09-000394 Gabriel Bovea vs. Mercantile Commerce Bank Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, June 30, 2009.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive all claims against his employer in a settlement agreement. FCHR has no jurisdiction to resolve employment discrimination claims, and the Petition for Relief should be granted.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GABRIEL BOVEA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 09-0394

)

MERCANTILE COMMERCEBANK, )

)

Respondent. )

_________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case

on March 17, 2009, by video teleconference, with the parties

appearing in Miami, Florida, before Patricia M. Hart, a duly-

designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings, who presided in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Sheila M. Cesarano, Esquire

Shutts & Bowen

1500 Miami Center

201 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131

For Respondent: Donn S. Dutton, Esquire

Donn S. Dutton, P.A.

4300 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 305

Miami, Florida 33137

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the Petitioner waived his statutory rights to

pursue a cause of action under the Florida Civil Rights Act of

1992 when he signed a post-termination agreement containing a

general release of all claims against the Respondent, thus

rendering the Florida Commission on Human Relations without

jurisdiction.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 8, 2008, Gabriel Bovea filed an Employment

Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human

Relations ("FCHR") alleging that Mercantil Commercebank

("Commercebank") discriminated against him on the basis of his

marital status and retaliated against him. On December 18,

2008, the FCHR entered a Determination: No Jurisdiction, in

which it found that Mr. Bovea had signed a general release

agreement in which, for consideration, he had agreed to forego

any claims against his employer. Mr. Bovea timely filed a

Petition for Relief, and the FCHR forwarded the matter to the

Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an

administrative law judge. Pursuant to notice, the final hearing

was held on March 17, 2009.

At the hearing, Mr. Bovea testified in his own behalf, and

Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 were offered and received into

evidence. Commercebank presented the testimony of Juan Carlos

Pró-Rísquez and Magdalena Mata; Respondent's Exhibits 1

through 4 were offered and received into evidence.

The one-volume transcript of the proceedings was filed with

the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 31, 2009, and

the parties timely filed proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law and closing arguments, which have been

considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the

final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the

following findings of fact are made:

1. Mr. Bovea was employed by Mercantil Banco Universal

("Banco Universal"), a Venezuelan corporation, from October 27,

1986, to June 15, 2003. During this time, Mr. Bovea worked in

Venezuela, and he eventually became manager of the Banco

Universal's call center, which handled inquiries from customers.

Mr. Bovea also earned an undergraduate degree and a master's

degree in business administration.

2. Mr. Bovea was promoted and transferred to Miami,

Florida, where, on June 16, 2003, he began working as the

manager of the call center for Commercebank, which is

incorporated in the United States.

3. Upon his separation from Banco Universal, Mr. Bovea was

paid the employment benefits that were due to him under

Venezuelan law for his employment that commenced in October 1986

and ended on June 15, 2003.

4. In 2005, Mr. Bovea was promoted to manager of global

electronic banking operations for both Commercebank in Florida

and Banco Universal in Venezuela. He had a supervisor in

Venezuela, Hilda Monsalve, and also one in Miami, Florida,

Herbie Folgueira.

5. After he was promoted in 2005, Ms. Monsalve told

Mr. Bovea that she wanted him to work with her in Venezuela at

Banco Universal and that he should request a transfer from

Commercebank. Ms. Monsalve continued to ask him to transfer to

Venezuela during 2005, 2006, and 2007, and Mr. Folgueira,

Mr. Bovea's supervisor at Commercebank in Miami, also told him

during this time that he would have to go back to Venezuela.

Mr. Bovea did not request the transfer because he wanted to

remain in Miami, and he chose to search for a different position

with Commercebank in Miami.

6. Finally, Ms. Monsalve told Mr. Bovea in or around

September 2007 that his opportunity to transfer to Venezuela

would expire on December 31, 2007.

7. Mr. Bovea met several times with Magdalena Mata,

Commercebank's Human Relations Manager, to discuss any job

vacancies that he might fill with Commercebank in Miami.

8. Mr. Bovea's final meeting with Ms. Mata was on

December 20, 2007, when Ms. Mata reviewed the vacant positions

and told him that there was nothing available for him at that

time. Ms. Mata advised Mr. Bovea that he had until December 31,

2007, to find a position with Commercebank or his employment

would be terminated.

9. At the December 20, 2007, meeting, Ms. Mata gave

Mr. Bovea a document entitled "Separation Agreement," and she

read the entire document to Mr. Bovea and explained it to him.

10. The Separation Agreement provided that Mr. Bovea would

be separated from employment with Commercebank and all its

affiliated companies effective December 31, 2007. It also

provided that Commercebank would pay Mr. Bovea six weeks' base

salary, less payroll deductions, "in full satisfaction of any

and all claims" and that this sum "is not a benefit to which

Employee would otherwise be entitled as a result of Employee's

employment" with Commercebank and its affiliated companies.

11. Ms. Mata advised Mr. Bovea that he had 21 days, or

until January 10, 2008, in which to sign the Separation

Agreement and return it to her. Ms. Mata also told Mr. Bovea

that, if he obtained another position at Commercebank, the

Separation Agreement would be invalid.

12. Mr. Bovea asked Ms. Mata if he was entitled to any

benefits under Venezuelan law. She told him she was not

familiar with Venezuelan law. She later telephoned him and told

him he should speak with her counterpart in Venezuela, Jose

Gregorio Silverio, to discuss any benefits to which he would be

entitled as a result of his employment between June 2003 and

December 2007.

13. Mr. Bovea left for vacation in Venezuela on

December 21, 2007, and he contacted Mr. Silverio at the Banco

Universal. Mr. Silverio arranged to meet with Mr. Bovea early

on the morning of January 8, 2008, the day Mr. Bovea was to

leave Venezuela to return to Florida. Mr. Bovea believed that

he and Mr. Silverio would discuss any benefits to which he might

be entitled under Venezuelan labor and employment law.

14. Mr. Bovea and Mr. Silverio were acquainted because

they had worked together through the years he had been employed

by Banco Universal, but they were not friends. As a result of

their relationship as colleagues, Mr. Bovea trusted

Mr. Silverio, and, as described by Mr. Bovea, the meeting was

cordial and friendly.

15. Mr. Bovea estimated that his meeting with Mr. Silverio

lasted about one hour. Mr. Silverio began the meeting by

advising Mr. Bovea that the purpose of the meeting was to

discuss his employment situation. After Mr. Bovea told

Mr. Silverio his story about what had happened, Mr. Silverio

produced a document that Mr. Bovea was to sign and a check.

Mr. Silverio told Mr. Bovea that the purpose of the document,

which was a settlement agreement, and the check was to protect

the company and its image.

16. The settlement agreement was presented to Mr. Bovea in

Spanish, his native language. The first paragraph of the

settlement agreement stated in pertinent part that Mr. Bovea and

Banco Universal, identified in the settlement agreement as the

"COMPANY," "agreed, based on our freedom to contract, to sign

this document describing the reason for voluntarily terminating

our employment relationship, in accordance with the settlement

agreement regulating the economic aspects of voluntarily [sic]

termination of the employment relationship." 1

17. The first clause of the Background section of the

settlement agreement, on page one of the document, confirmed

that Mr. Bovea had been employed by Banco Universal in Venezuela

and by Commercebank in the United States, both of which were

owned by Mercantil Servicios Financieros C.A. ("Mercantil"), and

the second clause provided the Mr. Bovea's employment extended

from October 27, 1986, through December 31, 2007, the inclusive

dates of his employment with Banco Universal and Commercebank.

18. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. Bovea

agreed, in exchange for the payment of 175,000 Strong Bolivars,

or approximately $81,000.00, that he had no further claims

against Banco Universal or any other company or entity related

to Banco Universal, "based on its activities, nor for any other

item" and that the purpose of the settlement amount was "to

finally resolve all claims, disagreements, and disputes between

the EMPLOYEE and the COMPANY." The settlement agreement also

provided that Mr. Bovea released

the COMPANY, as well as any other entity or

parent, subsidiary, or related company,

without any remaining pending obligation or

responsibility between the parties. In

addition, it is deemed that the settlement

indemnity set forth in this document

resolves any difference that could arise

based on activities at institutions forming

the group of companies [known as] MERCANTIL

SERVICIOS FINANCIEROS C.A.

The settlement agreement contains several other provisions to

the same effect.

19. At the January 8, 2008, meeting, Mr. Silverio and

Mr. Bovea discussed benefits that might be due Mr. Bovea under

Venezuelan law. Mr. Silverio told Mr. Bovea that, as set out in

the settlement agreement, he was entitled to no benefits in

addition to those he had received in June 2003, when he left his

employment with Banco Universal and moved to the United States

to work at Commercebank in Miami, Florida. Mr. Silverio also

told Mr. Bovea that he was owed nothing under Venezuelan law as

a result of his employment with Commercebank in Miami.

20. Mr. Silverio advised Mr. Bovea that the check

accompanying the settlement agreement, which was in the amount

of 175,000 Strong Bolivars, or about $81,000.00, was the best

deal Mr. Bovea could get because, even if Mr. Bovea was owed

benefits under Venezuelan law, they would be less than the

amount he was being offered. Mr. Silverio also told Mr. Bovea

that he needed to sign the settlement agreement that day or it

would be withdrawn.

21. Mr. Bovea asked Mr. Silverio whether he could sign the

settlement agreement presented to him by Mr. Silverio and the

Separation Agreement presented to him by Ms. Mata in Miami.

Mr. Silverio told him that the two documents were "mutually

exclusive." Mr. Bovea testified that he believed this meant

that the agreements were "complementary" and that he had the

option of signing both.

22. Mr. Bovea asked Mr. Silverio if he could consult his

attorney regarding the settlement agreement, and Mr. Silverio

told him that he could call his attorney but that he could not

take the document outside of the bank. Mr. Bovea did not,

however, have an attorney in Venezuela, so he had no one to

call. Mr. Silverio told Mr. Bovea that he had arranged for an

independent attorney, Ingrid Zuleima Castro Aldana, to be

present to answer any questions Mr. Bovea might have about the

settlement agreement. According to Mr. Bovea, Ms. Aldana did

not enter the room until after he had signed the settlement

agreement, but, in any event, Mr. Bovea did not ask her any

questions regarding the document.

23. Mr. Silverio gave Mr. Bovea the opportunity to review

the settlement agreement, and Mr. Bovea looked through it.

Mr. Bovea understood that the settlement agreement was a legal

document that was a binding agreement, but he also noted that it

was lengthy and complex.

24. A Notary Public was present and prepared a

certification statement in which he indicated that Sergio E.

Rodriguez Bastardo, Mr. Bovea, and Ms. Aldana were present in

the room when he arrived, together with two witnesses; there is

no indication that Mr. Silverio was present at the signing. The

Notary Public acknowledged in the statement that he had received

a copy of the settlement agreement on January 7, 2008, for his

review and that the parties all attested that the signatures

appearing on the document were theirs and that the contents of

the document were true.

25. In Venezuela, a Notary Public is an employee of the

government and must be a lawyer with at least five years'

experience. It is the responsibility of the Notary Public to

review the documents presented to him and to be prepared to

answer questions about the documents. Mr. Bovea did not ask the

Notary Public any questions about the settlement agreement.

26. After signing the settlement agreement, Mr. Bovea

received a check for 175,000 Strong Bolivars, which he cashed.

Mr. Bovea has not returned or offered to return this money. 2

27. At the January 8, 2008, meeting, Mr. Bovea, who was

single, discussed with Mr. Silverio his belief that he had been

discriminated against because of his marital status, especially

by Ms. Monsalve, his supervisor at Banco Universal in Venezuela.

Mr. Bovea and Mr. Silverio discussed Mr. Bovea's complaints of

discrimination, and Mr. Bovea told Mr. Silverio that he thought

he had a claim for employment discrimination under the laws of

Florida and of the United States. Mr. Bovea had previously, on

or about July 2007, discussed his claims that he was the object

of employment discrimination with Mr. Silverio, and he told

Mr. Silverio that he believed his termination was to retaliate

against him because of his discrimination complaints.

28. On or about January 10, 2008, Mr. Bovea telephoned

Ms. Mata and told her that he was not going to sign the

Separation Agreement she had offered to him in Miami.

Summary

29. The evidence presented by Mr. Bovea is insufficient to

establish with the requisite degree of certainty that he did not

knowingly and voluntarily release all claims against Banco

Universal and Commercebank by signing the settlement agreement

presented to him by Mr. Silverio and taking the check presented

to him in the amount of 175,000 Strong Bolivars. Mr. Bovea

presented himself through his testimony as being confused by

everything that "happened" to him, but it is also clear from his

testimony that he was very aware of his situation. He knew his

employment with Commercebank and its affiliates would terminate

on December 31, 2007; he knew that the document Ms. Mata

presented to him and discussed with him in detail on

December 20, 2007, was a separation agreement; and he knew that,

in exchange for a severance payment, the Separation Agreement

provided that he would release Commercebank and its affiliates

from any claims he might have against them should he sign the

agreement. 3

30. Mr. Bovea's testimony that, when he met with

Mr. Silverio on January 8, 2008, he was unaware that his

employment with Commercebank and Banco Universal was terminated

and that he was confused about the purpose and effect of the

settlement agreement presented to him by Mr. Silverio is not

persuasive. Mr. Bovea is an experienced businessman, having

earned a master's degree in business administration and having

been in middle management with Banco Universal and Commercebank

for many years. Mr. Bovea was given the opportunity to read the

document; to call a lawyer of his choice regarding the document;

and to ask questions about the document of an independent lawyer

retained on his behalf by the bank. The document clearly states

in numerous places that the purpose of the settlement agreement

was to settle all claims Mr. Bovea might have against Banco

Universal and its affiliates, which would include Commercebank,

in return for 175,000 Strong Bolivars and that the effect of the

document was to resolve all "claims, disagreements, and

disputes" Mr. Bovea might have with Banco Universal and its

affiliates. This language appears in bold typeface under the

section of the document entitled "SETTLEMENT."

31. Mr. Silverio gave Mr. Bovea the opportunity to read

the settlement agreement presented to him on January 8, 2008,

and to contact his lawyer, but the amount of time Mr. Silverio

gave Mr. Bovea was inordinately short. Nonetheless, the amount

of time Mr. Bovea had to review the document and the opportunity

he had to consult with an independent lawyer was, under the

circumstances, adequate to apprise Mr. Bovea that he would be

giving up his claims against Banco Universal and its affiliates.

It is clear from his testimony that Mr. Bovea was aware that the

Separation Agreement presented to him by Ms. Mata on

December 20, 2007, included a release of any claims he might

have against Commercebank and its affiliates, and he had had

ample time to consider the terms of the Separation Agreement.

During the January 8, 2008, meeting, Mr. Silverio and Mr. Bovea

discussed the relationship between the Separation Agreement

presented to Mr. Bovea in Miami and the settlement agreement

Mr. Silverio had presented to him, and Mr. Bovea's primary

concern was whether he could sign the Separation Agreement and

receive the six weeks' of salary pursuant to that document and

also sign the settlement agreement presented by Mr. Silverio and

receive the approximately $81,000.00 offered in that agreement.

32. Mr. Bovea testified that Mr. Silverio told him the

Separation Agreement presented to him by Ms. Mata and the

settlement agreement presented to him by Mr. Silverio were

"complementary" and "mutually exclusive." The use of these two

terms is contradictory, since "complementary" means that one

document supplements the other, while "mutually exclusive" means

that either document excludes the other. Both agreements,

however, expressly provide that they govern the employment

relationship between Mr. Bovea and both Banco Universal and

Commercebank, as affiliates of one another. Given the level of

Mr. Bovea's education and the clear intention expressed in the

documents themselves that the Separation Agreement and the

settlement agreement each apply to both Banco Universal and

Commercebank, Mr. Bovea's testimony that he thought the one

agreement applied only to his employment in the United States

and the other applied only to his employment in Venezuela,

especially since he had dual employment in the United States and

Venezuela from 2005 until his termination in December 2007, is

not creditable.

33. With respect to the sufficiency of the consideration

paid to Mr. Bovea under the settlement agreement, Mr. Bovea

presented no evidence to establish the amount to which he was

entitled under Venezuelan law. He merely expressed his belief

that he was entitled to much more than the 175,000 Strong

Bolivars he accepted upon signing the settlement agreement and

stated that he had filed suit in Venezuela claiming that the

amount he accepted was inadequate under Venezuelan law. In the

absence of a verdict in the Venezuelan case, it was incumbent

upon Mr. Bovea to provide proof that the consideration paid

under the settlement agreement was much less than the amount to

which he was entitled.

34. Finally, although the settlement agreement presented

to Mr. Bovea by Mr. Silverio indicated that it would be

presented to a labor official in the Venezuelan government "to

approve this settlement so that it may be deemed as res

judicata," the failure of Banco Universal to obtain the

signature of a labor official does not affect the legal validity

of the settlement agreement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

35. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of

the parties thereto pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes (2008).

36. Mr. Bovea has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that he was the object of employment

discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411

U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and this burden includes proof that he

has a claim that is cognizable under the Florida Civil Rights

Act of 1992, as amended.

37. The preponderance of the evidence standard requires

proof by "the greater weight of the evidence," Black's Law

Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that "more likely

than not" tends to prove a certain proposition. See Gross v.

Lyons , 763 So. 2d 276, 289 n.1 (Fla. 2000)(relying on American

Tobacco Co. v. State , 697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)

quoting Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)).

38. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2007), part of the

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, provides in

pertinent part:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

for an employer:

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

hire any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with

respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges or employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

* * *

(7) It is an unlawful employment practice

for an employer, an employment agency, a

joint labor-management committee, or a labor

organization to discriminate against any

person because that person has opposed any

practice which is an unlawful employment

practice under this section, or because that

person has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing

under this section.

39. Florida courts routinely rely on decisions of the

federal courts construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, codified at Title 42, Section 2000e et seq. , United States

Code, ("Title VII"), when construing the Florida Civil Rights

Act of 1992, "because the Florida act was patterned after

Title VII." Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp. , 139 F.3d

1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998), citing, inter alia , Ranger

Insurance Co. v. Bal Harbor Club, Inc. , 549 So. 2d 1005, 1009

(Fla. 1989), and Florida State University v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d

923, 925, n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) .

40. It is settled law that a person may waive his or her

rights to pursue an employment discrimination claim pursuant to

Title VII in a settlement agreement if the waiver of these

rights is knowing and voluntary. The court in Puentes v. UPS ,

86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996) explained the requirements for

a knowing and voluntary waiver as follows:

When an employee knowingly and

voluntarily releases an employer from

liability for Title VII . . . claims with a

full understanding of the terms of the

agreement, he is bound by that agreement.

E.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 415

U.S. 36, 52 & n. 15, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1021 &

n. 15, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974); Freeman v.

Motor Convoy, Inc. , 700 F.2d 1339, 1352

(11th Cir. 1983). However, the waiver of

such remedial rights must be closely

scrutinized. Freeman , 700 F.2d at 1352; see

also Coventry v. United States Steel Corp. ,

856 F.2d 514, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1988) ("In

light of the strong policy concerns to

eradicate discrimination in employment, a

review of the totality of the circumstances,

considerate of the particular individual who

has executed the release, is also

necessary.").

In determining whether a release was

knowingly and voluntarily executed, courts

look to the totality of the circumstances.

Factors that guide a court include:

the plaintiff's education and

business experience; the amount of

time the plaintiff considered the

agreement before signing it; the

clarity of the agreement; the

plaintiff's opportunity to consult

with an attorney; the employer's

encouragement or discouragement of

consultation with an attorney; and

the consideration given in

exchange for the waiver when

compared with the benefits to

which the employee was already

entitled.

Beadle v. City of Tampa , 42 F.3d 633, 635

(11th Cir. 1995); see also Gormin v. Brown-

Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323, 327 (11th

Cir. 1992).

* * *

There is no bright-line test for determining

what is a sufficient amount of time for an

employee to consider a release and consult

with an attorney before the employee is

considered to have signed the release

knowingly and voluntarily.

41. Based on the findings of fact herein and a

consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding

Mr. Bovea's execution of the settlement agreement in light of

the six factors set forth in Puentes , Mr. Bovea has failed to

carry his burden of proving that his release of all claims

against Banco Universal and Commercebank was unknowing or

involuntary. Accordingly, it is concluded, based on the

findings of fact herein, that Mr. Bovea released Commercebank,

as an affiliate of Banco Universal, from all claims he might

have against them in the Settlement Agreement he executed

January 8, 2008. Mr. Bovea, therefore, has no claim cognizable

under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, and the

FCHR has no jurisdiction in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations enter a final order finding that Gabriel Bovea

released his claims for employment discrimination and

retaliation against Commercebank and dismissing Mr. Bovea's

Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of

jurisdiction.

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2009, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

PATRICIA M. HART

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of June, 2009.

ENDNOTES

1 / The quotations included herein are from the certified

translation into English of the original document.

2 / Mr. Bovea has filed suit in Venezuela, alleging that he is

due additional benefits under Venezuelan law. It appears,

however, that he has not challenged the validity of the

settlement agreement in the Venezuelan lawsuit.

3 / Mr. Bovea's testimony that he did not know the document

Ms. Mata gave him was a separation agreement terminating his

employment and that he did not know what was "happening" to him

is rejected as not credible. Mr. Bovea had known since at least

September 2007 that he must either transfer to Banco Universal

in Venezuela or find another position in Miami at Commercebank.

Additionally, Mr. Bovea's own testimony supports the inference

that he was aware that the document Ms. Mata presented to him on

December 20, 2008, was an agreement governing the terms of his

separation from employment with Commercebank and its affiliates

and releasing any claims he might have against Commercebank and

its affiliates. Mr. Bovea admitted that Ms. Mata went over the

document with him in detail and explained it to him "very well,"

and his only question to her was whether he was entitled to any

additional benefits under Venezuelan law.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Sheila M. Cesarano, Esquire

Shutts & Bowen

1500 Miami Center

201 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131

Donn S. Dutton, Esquire

Donn S. Dutton, P.A.

4300 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 305

Miami, Florida 33137

Larry Kranert, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Derick Daniel, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions

to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.