08-002279 Edwin Handte vs. Forrer Ventures Capital, Llc And Monroe County Planning Commission Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, October 22, 2008.

Summary: The Planning Commission departed from essential requirements of law when it declined to hear evidence on the extent of improvement to a non-conforming use/structure.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

EDWIN HANDTE, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 08-2279

)

FORRER VENTURES CAPITAL, LLC )

and MONROE COUNTY PLANNING )

COMMISSION, )

)

Appellees. )

)

FINAL ORDER

This case is the appeal of Edwin Handte (Handte, or

Appellant) from a decision of the Monroe County Planning

Commission (Commission). By contract, and pursuant to

Article XIV, Section 9.5-535, Monroe County Code (M.C.C. or

Code), the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has

jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

On or about October 25, 2007, the Monroe County Building

Department (Department) issued Permit 073-03088, to Forrer

Ventures Capital, LLC (Forrer, or Applicant), to reconfigure the

interior of an existing 2,700 square foot structure for

showrooms, offices, conference room, and baths (one handicap)

for use in a home electronics retail business, and to install

handicap parking (without an increase in parking area), in

accordance with approved plans, at Block 11, Lots 13 and 14,

located in Largo Sound Park, 103375 Overseas Highway, Key Largo,

Monroe County, Florida (the Property). Handte appealed the

Department's decision to the Commission under Article XII,

Section 9.5-521, M.C.C.

Truncated Planning Commission Hearing

At the appeal hearing before the Commission, the staff of

the Commission presented the testimony of two witnesses and a

report recommending dismissal of Handte's appeal to the

Commission. The bases for staff's recommendation were: the

clarity of Monroe County Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use

Element (FLUE) Policy 101.4.3; the Property's existing lawful

use for "light retail"; no expansion of the square footage of

the building on the Property; and Administrative Interpretation

No. 01-109 exempting applications for interior renovations from

the requirement to bring a nonconforming property into

compliance with applicable Code provisions "whenever there is a

change of use or a substantial improvement." After hearing

argument of counsel, the Commission decided not to hear Handte's

evidence because it would not sustain his appeal. At that

point, the hearing before the Commission was terminated, and on

March 4, 2008, the Commission adopted Resolution P15-08, which

denied Handte's appeal.

Planning Commission's Resolution P15-08

The Planning Commission's Resolution P15-08 was based on

findings of fact as to: (1) the Property's Future Land Use Map

(FLUM) designation of Residential Medium; (2) Comprehensive Plan

FLUE Policy 101.4.3; (3) the Property's current land use

district (zoning) of Improved Subdivision-Masonry (IS-M); (4)

the historic use of the property, as established in an appeal

taken by Handte in 2002; Article VII, Section 9.5-242(e),

M.C.C.; the current owner's acquisition of the Property; the

application and issuance of a building permit for interior

renovations for use as a home electronics store, without any

increase in the footprint or floor area; and no change in the

intensity of the historical commercial retail use of the

Property (density not applying to commercial properties).

The Planning Commission's Resolution P15-08 was based on

conclusions of law that: (1) FLUE Policy 101.4.3 "allows

substantial improvement to non-conforming uses in the

Residential Medium (RM) Future Land Use Category if the

intensity, floor area, density and type of use remain the same

as before the 1996 Land Development Regulations"; (2) Article

VII, Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C., "limiting non-conforming uses

to be substantially improved only if limited to Two Thousand

Five Hundred (2,500) Square feet is inconsistent with the

Comprehensive Plan and cannot be enforced"; and building Permit

073-03088 was lawfully issued.

The Commission's Resolution did not mention Administrative

Interpretation No. 01-109.

Scope of Appellate Review

Under Article XIV, Section 9.5-540(b), M.C.C., the hearing

officer "may affirm, reverse or modify the order of the planning

commission." "The hearing officer's order may reject or modify

any conclusion of law or interpretation of the Monroe County

land development regulations or comprehensive plan in the

planning commission's order, whether stated in the order or

necessarily implicit in the planning commission's determination,

but he may not reject or modify any findings of fact unless he

first determines from a review of the complete record, and

states with particularity in his order, that the findings of

fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that

the proceeding before the planning commission on which the

findings were based did not comply with the essential

requirements of law." Id.

Issues on Appeal

Appellant raises three issues in this appeal: (1) the

Commission failed to comply with the essential requirements of

law by denying Handte an evidentiary hearing 1 ; (2) there was no

competent, substantial evidence to support the Commission's

decision because the hearing before the Commission was

truncated, and he was not allowed to present evidence; and (3)

the use of Administrative Interpretation 01-109 departed from

the essential requirements of law because it nullified the

requirements of the land development regulations (LDRs) and

Comprehensive Plan regarding nonconformities.

As to the third issue raised on appeal, while cited in the

staff report, Administrative Interpretation 01-109 relates to

Article V, Section 9.5-146, M.C.C., which addresses

"nonconforming signs and all uses that are nonconforming due to

failure to comply with the standards of article VII, divisions

9, 10, 11, 12 and 13," none of which apply to this case. For

that reason, it is irrelevant. Appellees do not rely on it as

support for the Commission's decision, which does not mention

it.

Although the second issue raised by Handte is framed in

terms of competent, substantial evidence, it actually makes the

same argument as the first issue on appeal--namely, that the

Commission failed to comply with the essential requirements of

law by truncating Handte's appeal hearing.

Compliance with Essential Requirements of Law

Under Article XIV, Section 9.5-540(b), M.C.C., compliance

with the essential requirements of law relates to the

modification or rejection of findings of fact.

Handte contends that the Commission's finding of no change

in the intensity of the historical commercial use of the

Property must be rejected because there was no evidentiary

hearing on the question. His Initial Brief argued that the IS-M

land use district authorizes only up to medium intensity

commercial retail. See Art. VII, § 9.5-242(d)(1), M.C.C.

Similarly, the Initial Brief argued that, in addition to a

building permit, a new minor or major conditional use permit was

required because Article III, Section 9.5-63, M.C.C., provides:

"Only those uses which are authorized in article VII, division

2, or those nonconforming uses which are damaged or destroyed,

and are permitted to be reestablished in article V, may be

approved as conditional uses." But the record-on-appeal is

clear that these issues were not presented to the Commission

below. To the contrary, the issues raised on appeal to the

Commission assumed no change in the intensity of the commercial

use of the Property as a result of the construction authorized

by Permit 073-03088. There is no indication in the record-on-

appeal that Handte intended to introduce evidence that the

construction authorized by Permit 073-03088 would result in a

change in the intensity of the commercial use of the Property.

Counsel for Handte argued orally that Handte had no reason

to raise an issue as to the intensity of Forrer's commercial use

of the Property before the Commission because Handte had no

reason to know that the Commission would deny his appeal based

on FLUE Policy 101.4.3. But FLUE Policy 101.4.3 was not

relevant to claims under Article VII, Section 9.5-242(d)(1), and

under Article III, Section 9.5-63, M.C.C.

For these reasons, Handte waived the issue of intensity of

use by not raising it as a basis for his appeal to the

Commission; he did not preserve the issue for this appeal; and

he did not establish that the Commission applied the incorrect

law or otherwise failed to comply with the essential

requirements of law by not considering evidence on intensity of

use. See Commission on Ethics v. Barker , 677 So. 2d 254 (Fla.

1996); Pullen v. State , 818 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002);

Couch v. Commission on Ethics , 617 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA

1993).

Besides the finding of no change in the intensity of the

historical commercial use of the Property, Handte does not seek

to have any particular finding of fact of the Commission

rejected. Rather, he seeks to add findings of fact as to the

nature of the improvements authorized by Permit 073-03088.

Specifically, Handte intended to present evidence to support his

position that the work authorized by the building permit at

issue would have constituted a substantial improvement and more

than 50% of the value of the Property. 2 In addition, Handte

intended to prove that the Applicant intends to install brick

pavers and asphalt outside the rear door of the building, where

there was once a loading dock, and which likely will be used as

a loading dock. He contends that it was a departure from the

essential requirements of law for the Commission to deny him the

opportunity of a full evidentiary hearing to determine those

facts.

As stated in Ivey v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 774 So. 2d

679, 682 (Fla. 2000), quoting with approval Stilson v. Allstate

Insurance Co. , 692 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), a

departure from the essential requirements of law "is something

more than a simple legal error" and the reviewing tribunal

"should examine the seriousness of the error and use its

discretion to correct an error 'only when there has been a

violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in

a miscarriage of justice.'" It also has been held that a

departure from the essential requirements of law occurs when the

lower tribunal does not “appl[y] the correct law." Haines City

Community Development v. Heggs , 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995).

As to Handte's evidence on the Applicant's intention to

install brick pavers and asphalt outside the rear door of the

building, it is clear that no brick pavers or asphalt were

included in Permit 073-03088. For that reason, evidence as to

the applicant's intention to install them is irrelevant to the

issuance of Permit 073-03088, and the Commission did not apply

the incorrect law or otherwise fail to comply with the essential

requirements of law by not considering this evidence.

On the other hand, if Handte's evidence on the extent of

the improvements authorized by Permit 073-03088 could have

sustained his appeal, the Commission would have failed to comply

with the essential requirements of law by not holding a full

evidentiary hearing. Article XII, Section 9.5-521(e), M.C.C.,

provides that "a party appealing an administrative decision,

determination or interpretation shall be entitled to present

evidence and create a record before the planning commission

. . . ." Whether those facts would sustain Handte's appeal

depends on conclusions of law and interpretations of the LDRs

and Comprehensive Plan, which the hearing officer's order may

reject or modify. See Art. XIV, § 9.5-540(b), M.C.C. The

pertinent Comprehensive Plan provisions and LDRs relate to

nonconforming uses and structures.

Nonconformity of Applicant's Use and Structure

Article VII of Chapter 9.5 of the Code provides for "land

use districts," and Section 9-5.231 provides for "permitted

uses." "No structure or land in Monroe County shall hereinafter

be developed, used or occupied unless expressly authorized in a

land use district in this division." Art. VII, § 9.5-231(a),

M.C.C.

It is undisputed that the applicant's building is located

in the IS-M land use district. This land use district

authorizes, as a major conditional use, any combination of low

and medium intensity commercial retail and office uses of less

than 2,500 square feet of floor area. See Art. VII, § 9.5-

242(d)(1), M.C.C. For that reason, commercial retail use of

Forrer's 2,700 square-foot building is nonconforming.

Alternatively, it is possible that the building could be viewed

as a nonconforming structure due to its floor area.

General Plan and LDR Limitations on Non-Conformities

Monroe County Comprehensive Plan FLUE Objective 101.8

states that the County "shall eliminate or reduce the frequency

of uses which are inconsistent with the applicable provisions of

the land development regulations and the Future Land Use Map,

and structures which are inconsistent with applicable codes and

land development regulations." The policies under Objective

101.8 have been implemented through the LDRs in Article V of

Chapter 9.5, M.C.C.

Article V of the Code regulates both nonconforming uses and

nonconforming structures: "The purpose of this article is to

regulate and limit the continued existence of uses and

structures established prior to the enactment of this chapter

that do not conform to the provisions of this chapter. Many

nonconformities may continue, but the provisions of this article

are designed to curtail substantial investment in

nonconformities and to bring about their eventual elimination in

order to preserve the integrity of this chapter." Art. V,

§ 9.5-141, M.C.C. See also JPM Investment Group, Inc. v.

Brevard County Board of County Commissioners , 818 So. 2d 595,

598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

"Nonconforming uses of land or structures may continue in

accordance with the provisions of this section." Art. V, § 9.5-

143(a), M.C.C. "Normal maintenance and repair to permit

continuation of registered nonconforming uses may be performed."

Art. V, § 9.5-143(b), M.C.C. "Nonconforming uses shall not be

extended" and "[t]his prohibition shall be construed so as to

prevent . . . [e]nlargement of nonconforming uses by additions

to the structure in which such nonconforming uses are located"

or ". . . [o]ccupancy of additional lands." Art. V, § 9.5-

143(c)(1)-(2), M.C.C. With certain exceptions that would not

apply, "if a structure in which a nonconforming use is located

is damaged or destroyed so as to require substantial

improvement, then the structure may be repaired or restored only

for uses which conform to the provisions of the land use

district in which it is located." Art. V, § 9.5-143(e)(2),

M.C.C.

"A nonconforming structure devoted to a use permitted in

the land use district in which it is located may be continued in

accordance with the provisions of this section." Art. V, § 9.5-

144(a), M.C.C. "Normal maintenance and repair of registered

nonconforming structures may be performed." Art. V, § 9.5-

144(b), M.C.C. "Nonconforming structures which are used in a

manner conforming to the provisions of this chapter may be

enlarged or extended provided that the nonconformity is not

further violated." Art. V, § 9.5-144(c), M.C.C. "Any part of a

nonconforming structure which is damaged or destroyed to the

extent of less than fifty (50) percent of the fair market value

of such structure may be restored as of right if a building

permit for reconstruction shall be issued within six (6) months

of the date of the damage." Art. V, § 9.5-144(e)(2), M.C.C.

However, with certain exceptions that would not apply, "any

nonconforming structure which is damaged or destroyed so as to

require substantial improvement may be repaired or restored only

if the structure conforms to the provisions of the land use

district in which it is located." Id.

Comprehensive Plan Policy 101.4.3

The Commission concluded that Monroe County Comprehensive

Plan FLUE Policy 101.4.3 requires the issuance of Permit 073-

03088. Appellees concur with the Commission.

FLUE Policy 101.4.3 provides:

The principal purpose of the Residential

Medium land use category is to recognize

those portions of subdivisions that were

lawfully established and improved prior to

the adoption of this plan and to define

improved subdivisions as those lots served

by a dedicated and accepted existing

roadway, have an approved potable water

supply, and have sufficient uplands to

accommodate the residential uses.

Development on vacant land within this land

use category shall be limited to one

residential dwelling unit for each such

platted lot or parcel which existed at the

time of plan adoption. However, Monroe

County shall adopt Land Development

Regulations which allow nonresidential uses

that were listed as a permitted use in the

Land Development Regulations that were in

effect immediately prior to the institution

of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan (pre-2010

LDR's), and that lawfully existed on such

lands on January 4, 1996 to develop,

redevelop, reestablish, and/or substantially

improve provided that the uses are limited

in intensity, floor area, density and to the

type of use that existed on January 4, 1996

or limited to what the pre-2010 LDR's

allowed, whichever is more restricted

[sic]." Lands within this land use category

shall not be further subdivided. [9J-

5.006(3)(c)1 and 7]

Ordinance 034-2005

Monroe County adopted Ordinance 034-2005 to implement FLUE

Policy 101.4.3 (and other similar Comprehensive Plan policies

applicable to other residential land use categories). Codified

as Article VII, Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C., which pertains to

the Improved Subdivision District of the LDRs, the relevant part

of Ordinance 034-2005 provides:

The following lawfully established

nonresidential uses . . . which were

rendered nonconforming by the 2010

comprehensive plan, but listed as permitted

uses in the [LDRs] that were in effect

immediately prior to the institution of the

2010 Comprehensive Plan (pre-2010 LDRs) and

lawfully existed on such lands on January 4,

1996, which are damaged or destroyed may be

permitted to be redeveloped, make

substantial improvements, or be

reestablished as an amendment to a major

conditional use, subject to the standards

and procedures set forth in article III,

division 3. [ 3 ]

(1) Commercial retail of low- and medium-

intensity or office uses or any combination

thereof of less than two thousand five

hundred (2,500) square feet of floor area ,

provided that:

[a.-h. certain locational and

other requirements are met, which

it appears the Property can meet];

i. The use is limited in

intensity, floor area, density and

to the type of use that existed on

January 4, 1996 or limited to the

permitted uses and/or the

provisions for minor or major

conditional uses allowed in the

pre-1996 LDRs for this district,

whichever is more restrictive.

(Emphasis added.)

FLUE Policy 101.4.3, Plan, and LDRs

The Commission concluded: that FLUE Policy 101.4.3 and

Article VII, Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C., conflict in that the

LDR has a "less than 2,500 square feet of floor area"

restriction; and that FLUE Policy 101.4.3 controls and governs.

Appellees concur, citing Section 163.3194(1)(b), Florida

Statutes (2007), for the proposition that the Comprehensive Plan

provision controls and governs, not the conflicting LDR. Handte

concedes the conflict between the FLUE Policy and Article VII,

Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C. 4 However, he contends that FLUE

Policy 101.4.3 requires LDRs to take effect and that Article

VII, Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C., prohibits the issuance of

Permit 073-03088, as would the Article V LDRs if the building

permit would authorize substantial improvements to the Property.

Actually, Article VII, Section 9.5-242(e)(1), M.C.C.,

applies only in the event that a structure is "damaged or

destroyed"; it does not apply directly to the facts of this case

since the Property subject to Permit 073-03088 has not been

damaged or destroyed. (Similarly, Article V, Sections 9.5-

143(e)(2) and 9.5-144(e)(2), M.C.C., apply when a property is

damaged or destroyed.)

Under the applicable LDRs in Article V, Chapter 9.5,

M.C.C., which implement FLUE Objective 101.8 and the FLUE

policies under that Objective , Forrer would be allowed to

perform normal maintenance and repair. Art. V, §§ 9.5-143(b)

and 9.5-144(b), M.C.C. Forrer would not be allowed to extend

the Property's nonconformity-- i.e. , enlarge it by addition or

9.5-144(c), M.C.C. It is not clear whether those LDRs would

allow Forrer to substantially improve the Property through

interior renovations that do not enlarge the structure or

increase intensity of the use. However, in view of the

prohibitions in the context of damage or destruction in Article

V, Sections 9.5-143(e)(2) and 9.5-144(e)(2), as well as the

2,500 square foot floor area restriction in Article VII, Section

9.5-243(e)(1), M.C.C., it does not appear that substantial

improvement of the Property through interior renovations would

be allowed by the LDRs even if the improvements would not

enlarge the structure or increase intensity of the use.

FLUE Policy 101.4.3 Not Self-Executing

It has been held: "The basic guide, or test, in

determining whether a constitutional provision should be

construed to be self-executing, or not self-executing, is

whether or not the provision lays down a sufficient rule by

means of which the right or purpose which it gives or is

intended to accomplish may be determined, enjoyed, or protected

without the aid of legislative enactment." Gray v. Bryant , 125

So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960). See also Florida Hosp. Waterman

Inc. v. Buster , 984 So. 2d 478, 485-86 (Fla. 2008); Notami Hosp.

of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen , 927 So. 2d 139, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA

2006). By analogy (albeit imperfect, of comprehensive plan

provisions to state constitutional provisions), FLUE Policy

101.4.3 would be self-executing if it is sufficiently clear. In

light of the Policy's express mandate that it be implemented

through LDRs, together with the apparent conflict between the

LDRs (including not only Article VII, Section 9.5-243(3), M.C.C,

but also the Article V LDRs that implement FLUE Objective 101.8

and the FLUE policies under that Objective) and the Commission's

interpretation of FLUE Policy 101.4.3, it cannot be concluded

that FLUE Policy 101.4.3 is self-executing or that it controls

over conflicting LDRs.

Handte argues in part that FLUE Policy 101.4.3 is not self-

executing because LDRs are necessary to establish the

"intensity, floor area, [and] density" limitations mentioned in

FLUE Policy 101.4.3. Arguably, the Policy itself establishes

those limitations, being those "that existed on January 4, 1996,

or limited to what the pre-2010 LDR's allowed, whichever is more

restricted [sic]." But such an interpretation would conflict

with the 2,500 square feet floor area restriction placed in

Article VII, Section 9.5-243(e), M.C.C., which is the LDR

adopted to implement FLUE Policy 101.4.3. In addition, FLUE

Policy 101.4.3 does not make clear that there is no limit to the

extent of the substantial improvements it would allow--in this

case by way of interior renovations.

Since FLUE Policy 101.4.3 is not self-executing, it does

not conflict with the LDRs. Under the Comprehensive Plan

provisions and the LDRs adopted to date, Permit 073-03088 should

not be issued if it would authorize substantial improvements to

the Property.

DECISION

For these reasons, the Commission did not apply the correct

law, and failed to comply with the essential requirements of law,

when it did not allow Handte to present evidence as to the extent

of the improvements authorized by Permit 073-03088; and the

Commission's decision to deny Handte's appeal without giving him

the opportunity to present such evidence is REVERSED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of October, 2008, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 22nd day of October, 2008.

ENDNOTES

1 / Handte contended in his Initial Brief that there was no

evidentiary hearing and that there were no findings of fact in

Resolution P15-08. In his Reply Brief, Handte conceded that

findings of fact were made, but he contended that they were

invalid because the hearing before the Commission was truncated,

and he was not allowed to present evidence.

2 / Appellees do not concede that Permit 073-03088 would

authorize substantial improvements. Rather, they take the

position that Permit 073-03088 must be issued under FLUE Policy

101.4.3 regardless whether substantial improvements would be

authorized. It is noted, however, that the Code not only

defines "substantial improvement" as costing fifty percent or

more of the assessed value of a property, but it also states:

"For purposes of this definition, substantial improvement is

considered to occur when the first alteration of any wall,

ceiling, floor or other structural part of the building

commences, whether or not that alteration affects the external

dimension of the structure." Art. I, § 9.5-4(S-19), M.C.C.

Permit 073-03088 authorizes the demolition of the existing drop

ceiling and all interior walls.

3 / Understanding the circular "standards and procedures set

forth in article III, division 3" is difficult. Article III,

Division 3, of Chapter 9.5 of the LDRs deals extensively with

conditional uses and includes a provision for amendments to

conditional use permits "only pursuant to the standards and

procedures established for its original approval or as otherwise

set forth in this article." Art. III, § 9.5-73, M.C.C. Article

III of Chapter 9.5, M.C.C., also includes Section 9.5-63, which

provides: "Only those uses which are authorized in article VII,

division 2, or those nonconforming uses which are damaged or

destroyed, and are permitted to be reestablished in article V,

may be approved as conditional uses." Article VII, Division 2,

of Chapter 9.5, M.C.C., includes the LDRs on permitted uses in

land use districts, which lead back to Article VII, Section 9.5-

242(e)(1), M.C.C.

4 / Both before the Commission and in his Initial Brief in this

appeal, Handte agreed to the applicability of Article VII,

Section 9.5-242(e), M.C.C., to the Property, and agreed that it

conflicts with FLUE Policy 101.4.3. In his Reply Brief, Handte

questioned the applicability of Article VII, Section 9.5-242(e),

M.C.C., to the Property because it refers to the "Suburban

Residential Land Use District" instead of the "Improved

Subdivision District." However, Handte's attempt to raise the

issue in his Reply Brief is untimely, the issue having been

waived and not preserved for this appeal. See Commission on

Ethics v. Barker , 677 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1996); Pullen v. State ,

818 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Couch v. Commission on

Ethics , 617 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In any event, the

reference to the "Suburban Residential Land Use District"

appears to have been an inadvertent scrivener's error. It is

clear that it was meant to pertain to the "Improved Subdivision

District."

COPIES FURNISHED :

Nicole Petrick, Planning Commission Coordinator

Monroe County Growth Management Division

2798 Overseas Highway, Suite 400

Marathon, Florida 33050

Lee Robert Rohe, Esquire

Lee R. Rohe, P.A.

25000 Overseas Highway, Suite 2

Summerland Key, Florida 33042

Nicholas W. Mulick, Esquire

Nicholas W. Mulick, P.A.

91645 Overseas Highway

Tavernier, Florida 33070

Derek V. Howard, Esquire

Monroe County Attorney's Office

1111 12th Street, Suite 408

Key West, Florida 33040

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

Pursuant to Article XIV, Section 9.5-540(c), M.C.C., this

Final Order is "the final administrative action of Monroe

County." It is subject to judicial review by common law

petition for writ of certiorari to the circuit court in the

appropriate judicial circuit.