09-006379 Camekco Webb vs. The Community Mercy Center Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, February 3, 2010.

Summary: Petitioner did not prove the Respondent discriminated against her based on her race by evicting her from her apartment without notice.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CAMEKCO WEBB, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 09-6379

)

THE COMMUNITY MERCY CENTER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal hearing was conducted in this case on January 8,

2010, in Lake City, Florida, before Suzanne F. Hood,

Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative

Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Camekco Webb, pro se

910 Southeast 6th Street

Lake City, Florida 32054

For Respondent: Lloyd Peterson, Jr. Esquire

905 Southwest Baya Drive

Lake City, Florida 32025

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Petitioner was the subject of housing discrimination based on her race in violation of Sections 760.20

through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009), Florida Fair Housing

Act ("the Act").

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On or about August 12, 2009, Petitioner Camekco Webb

(Petitioner), an African-American female, filed a housing

complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).

According to the complaint, on May 26, 2009, The Community Mercy

Center (Respondent) moved Petitioner's personal property out of

one apartment and into a smaller apartment without prior notice

or Petitioner's knowledge and then moved a family of five

Caucasian individuals into Petitioner's former apartment.

On or about November 9, 2009, FCHR issued a Notice of

Determination of No Cause. On November 13, 2009, Petitioner

filed a Petition for Relief with FCHR, seeking an administrative

hearing to challenge the Determination of No Cause.

On November 19, 2009, FCHR referred the petition to the

Division of Administrative Hearings. That same day, the

undersigned issued an Initial Order.

On December 10, 2009, the undersigned issued a Notice of

Hearing, scheduling the hearing for January 8, 2010.

When the hearing commenced, one of Respondent's directors,

Lloyd Peterson, Esquire, made an appearance on behalf of

Respondent.

During the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf

and presented the testimony of one additional witness.

Petitioner offered no exhibits for admission into evidence.

Respondent presented no witnesses and offered no exhibits for

admission into evidence.

FCHR did not arrange for the appearance of a court

reporter. Therefore, a copy of the hearing transcript is not

available.

On January 21, 2010, Petitioner filed an ex - parte

statement, which is accepted here as a proposed recommended

order. On January 25, 2010, the undersigned issued a Notice of

Ex - Parte Communication relative to Petitioner's statement.

As of the date that this Recommended Order was issued,

Respondent has not filed proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is an African-American female. At all times

relevant here, Petitioner was a single mother with a one-year-

old child. Petitioner is unemployed but receives disability

benefits from the Social Security Administration.

2. At all times relevant here, Respondent was a Florida

non-profit corporation. In April 2009, Respondent operated an

apartment complex located in Lake City, Florida.

3. In April 2009, Petitioner signed a lease for Unit No.

203 in the apartment complex. She gave Respondent a $400 money

order for the first month's rent on the one-bedroom apartment.

Petitioner was not required to pay any other deposit. At that

time, Respondent's office was located on or near the apartment

complex premises.

4. The lease stated that three individuals could occupy

the premises. It also prohibited the use or possession of any

illegal controlled substance.

5. Petitioner bought some furniture for the apartment.

She also bought a 52-inch television.

6. After paying her rent in May 2009, Petitioner began

letting a male friend named Von Powell live with her in the

apartment. Petitioner testified that Mr. Powell, who was

mentally challenged, had just been expelled from a group home.

7. Mr. Powell had been living with Petitioner for about

two weeks when he took the keys to a car belonging to

Petitioner's sister. Because Mr. Powell was driving recklessly

in the apartment complex, someone called 911. When the police

arrived, Mr. Powell ran back upstairs to Petitioner's apartment.

8. The police followed Mr. Powell to Unit No. 203. When

they arrived, they asked if they could search the apartment

because they said that they smelled marijuana and believed Mr.

Powell was dealing drugs.

9. Petitioner denied that they could smell marijuana in

her home. She denied that there were any illegal drugs in the

apartment. However, she allowed the police to perform a search.

The police left after not finding any illegal drugs.

10. Harley Saradini, a Caucasian, was in charge of

maintenance for the apartment complex. Mr. Saradini told

Petitioner that Mr. Powell would have to move out of the

apartment. Petitioner subsequently took Mr. Powell to his

grandmother's home Gainesville, Florida.

11. A few days later, Mr. Saradini came back to talk to

Petitioner, asking her to move out for not following the rules

relating to the use and/or possession of illegal drugs.

Petitioner refused, stating that she had paid her rent and

wanted to talk to the landlords, Samuel Taylor and Anthony

Raburn, both of whom were Caucasian.

12. On or about May 26, 2009, Petitioner and her son went

to an out-of-town doctor's appointment. While she was gone,

Mr. Saradini and two other men entered Petitioner's locked

apartment and started removing her personal property.

13. A neighbor named Bernard Owens, an African-American

male, told Mr. Saradini that he should not be in Petitioner's

apartment when she was not at home. Mr. Saradini replied that

Petitioner did not live there anymore and that he was just

following orders. Mr. Saradini also stated that a family of

five needed the larger apartment.

14. Mr. Owens then watched as Mr. Saradini and the men

gave some of Petitioner's food away and shoved her furniture,

including the television, down one flight of stairs to the

ground floor. Petitioner's belongings were piled in Unit No.

104, a smaller, one-bedroom apartment that had never been

cleaned after the last residents vacated it.

15. During this moving process, Petitioner's couch lost a

leg. Additionally, her 52-inch television was dented and

damaged, resulting in a diminished picture.

16. When Petitioner returned home, she could not get in

her old apartment, she also had no key to Unit No. 104, and she

and her child became hysterical.

17. Petitioner eventually called the police who talked to

Mr. Saradini. After that conversation, Petitioner was told that

she could leave her belongings in Unit No. 104 for the night.

18. The next day, Respondent's office staff apologized to

Petitioner, telling her that she could stay and pay rent to live

in Unit No. 104. Petitioner then began cleaning up the new

apartment.

19. Respondent subsequently moved the Caucasian family

into Petitioner's former apartment, Unit No. 203.

20. Petitioner did not pay rent after the May 2009

payment. When Petitioner asked Respondent's staff about paying

her rent, she was told to hold it. Petitioner understood that

she could pay her rent in cash only and that someone would be

coming to collect it.

21. Respondent's staff told Mr. Owens and another neighbor

to take their rent, cash only, to Respondent's new office

located in another part of town. When Mr. Owens and the

neighbor took money orders to pay their rent at Respondent's new

office, Respondent's staff would not accept the money orders.

Instead, Mr. Owens and the neighbor were told that the staff had

to leave and would be back in a few minutes. Mr. Owens and the

neighbor left when the staff did not return in a reasonable

amount of time.

22. In August 2009, the same people who had worked for

Respondent told the tenants that everyone would have to sign new

leases because Respondent was going out of business and the

apartment complex was starting over with a clean slate. The

record is not clear as to the name of the alleged new

landlord(s) in August 2009.

23. Petitioner signed a new lease for Unit No. 104, but

paid no rent. This was the last time that Petitioner had

contact with Respondent's staff. Petitioner admitted during the

hearing that she never felt that Respondent's staff was

prejudiced against her.

24. In August 2009, Petitioner and her child began living

in another county with the father of Petitioner's child. She

left her personal belongings in Unit No. 104 and kept the door

locked.

25. After the tenants signed new leases, several unnamed

people came to collect rent in cash. Even the man that ran the

carwash business across the street claimed to have authority to

collect rent.

26. In November 2009, Petitioner and her child returned to

live in Unit No. 104. She paid to have the utilities turned

back on, but paid no rent.

27. In December 2009, Respondent's former staff informed

the tenants that Respondent no longer existed and that everyone

would have to move out. Petitioner moved out around the second

week in December 2009. She moved into an apartment at another

location in Lake City.

28. While Petitioner lived in the apartment complex, three

of the eight units were occupied by African-Americans, including

Petitioner and Mr. Owens. Five of the apartments were occupied

by Caucasians, including Mr. Saradini and the family of five.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

29. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

case pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.35,

Florida Statutes (2009).

30. Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing is

prohibited in Section 760.23, Florida Statutes, as follows in

relevant part:

760.23 Discrimination in the sale or

rental of housing and other prohibited

practices.--

(1) It is unlawful to refuse to sell

or rent after the making of a bona fide

offer, to refuse to negotiate for the sale

or rental of, or otherwise to make

unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person

because of race, color, national origin,

sex, handicap, familial status, or religion.

(2) It is unlawful to discriminate

against any person in the terms, conditions,

or privileges of sale or rental of a

dwelling, or in the provision of services or

facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial status, or religion.

31. In interpreting and applying the Act, FCHR and Florida

courts regularly seek guidance from federal court decisions

interpreting similar provisions of federal fair housing laws.

See Robert Cowen v. Charles Clotfelter and King's Gate Club ,

Inc. , Case No. 07-0498, para. 14 (DOAH June 5, 2007).

32. In cases involving a claim of housing discrimination,

the complainant has the initial burden of proving a prima facie

case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See

§§ 120.57(1)(j) and 760.34(5), Fla. Stat.

33. A prima facie showing of rental housing discrimination

may be established by direct evidence, statistical evidence or

circumstantial evidence. This case presents no direct or

statistical evidence of housing discrimination.

34. A prima facie case usually comprises circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory animus, such as proof that the

charged party treated persons outside of the protected class,

who were otherwise similarly situated, more favorably than the

complainant was treated. Failure to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination ends the inquiry. See Ratliff v. State ,

666 So. 2d 1008, 1013 n.7 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd , 679 So. 2d 1183

(Fla. 1996).

35. If, however, the complainant sufficiently establishes

a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the charged party

to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

action. If the charged party satisfies this burden, then the

complainant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the reason asserted by the charged party is, in fact,

merely a pretext for discrimination. See Massaro v. Mainlands

Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 808 (1994)("Fair housing

discrimination cases are subject to the three-part test

articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792

(1973)").

36. In order to present a prima facie case of racial

discrimination based on disparate treatment, Petitioner needed

to show the following: (a) she is a member of a protected

class; (b) she was qualified to rent an available apartment; (c)

she was removed from Unit No. 203; and (d) she was treated less

favorably by Respondent than were similarly situated persons

outside the protected class. See , e.g. , Jackson v. Comberg ,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66405, *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2006).

37. Petitioner, an African-American, is a member of a

protected class. She was qualified to rent Unit No. 203 and was

renting it when Respondent moved her into a smaller dirty

apartment without notice. Petitioner was treated less favorably

than the Caucasian family that moved into Unit No. 203.

Accordingly, Petitioner has met her prima facie burden.

38. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that

Respondent wanted her to leave the apartment complex because

Respondent believed she violated the rules by letting

Mr. Powell, a suspected drug dealer, live with her. She also

admitted that she was moved because Respondent wanted to put a

larger Caucasian family in Unit 203.

39. Petitioner has not proved that these reasons for

Respondent's actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Instead, Petitioner admits that her claims are based on

assumptions relative to Respondent's reason for moving her into

Unit 104.

40. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that

Respondent mismanaged the apartment complex in general and that

Petitioner was evicted without notice from Unit No. 203.

However, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent's

mistreatment of Petitioner was based on intentional racial

discrimination.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED:

That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a

final order dismissing the Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2010, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

SUZANNE F. HOOD

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone]

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 3rd day of February, 2010.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Camekco Webb

910 Southeast 6th Street

Lake City, Florida 32054

Paul Mabile

The Community Mercy Center

1120 Southwest Hope Henry Street

Lake City, Florida 32024

Lloyd E. Peterson, Jr., Esquire

905 Southwest Baya Drive

Lake City, Florida 32025

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Larry Kranert, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Derick Daniel, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.