a white female adult of

indeterminate age with long, dark hair.

9. The descriptive data from Keys' application is

considered to be highly reliable because it was put together

nearly three years before the incident in question, at a time

when Keys had no discernable motive to be untruthful. Moreover,

Keys signed the application before a notary public under a

certificate that provided, in part, as follows:

I have carefully read the questions in the

foregoing application and have answered them

completely, without reservation of any kind,

and I declare that my answers and all

statements made by me herein are true and

correct and that the photograph attached to

the application is a photograph of me.

Should I furnish any false information on

this application, I understand that such

action shall constitute cause for the

denial, suspension or revocation of any

license to practice in the state of Florida

the profession for which I am applying.

(Emphasis added).

The Department's Evidence

10. The "Event Report." Detective Edward Domako of the

Broward Sheriff's Office was involved in the undercover

investigation of Shogun. Through Detective Domako, the

Department introduced a one-page exhibit which he described as a

Broward Sheriff's Office event report. This undated document

contains information about two "arrestees," one of whom is

"Debbie Lynn Keys."

11. In response to a leading question from the

Department's counsel, Detective Domako agreed that he had

prepared this report around January 5, 1998. On cross-

examination, however, the detective admitted that he had never

personally been involved with Keys.

12. It is undisputed that the information set forth in

this event report was not based on Detective Domako's personal

knowledge. Rather, he claimed to have taken the data from

another detective's probable cause affidavit, which is discussed

below. Detective Domako also testified that "some of this

information [in the event report] may have been garnered from"

Keys herself, but this statement has been given no weight

because (a) the witness was simply speculating and clearly did

not know one way or the other if he were correct and (b) no

other evidence corroborated his speculation.

13. In this event report, Keys is described as a white

female, five feet, three inches tall, 136 pounds, with long,

straight, brown hair, blue eyes, and no visible scars, marks,

tattoos, or deformities. A residence address is listed which

matches her known address at the time.

14. The description of Keys in the event r eport is similar

to that contained in her application for licensure. The

problem, however, is that the information in the event report is

not consistent with the description of Keys contained in the

probable cause affidavit from which Detective Domako asserted he

had derived the data. See Paragraph 29, infra .

15. Ironically, the undated event report prepared by a

detective without personal knowledge concerning Keys' physical

appearance is the only piece of evidence that the Department

offered which matches the description of her found in the

Department's application file.

16. Because Detective Domako was plainly mistaken about

the source of the information he put in the event report;

because the event report was not based on the preparer's

personal knowledge; and because the undated report was based not

on information provided by someone who allegedly had seen Keys

engage in the alleged misconduct (for that witness described her

differently) but instead upon information acquired after-the-

fact from a source or sources unknown, Detective Domako's

testimony and the event report are unreliable proof of Keys'

identity as the wrongdoer. Hence, this evidence has little or

no probative value and is certainly not clear and convincing

proof that Keys engaged in the alleged misconduct on

December 29, 1997.

17. Officer Ho's Testimony. Jimmy Ho is a police officer

with the City of Lauderhill. Officer Ho was involved in the

undercover investigation of Shogun.

18. Officer Ho was present at Shogun on January 5, 1998,

when detectives from the Broward Sheriff's Office executed a

search warrant on the premises. He was there to assist the

sheriff's detectives and described his role as that of

"spectator."

19. Officer Ho detained several suspects in a room at

Shogun. He claimed that Keys was one of the detainees, and that

she had identified herself to him by providing her driver's

license, which he reviewed to make a positive identification at

the time.

20. Neither Officer Ho nor anyone else at the scene on

January 5, 1998, however, bothered to make a copy of the

driver's license supposedly tendered by "Keys." No one took

"Keys'" fingerprints or photograph either.

21. Officer Ho had not seen "Keys" before January 5, 1998.

At no time did he observe her performing or offering to perform

any improper acts.

22. Asked at hearing to describe "Keys," Officer Ho

testified: "All I can remember, she's a white female, that

time, short hair. . . . I think [her hair] was brown color

[and not blonde]. . . . I'd say she was somewhere between

five [feet]-three [inches] and five [feet]-four [inches tall]."

Final Hearing Transcript ("T.") at pp. 107-08.

23. The facts to which Officer Ho testified regarding

"Keys'" appearance were not distinctly remembered; his

recollection was neither precise nor explicit. Undoubtedly

hundreds if not thousands of women in Broward County would

satisfy "Keys'" physical profile as generally described by

Officer Ho. Moreover, incidentally, his testimony that "Keys'"

hair was short does not match the description in Detective

Domako's event report, where she is said to have long hair.

24. For these reasons, Officer Ho's testimony is minimally

useful at best. Moreover, even if Officer Ho's testimony

clearly and convincingly proved that Keys was present at Shogun

on January 5, 1998, that fact would not establish, even by a

preponderance of evidence, that Keys engaged in the alleged

misconduct on December 29, 1997.

25. The Investigative Action Report. Detective Steven

Drum of the Broward Sheriff's Office, who was involved in the

undercover investigation of Shogun, was the Department's key

witness. He is, in fact, the one and only witness to the

alleged sexual misconduct that Keys is charged with having

engaged in on December 29, 1997.

26. Detective's Drum's account of his visit to Shogun on

December 29, 1997, is set forth in an Investigative Action

Report that he prepared on January 5, 1998. In his report,

Detective Drum recounted a one-hour massage session with

"Debbie" who, he claimed, had offered to perform various sexual

services.

27. According to Detective Drum's report, "Debbie" was a

white female in her mid- 30's with brown hair, brown eyes, and a

medium build.

28. The Probable Cause Affidavit. Detective Drum wrote a

summary of his December 29, 1997, encounter with "Debbie" in a

probable cause affidavit signed January 6, 1998.

29. In his probable cause affidavit, Detective Drum

described "Debbie" as a white female with brown hair, brown

eyes, five feet, six inches tall, with no visible scars, marks,

or tattoos. The affidavit contains Keys' social security number

and date of birth.

30. Detective Drum's Testimony. At hearing, Detective

Drum's testimony regarding the December 29, 1997, incident

closely followed the Investigative Action report and probable

cause affidavit. Asked to describe Keys, Detective Drum

responded: "She's a white female, approximately five-six,

medium build with brown hair." T. 144.

31. Detective Drum testified that he saw "Debbie" again at

Shogun on January 5, 1998, when the search warrant was served,

and that "Debbie" identified herself to him as Keys. He

testified that there was "no doubt" in his mind that the woman

who identified herself as Keys on January 5, 1998, was the

"Debbie" who had offered him sexual services on December 29,

1997.

32. The factfinder, however, has considerable doubt that

Detective Drum possessed any meaningful present recollection

either of "Debbie's" appearance or his encounter with her nearly

four years ago. The details of his testimony obviously were

drawn from the written documents he had prepared

contemporaneously.

33. Significantly, moreover, Detective Drum did not

mention in either the Investigative Action Report or the

probable cause affidavit that on January 5, 1998, the woman he

now has no doubt was "Debbie" had told him her name was Deborah

Keys——a fact that, had it occurred, would or should have been

worthy of note.

34. Taken as a whole, Detective Drum's testimony does not

convincingly link Keys to the December 29, 1997, incident. He

described "Debbie" contemporaneously as having brown eyes——but

Keys' eyes are blue. He also wrote, soon after the alleged

misconduct, that "Debbie" was five feet, six inches tall; Keys,

however, is a material three inches shorter than that.

35. Detective Drum is an experienced law enforcement

officer whose business it is to observe details about suspected

perpetrators. It is telling, therefore, that he was mistaken

about two obvious details concerning Keys' appearance. Given

that there were only a few physical characteristics with which

to work in this case (hair color and length, eye color, height,

weight, age), and most of them subject to change, Detective

Drum's failure to identify accurately two relatively immutable

characteristics of Keys was sufficient to render his testimony

that the "Debbie" of December 29, 1997, was the "Keys" of

January 5, 1998, less than clear and convincing. 3

Other Considerations

36. The factfinder found it striking that the Department

made relatively little effort to identify Keys conclusively as

the wrongdoer. It would have been a simple matter to have

subpoenaed her for the final hearing, so that a definitive

identification could be made, or, failing that, to have obtained

photographs or videotapes of her during discovery upon which a

persuasive in-hearing identification could be based. The

Department's failure to take these or similar steps toward

meeting its heavy evidential burden——particularly given the

paucity of information that it had concerning Keys' appearance,

about which nothing unique or distinguishing was elicited——

reflected negatively on its entire case.

37. But worse than that, the Department did not show to a

single witness the one photograph of Keys that it did have in

its possession, and which it introduced into evidence. If, for

example, Detective Drum had testified that the woman in the

picture attached to Keys' Application for Licensure is "Debbie,"

then the Department might have proved its case; at least the

decision would have been closer. But Detective Drum was not

asked to identify the photograph of Keys.

38. Because the Department knew that it had this

photograph of Keys, its failure to question Detective Drum (or

anyone else) about the picture is inexplicable——unless the

detective could not identify the photograph and therefore his

answer to the obvious question would not have been helpful.

39. In this case, where the accused was not physically

present at hearing and the only eyewitness to the alleged

misconduct described her inaccurately and was not asked to

identify an available photograph, the Department's heavy burden

of proof has not been met; to find otherwise, the factfinder, in

effect, would need to assume that the right person was charged,

which he will not do.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

40. The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal

and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to

Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

41. A proceeding to suspend, revoke, or impose other

discipline upon a professional license is penal in nature.

State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission , 281 So.

2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1973). Accordingly, to impose discipline, the

Department must prove the charges against Keys by clear and

convincing evidence. Department of Banking and Finance, Div. of

Securities and Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern & Co. , 670

So. 2d 932, 935-36 (Fla. 1996)(citing Ferris v. Turlington , 510

So. 2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. 1987)) ; Nair v. Department of Business

& Professional Regulation , 654 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA

1995).

42. In Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla.

4th DCA 1983), the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, canvassed

the cases to develop a "workable definition of clear and

convincing evidence" and found that of necessity such a

definition would need to contain "both qualitative and

quantitative standards." The court held that

clear and convincing evidence requires that

the evidence must be found to be credible;

the facts to which the witnesses testify

must be distinctly remembered; the testimony

must be precise and explicit and the

witnesses must be lacking confusion as to

the facts in issue. The evidence must be of

such weight that it produces in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction, without hesitancy, as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be

established.

Id. The Florida Supreme Court later adopted the fourth

district's description of the clear and convincing evidence

standard of proof. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 93-62 , 645

So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). The First District Court of Appeal

also has followed the Slomowitz test, adding the interpretive

comment that "[a ]lthough this standard of proof may be met where

the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to preclude evidence

that is ambiguous." Westinghouse Electric Corp., Inc. v. Shuler

Brothers, Inc. , 590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev .

denied , 599 So. 2d 1279 (1992)(citation omitted).

43. Whether Keys committed the wrongful act of which she

stands accused is a question of fact for the trier to resolve——

not an issue of law. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care

Administration , 676 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As

set forth in the Findings of Fact, the trier has determined as a

matter of ultimate fact that the Department failed to establish,

by the requisite level of proof, that Keys is guilty as charged.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, the Department having failed to prove the charges brought

against Keys by clear and convincing evidence, it is RECOMMENDED

that the Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative

Complaint.

DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2001, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488- 9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 4th day of September, 2001.

ENDNOTES

1 / The Rule under which Keys was charged no longer exists,

having been substantially revised and renumbered, effective

September 14, 1998, after the date of the incident in question.

The current rule governing misconduct and negligence in the

practice of massage therapy is Rule 64B7-30.001, Florida

Administrative Code. Interestingly, the present Rule does not

explicitly forbid sexual misconduct per se, although the failure

to appropriately drape a client without first obtaining specific

informed consent is a punishable offense. Sexual misconduct in

the practice of massage therapy is proscribed by statute,

however, and has been since July 1, 1997. See Section 480.0485,

Florida Statutes (2000); see Chapter 97-264, Laws of Florida.

Somewhat confusingly, in its Administrative Complaint, the

Department accused Keys of breaking Rule 64B7 -30.001(1)(d)——a

provision that seems never to have existed——and did not cite

Section 480.0485. The former was probably a typographical error

(the Department no doubt meant Rule 61G11 -30.001(1)(d)) and the

latter an oversight. At any rate, Keys was adequately put on

notice of the charge against her.

2 / Occasionally, a reviewing court will examine the record to

determine whether an administrative law judge's finding that

there was not clear and convincing evidence for an element of

the agency's case is supported by competent and substantial

evidence. E.g. Williams v. Davis , 459 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1984). Respectfully, however, this analytical approach is,

in addition to being logically suspect, difficult to square with

the evidential burden imposed by the clear and convincing

standard.

From a logical standpoint, one struggles to envision

competent substantial evidence in support of a determination

that the agency's proof is not clear and convincing. Such a

determination, as noted in the text, does not "find" any fact

and therefore does not appear to be subject to conventional

methods of proof. Put another way, a determination that X was

not convincingly proved is not functionally equivalent to a

finding that "Y, not X" occurred, with Y being either an

exculpatory alternative or an unknown event; rather, the

possibility that X happened is left open. With that in mind,

consider : What evidence would support an ultimate factual

determination that "X is possibly true, but the trier is not

convinced that it is highly probable that X happened as

alleged"? In the end, the factfinder's determination that the

evidence has failed to convince him of the truth of an

allegation sought to be established reflects his subjective

judgment about the quality and quantity of the evidence adduced,

taking into account "intangibles" such as witnesses' demeanor

and body language that a reviewing court cannot reliably assess.

More critical than the logic, perhaps, is the notion,

implicit in a review to determine whether there is evidence in

support of a determination that an agency's proof was not clear

and convincing, that the party against whom a clear and

convincing case must be made needs to come forward with evidence

proving the deficiencies in the agency's presentation. Indeed,

in Williams the court ruled that unrebutted testimony made out a

clear and convincing "prima facie" showing that the factfinder

was "bound" to believe, even though he had chosen to reject the

evidence as insufficiently persuasive. Id. This, it seems,

cannot be followed as a general rule : A factfinder must be

permitted to reject testimony that, in his judgment, is

incredible, untrue, unreliable, or mistaken——even if that

testimony is not contradicted either by cross-examination or

direct evidence. Further, for any number of reasons unique to a

particular case, evidence that is unrebutted may not be so

persuasive and of such weight that it produces in the

factfinder's mind a firm conviction regarding the truth of the

matter to be proved, despite its unchallenged status. The clear

and convincing standard presupposes that the proponent may

introduce some credible evidence in support of its position——may

even prove that its allegations are more likely than not true——

and yet lose. The raison d'etre of a heightened standard of

proof, after all, is to reduce the margin for error in favor of

the respondent whose substantial property interests (in a

disciplinary proceeding such as this) are at stake.

Here, the correct and applicable legal principle, it is

held, is that the respondent was not required to come forward

with any evidence unless and until the agency first introduced

proof that turned out to be, in the factfinder's ultimate

judgment, clear and convincing if left unchallenged. See

Greenfield Estate Development Corp. v. Merritt , 348 So. 2d 1199,

1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)(defendant has no duty to go forward with

evidence until plaintiff establishes prima facie case).

Needless to say, where, as here, the standard of proof is clear

and convincing evidence, the agency's "prima facie" case must be

made with clear and convincing evidence——and nothing less than

that will shift the burden of going forward with the

presentation of evidence to the respondent. Steinhardt v.

Steinhardt , 445 So. 2d 352, 355-56 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. rev.

denied , 456 So. 2d 1181 (1984)(plaintiffs' failure to adduce

clear and convincing evidence, which must be presented to make

prima facie case for imposition of constructive trust, justified

involuntary dismissal at conclusion of plaintiffs' case-in-

chief). Obviously, a respondent takes a substantial risk when

she chooses not to offer evidence in support of an exculpatory

alternative to the agency's theory of guilt, because she does

not know, during the hearing, whether the agency has convinced

the administrative law judge that its version of history is

correct. Cf. Willingham v. Secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare , 377 F.Supp. 1254, 1257 (S.D.Fla. 1974)(plaintiff always

has burden of persuasion, which never shifts, but he may produce

sufficient proof that his opponent's failure to adduce

contradictory evidence may, and in some cases must, lead to a

decision for plaintiff). She is entitled, however, to take that

chance.

In the instant case, the Department's proof was not clear

and convincing in the first instance, even if unchallenged. The

Department, in short, failed to establish a prima facie case.

Consequently, the burden of moving forward with the presentation

of evidence never shifted to Keys. The discussion of the

(irrelevant) facts that follows in the text will demonstrate

that the factfinder did not simply choose to disbelieve the

Department's witnesses but, in the deliberative exercise of his

prerogatives as the arbiter of credibility and weigher of

evidence, concluded that the Department's proof simply lacked

the persuasive force that the clear and convincing standard

demands.

3 / The factfinder has not forgotten that Detective Drum's

probable cause affidavit contains Keys' social security number

and date of birth, or that Detective Domako's event report

contains a known residence address of Keys. These facts do not

convincingly establish that Keys was "Debbie," however, because,

by January 5, 1998, after the search warrant was served on

Shogun, the authorities were clearly aware of Keys' name——from

Shogun's employment records if from no other source; and, while

Shogun's records probably would have revealed Keys' social

security number, date of birth, and residence address as well,

the detectives, armed with Keys' name at least, could easily

have obtained that additional information about her, regardless

whether she had, in fact, offered to engage Detective Drum in

sexual activities on December 29, 1997.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Gary L. Asbell, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration

2727 Mahan Drive

Building Three, Mail Station 39

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

John G. George, Esquire

Law Offices of John G. George, P.A.

409 Southeast 7th Street

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

William H. Buckhalt, Executive Director

Board of Massage Therapy

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way

Bin C06

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way

Bin A02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this R ecommended O rder. Any exceptions

to this R ecommended O rder should be filed with the agency that

will issue the F inal O rder in this case.