16-005778 Jose A. Ramirez vs. Gca Service Group
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, April 26, 2017.


View Dockets  
Summary: Pet. failed to prove that Resp. terminated his employment based on race & did not identify similarly situated coworkers who were not discharged or were treated more favorably. Resp. presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8JOSE A. RAMIREZ,

11Petitioner,

12vs. Case No. 16 - 5778

18GCA SERVICE GROUP,

21Respondent.

22_______________________________/

23RECOMMENDED ORDER

25The final hearing in this matter was conducte d before

35J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

45Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and

52120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2016), 1/ on December 8, 2016, in

62Orlando, Florida.

64APPEARANCES

65For Petitioner: Jose Ramirez , pr o se

721525 Ravana Drive

75Orlando, Florida 32822

78For Respondent: Grissel T. Seijo, Esquire

84Littler Mendelson, PC

87Wells Fargo Center, Suite 2700

92333 Southeast 2nd Avenue

96Miami, Florida 33131

99STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

103Whether Petitioner, Jose A. Ramirez, was subject to an

112unlawful employment practice by Respondent, GCA Service Group,

120based on his race, color, or national origin in violation of the

132Florida Civi l Rights Act.

137PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

139On March 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a Charge of

148Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

156(the ÐCommissionÑ) alleging that Respondent, GCA Service Group

164(ÐGCAÑ), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, by discriminating

173against him based on his race, color, and national origin.

183The Commission failed to determine whether there was

191reasonable cause for PetitionerÓs complaint within 180 days of

200the filing of the complaint in accordance with section 760.11(8 ) ,

211Florida Statutes . Therefore, on June 16, 2016, the Commission

221issued a Notice of Dismissal to allow Petitioner to proceed with

232an action under section 760.11(4).

237Petitioner elected to request an administrative hearing

244under section 760.11(4)(b). The reafter, on September 16, 2016,

253Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission

262alleging a discriminatory employment practice against GCA. On

270October 5, 2016, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the

280Division of Administrative Hearings (Ð DOAHÑ) to conduct a

289c hapter 120 evidentiary hearing.

294The final hearing was held on December 8, 2016. At the

305final hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf.

313Petitioner did not present exhibits or witnesses. GCA presented

322the testimony of Jorge Ri vera, Reina Bermudez, and Thomas Pugh.

333GCA Exhibits 1 through 6 were admitted into evidence.

342A one - volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with

354DOAH on February 23, 2017. At the close of the hearing, the

366parties were advised of a ten - day timefra me following receipt of

379the hearing transcript at DOAH to file post - hearing submittals.

390Following GCAÓs request, the parties agreed to a deadline for

400filing post - hearing submissions more than ten days a fter the

412filing of the hearing t ranscript. Petitione r filed a ÐSummaryÑ

423statement which was considered in preparing this Recommended

431Order.

432FINDING S OF FACT

4361. Petitioner is a former route driver for GCA. Petitioner

446began working for GCA in June 2012.

4532. Generally, GCA contracts with rental car companies , such

462as Avis, Budget, and Enterprise, to move and transfer vehicles

472between rental car facilities and locations.

4783. In 2015, Petitioner supported the GCA services contract

487at the Avis rental car facility at the Orlando International

497Airport. The Avis - O rlando location employed between 60 to 100

509route drivers. The majority of these drivers were Hispanic.

5184. On August 15, 2015, Petitioner requested 30 days off

528from work as personal leave. Petitioner submitted the

536appropriate Time Off Request Form to his immediate supervisor

545seeking a leave of absence from August 16, 2015, through

555September 15, 2015. Petitioner recorded that the reason for his

565leave was a personal/family situation.

5705. Thomas Pugh, GCAÓs account m anager for the Avis

580contr act, authorized PetitionerÓs 30 - day leave of absence.

590Mr. Pugh was also responsible for scheduling the route drivers

600for the Avis - Orlando location. Based on PetitionerÓs return date

611of September 15, 2015, Mr. Pugh scheduled Petitioner for work on

622September 20 through 2 2, 2015.

6286. Petitioner did not return to work on September 20, 2015.

639Neither did Petitioner report to GCA on September 21 or 22, 2015.

651No evidence shows that Petitioner attempted to communicate with

660GCA, Mr. Pugh, or any of his supervisors between Septe mber 15 and

673September 24, 2015 (the date Petitioner was officially

681terminated).

6827. According to GCA company policy, an employee who is a

693Ðno call, no showÑ for three consecutive shifts is automatica lly

704terminated. Consequently, w hen Petitioner failed to report to

713work on September 20, 21, and 22, 2015, Mr. Pugh determined that

725Petitioner should be fired. On September 24, 2015, GCA

734officially terminated PetitionerÓs employment. The GCA

740employment document notating PetitionerÓs termination date

746records Ðt erm because exceeded 30 days.Ñ

7538. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that on

762September 24, 2015, he called Reina Bermudez, the assistant to

772the ac count manager, to request a ten - day extension of his

785personal leave. 2/ Petitioner claimed that durin g that phone call,

796Ms. Bermudez authorized him to remain on leave until October 15,

8072015.

8089. Petitioner finally appeared at the Avis - Orlando work

818site on October 13, 2015. There, he requested to meet with

829Mr . Pugh and Jorge Rivera, GCAÓs h uman r esources m anager.

842However, neither Mr. Pugh nor Mr. Rivera were available to see

853Petitioner.

85410. Mr. Rivera called Petitioner the following day.

862Mr. Rivera testified that Petitioner told him that he had not

873returned to GCA on September 15, 2015, because he had gone to

885Cuba to handle family personal issues. When Mr. Rivera responded

895that GCA would not reconsider its decision to terminate him,

905Petitioner became upset and threatened to file a discrimination

914lawsuit against GCA.

91711. On March 7, 2016, Petitioner d id, in fact, initiate a

929claim alleging discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil

938Rights Act (ÐFCRAÑ). Petitioner asserts that GCA discriminated

946against him based on his race, color, and national origin.

956Petitioner is black and Hispanic. He repres ents that he is from

968Cuba. Petitioner identifies Mr. Pugh as the individual who

977discriminated against him.

98012. At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that GCAÓs

989discrimination actually began in May 2015. That month, GCA

998significantly reduced his work hours. Petitioner complained that

1006GCA (Mr. Pugh) scheduled more work days for drivers with less

1017seniority that him. Petitioner also claimed that GCA (Mr. Pugh)

1027scheduled non - minority drivers for more work assignments than

1037him. Specifically, Petitioner identified a former co - worker

1046named William Genao , who worked more days than Petitioner.

105513. In addition to the scheduling disparity, Petitioner

1063charged GCA with wrongfully denying him leave authorized under

1072the Family and Medical Leave Act (ÐFMLAÑ). Pet itioner insisted

1082that GCA should have allowed him to take FMLA leave after

1093September 15, 2015. 3/ Petitioner provided the name of Hector

1103Prieto, a white employee, who used FMLA while working for GCA.

111414. Petitioner also declared that GCA discouraged him f rom

1124joining a union. Petitioner stated that GCA issued several memos

1134opposing union membership. In light of this material, Petitioner

1143feared GCA would fire him if he joined the local union. In

1155support of his position, Petitioner identified two non - white co -

1167workers who m Petitioner alleged , GCA fired because they were

1177union delegates.

117915. Finally, Petitioner accused GCA of promoting white

1187employees over him. Petitioner identified a co - worker named

1197Samuel Rojas , who m GCA treated differently. 4/

120516. Mr. Pu gh testified at the final hearing on behalf of

1217GCA. As the GCA a ccount m anager for the Avis/Budget account,

1229Mr. Pugh relayed that he is in charge of GCAÓs overall operations

1241for the Avis contract at the Orlando International Airport. His

1251responsibilitie s include scheduling route drivers.

125717. Mr. Pugh stated that GCA terminated Petitioner based on

1267Ðjob abandonment.Ñ Petitioner did not return to work after his

127730 days for personal leave ended on September 15, 2015.

1287Therefore, GCA fired him.

129118. Mr. Pug h personally approved PetitionerÓs leave request

1300on August 15, 2015, and authorized Petitioner to take 30 days of

1312personal leave through September 15, 2015. Mr. Pugh stated that

1322GCA company policy allows the location manager to approve

1331personal leave up t o 30 days. Mr. Pugh relayed that he did not

1345speak to Petitioner when he submitted his leave request.

1354Petitioner had already left work by the time Mr. Pugh reviewed

1365his Time Off Request Form. Mr. Pugh was under the impression

1376that Petitioner requested le ave so that he could travel to Cuba

1388due to a family situation.

139319. Regarding PetitionerÓs complaint of reduced work hours

1401in May 2015, Mr. Pugh explained that driversÓ schedules are based

1412on customer demand. In May 2015, Avis needed fewer cars moved to

1424a nd from its airport location. Therefore, the Avis account

1434required less drivers. Consequently, almost every route driver

1442transferring Avis vehicles saw their work days reduced. Mr. Pugh

1452normally tried to schedule drivers to work approximately three

1461days a week. Because of the lower demand in May 2015, Mr. Pugh

1474was forced to cut the driversÓ schedules to only two days a week.

1487Mr. Pugh explained that he schedules drivers based on hire date.

1498All the drivers he scheduled in May 2015 had comparable seniori ty

1510to Petitioner.

151220. Jorje Rivera testified regarding GCAÓs decision to

1520terminate Petitioner. Mr. Rivera explained that GCA allows its

1529employees to take up to 30 days of personal leave (not including

1541FMLA). Mr. Rivera confirmed that Mr. Pugh only had a uthority to

1553approve leave up to 30 days. GCA upper management approval is

1564required if an employee requests more than 30 days leave.

157421. Ms. Bermudez testified that she recalled receiving a

1583phone call from Petitioner on or about September 24, 2015. She

1594r emembered that Petitioner requested an extension of his leave so

1605that he could assist a sick family member. Ms. Bermudez

1615recounted that she advised Petitioner that she did not have the

1626authority to approve his leave extension. Therefore, she told

1635him tha t she would forward his request up to the appropriate

1647manager.

164822. Thereafter, Ms. Bermudez contacted Jackie Rivera in GCA

1657management to relay PetitionerÓs request to extend his time off.

1667Ms. Rivera, however, informed Ms. Bermudez that PetitionerÓs

1675leave extension request would not be granted because he had been

1686off the driver schedule for over 28 days. Ms. Bermudez then

1697called Petitioner several times to try and convey the message

1707that GCA did not approve his leave request. However, she could

1718not reach him.

172123. Mr. Pugh and Mr. Rivera testified that neither

1730PetitionerÓs race nor national origin had any bearing on GCAÓs

1740decision to terminate his employment. GCAÓs decision was based

1749solely on PetitionerÓs failure to return to work following his

175930 - day l eave of absence.

176624. In response to the testimony from Mr. Pugh and

1776Mr. Rivera, Petition er denied that he told them he went to Cuba

1789in September or October 2015. Instead, Petitioner produced

1797evidence that he was sworn in as a United States citizen on

1809No vember 18, 2015.

181325. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the

1822record , the preponderance of the evide nce does not establish that

1833GCA discriminated against Petitioner based on race, color, or

1842national origin. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to mee t his

1851burden of proving that GCA discriminated against him in violation

1861of the FCRA.

1864CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

186726. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

1874jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

1884cause pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57 (1), and 760.11(4)(b)

1893and (6), Florida Statutes. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y -

19054.016.

190627. Petitioner brings this matter alleging that GCA

1914discriminated against him based on his race, color, and national

1924origin in violation of the FCRA. The FCRA prote cts individuals

1935from discrimination in the workplace. See §§ 760.10 and 760.11,

1945Fla. Stat. Section 760.10 states, in pertinent part:

1953(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

1960for an employer:

1963(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

1972hire any individua l, or otherwise to

1979discriminate against any individual with

1984respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

1989or privileges of employment, because of such

1996individualÓs race, color, religion, sex,

2001pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or

2007marital status.

200928. Section 760.11(8) states that if the Commission Ðfails

2018to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on

2028any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of

2040the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under [section

2049760.11(

2050reasonable cause.Ñ Section 760.11(4)(b) permits a party , for

2058who m the Commission determines there is reasonable cause to

2068believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred , to request

2077an administrative hearing before DOAH. Following an

2084administrative hearing, if the Administrative Law Judge (ÐALJÑ)

2092finds that a violation of the FCRA has occurred, the ALJ Ðshall

2104issue an appropriate recommended order in accordance with chapter

2113120 prohibiting the practic e and providing affirmative relief

2122from the effects of the practice, including back pay.Ñ See

2132§ 760.11(6), Fla. Stat.

213629. The burden of proof in an administrative proceeding,

2145absent a statutory directive to the contrary, is on the party

2156asserting the af firmative of the issue. DepÓt of Transp. v.

2167J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also DepÓt of

2181Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern &

2194Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996)(ÐThe general rule is that a

2207party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of

2218presenting evidence as to that issue.Ñ). The preponderance of the

2228evidence standard is applicable to this matter. See

2236§ 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

224030. The FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil

2251Right s Act of 1964, as amended. Accordingly, Florida courts hold

2262that federal decisions construing Title VII are applicable when

2271considering claims under the FCRA. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't

2280Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Valenzuela v.

2290GlobeGr ound N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); and

2305Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923, 925 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA

23191996).

232031. Discrimination may be proven by direct, statistical, or

2329circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22. Direct

2338evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence

2348of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without

2356any inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d

23671172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); and Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d

23781555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have held that ÐÒonly the

2389most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

2400discriminate . . .Ó will constitute direct evidence of

2409discrimination.Ñ Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. ,

2417196 F.3d 1354, 1358 - 59 (11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted).

242732. Petitioner presented no direct evidence of race, color,

2436or national origin discrimination on the part of GCA. Similarly,

2446the record in this proceeding contains no statistical evidence of

2456discriminat ion by GCA in its decision affecting Petitioner.

246533. In the absence of direct or statistical evidence of

2475discriminatory intent, Petitioner must rely on circumstantial

2482evidence of discrimination to prove his case. For discrimination

2491claims involving circu mstantial evidence, Florida courts follow

2499the three - part, burden - shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

2511Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.

25252d 668 (1973), and its progeny. See also Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d

2537at 21 - 22; and St. Lou is v. Fla. Int'l Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455, 458

2554(Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

255834. In a race discrimination action, a petitioner bears the

2568initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the

2577evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a

2587prima faci e case, the petitioner must show that: (1) he belongs

2599to a protected class (race, class, or national origin); (2) he

2610was qualified for his position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse

2622employment action; and (4) his employer treated similarly - situated

2632empl oyees outside of his protected class more favorably than he

2643was treated. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 - 04; Burke -

2656Fowler v. Orange Cnty. , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

266735. Demonstrating a prima facie case is not difficult, but

2677rather only requires the petitioner Ðto establish facts adequate

2686to permit an inference of discrimination.Ñ Holifield , 115 F.3d

2695at 1562.

269736. If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case, he

2707creates a presumption of discrimination. At that point, the

2716burden shi fts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non -

2728discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action. See

2736Valenzuela , supra , at 22. The reason for the employerÓs decision

2746should be clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence.

2755See DepÓt of Corr . v. Chandler , 582 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st

2769DCA 1991). The employer has the burden of production, not the

2780burden of persuasion, to demonstrate to the finder of fact that

2791the decision was non - discriminatory. See Flowers v. Troup C n ty.

2804803 F.3d 1327, 13 36 (11th Cir. 2015) . This burden of production

2817is Ðexceedingly light.Ñ Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1564. The

2826employer only needs to produce evidence of a reason for its

2837decision. It is not required to persuade the trier of fact that

2849its decision was actuall y motivated by the reason given. See

2860St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1993).

287137. If the employer meets its burden, the presumption of

2881discrimination disappears. The burden then shifts back to the

2890petitioner to prove that the employerÓ s proffered reason was not

2901the true reason but merely a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. See

2911Combs v. Plantation Patterns , 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir.

29211997); Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 25.

292838. In order to satisfy this final step of the process, the

2940petitio ner must show Ðdirectly that a discriminatory reason more

2950likely than not motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing

2960that the proffered reason for the . . . decision is not worthy of

2974belief.Ñ Chandler , 582 So. 2d at 1186 (citing Tex. Dep't of

2985Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252 - 256 (1981)). The

2997proffered explanation is unworthy of belief if the petitioner

3006demonstrates "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

3011incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered

3018legitimate rea sons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

3028could find them unworthy of credence.Ñ Combs , 106 F.3d at 1538;

3039see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133,

3050143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). The petitioner

3063must prove t hat the reasons articulated were false and that the

3075discrimination was the real reason for the action. City of Miami

3086v. Hervis , 65 So. 3d 1110, 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)(citing

3097St. Mary's Honor Ctr . , 509 U.S. at 515)("[A] reason cannot be

3110proved to be 'a p retext for discrimination ' unless it is shown

3123both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the

3134real reason.").

313739. Despite the shifting burdens of proof, Ðthe ultimate

3146burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

3156intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

3164times with the plaintiff.Ñ Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct.

3176at 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207; Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22.

318940. Applying the burden - shifting analysis to the facts

3199found in this matter, Petiti oner did not meet his burden of

3211proving that GCA discriminated against him based on his race,

3221color, or national origin. Petitioner presented sufficient

3228evidence to establish the first three prongs of the prima facie

3239case in that he proved that he belongs to a protected class, was

3252qualified to perform as a route driver, and was subject to an

3264adverse employment action (termination). However, Petitioner

3270failed to establish that GCA treated similarly situated, non -

3280minority employees differently.

328341. In dete rmining whether employees are similarly situated

3292for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Ð[w]hen

3301comparing similarly situated individuals to raise an inference of

3310discriminatory motivation, these individuals must be similarly

3317situated in all relev ant respects.Ñ Jackson v. BellSouth

3326Telecomm. , 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (l1th Cir. 2004). The standard is

3337a Ðfairly rigorous one.Ñ Rioux v. City of Atlanta , 520 F.3d

33481269, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008); Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1562. "The

3359quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be

3368nearly identical to prevent courts from second - guessing employers'

3378reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges."

3385McCann v. Tillman , 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 - 74 (11th Cir. 2008); see

3398also Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Co mmc'ns , 738 F.2d 1181, 1185

3409(11th Cir. 1984)("[T]he misconduct for which [the petitioner] was

3419discharged [must be] nearly identical to that engaged in by an

3430employee outside the protected class whom the employer

3438retained.").

344042. At the final hearing, Pet itioner did not present

3450evidence or testimony identifying a non - minority route driver,

3460Ðsimilarly situated in all relevant respects,Ñ who was not

3470terminated for failing to report to work following 30 days of

3481leave. Although Petitioner offered the names of several co -

3491workers who GCA allegedly treated differently, Petitioner did not

3500show that any of these individuals were not fired for Ðjob

3511abandonmentÑ and/or missing three consecutive work shifts.

3518Accordingly, the competent substantial evidence in the reco rd

3527does not support PetitionerÓs allegation that GCA treated him

3536differently than other similarly situated employees based on his

3545race, color, or national origin. Therefore, Petitioner failed to

3554prove a prima facie case of discrimination by circumstantial

3563evidence.

356443. Assuming, a rguendo , that Petitioner did establish a

3573prima facie case of discrimination, GCA articulated a legitimate,

3582non - discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner. GCAÓs

3590burden to refute PetitionerÓs prima facie case is light. GCA met

3601this burden by providing credible testimony that its decision to

3611fire Petitioner was based on Ðjob abandonment.Ñ

361844. Completing the McDonnell Douglas burden - shifting

3626analysis (again, assuming that Petitioner made a prima facie

3635showing of discriminati on), Petitioner did not prove, by a

3645preponderance of the evidence, that GCAÓs stated reasons for

3654terminating him were not its true reasons, but were merely a

3665ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. The evidentiary record in this

3673proceeding does not support a findin g or conclusion that GCAÓs

3684proffered explanation for firing Petitioner was false or not

3693worthy of credence. Petitioner indisputably did not appear for

3702work after his 30 days of personal leave ended on September 15,

37142015. Neither did he report to GCA on S eptember 20, 21, or 22,

37282015. As credibly represented by Mr. Pugh, GCA company policy

3738was to terminate a Ðno call, no showÑ employee who was absent

3750three consecutive work days. Accordingly, the facts found in

3759this matter do not support a finding that GCA Ós proffered reason

3771for terminating PetitionerÓs employment was a pretext for

3779discrimination.

378045. At the final hearing, Petitioner expressed frustration

3788with GCAÓs decision to fire him instead of extending his leave by

380030 days. It should be noted, howeve r, that in a proceeding under

3813the FCRA, the court is Ðnot in the business of adjudging whether

3825employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, [the courtÓs]

3834sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates

3842a challenged employment decisi on.Ñ Damon , 196 F.3d at 1361. Not

3853everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable

3862adverse action. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla. , 245 F.3d 1232,

38741238 (11th Cir. 2001). For example, an employer may fire an

3885employee Ðfor a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on

3897erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action

3910is not for a discriminatory reason.Ñ Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall

3920CommcÓns , 738 F.2d at 1187. An employee cannot succeed by simply

3931quarreling with the wisdom of the em ployer's reasons. Chapman v.

3942AI Transp. , 229 F.3d 1012 (l1th Cir. 2000); see also Alexander v.

3954Fulton Cnty., Ga . , 207 F .3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (Ð[I]t is

3968not the court's role to second - guess the wisdom of an employer's

3981decisions as long as the decis ions are not racially motivated.Ñ).

399246. In sum, the evidence on record does not support

4002PetitionerÓs claim that GCA discriminated against him based on

4011his race, color, or national origin. Further, no credible

4020evidence shows that GCA treated similarly sit uated non - minority

4031members differently or that GCAÓs stated reason for terminating

4040Petitioner was a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination. Because

4047Petitioner failed to put forth sufficient evidence that GCA had

4057some discriminatory animus motivating its decision, h is Petition

4066for Relief must be dismissed.

4071RECOMMENDATION

4072Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

4082Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

4092Relations issue a final o rder finding that Respondent, GC A

4103Service Group, did no t commit any unlawful employment practice

4113against Petitioner and dismiss ing his Petition for Relief from an

4124unlawful employment practice.

4127DONE AND ENTERED this 26 th day of April, 2017 , in

4138Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

4142S

4143J. BRUCE CULPEPPER

4146Administrative Law Judge

4149Division of Administrative Hearings

4153The DeSoto Building

41561230 Apalachee Parkway

4159Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

4164(850) 488 - 9675

4168Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

4174www.doah.state.fl.us

4175Filed with the Clerk of the

4181Divi sion of Administrative Hearings

4186this 26 th day of April, 2017 .

4194ENDNOTE S

41961/ All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2016),

4205unless otherwise noted.

42082 / The evidence does not indicate whether Petitioner contacted

4218Ms. Bermudez before or after GCA officially terminated

4226Petitioner, or whether Petitioner was aware of GCAÓs decision at

4236the time of his phone call.

42423 / No evidence indicates that Petitioner requested FMLA leave

4252prior to his termination.

42564 / The parties did not present evidence of Mr. R ojasÓ race.

4269However, Petitioner stated that Mr. Rojas did not speak English.

4279COPIES FURNISHED:

4281Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

4286Florida Commission on Human Relations

4291Room 110

42934075 Esplanade Way

4296Tallahassee, Florida 32399

4299(eServed)

4300Grissel T. Seijo, Esqui re

4305Littler Mendelson, PC

4308Wells Fargo Center, Suite 2700

4313333 Southeast 2nd Avenue

4317Miami, Florida 33131

4320(eServed)

4321Will Dunn

4323GCA Service Group

4326Suite 1500

43281350 Euclid Avenue

4331Cleveland, Ohio 44115

4334Jose Ramirez

43361525 Ravana Drive

4339Orlando, Florida 32822

4342Che yanne Costilla, General Counsel

4347Florida Commission on Human Relations

43524075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

4357Tallahassee, Florida 32399

4360(eServed)

4361NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

4367All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

437715 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

4388to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

4399will issue the Final Order in this case.

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PDF
Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 07/13/2017
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 07/13/2017
Proceedings: Petitioner's Exceptions filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/13/2017
Proceedings: Agency Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/31/2017
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/05/2017
Proceedings: Transmittal letter from Claudia Llado forwarding Petitioner's Exceptions to the Recommended Order to the agency.
PDF:
Date: 05/04/2017
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Culpepper from Jose A. Ramirez filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/27/2017
Proceedings: Transmittal letter from Claudia Llado forwarding Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits to Petitioner.
PDF:
Date: 04/26/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 04/26/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 04/26/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held December 8, 2016). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 04/20/2017
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Culpepper from Jose A. Ramirez filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/24/2017
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Transcript.
Date: 02/23/2017
Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/19/2016
Proceedings: (Petitioner's) Resumen filed.
Date: 12/08/2016
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 12/07/2016
Proceedings: Court Reporter Request filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/05/2016
Proceedings: Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 8, 2016; 9:00 a.m.; Orlando, FL; amended as to start time).
PDF:
Date: 12/05/2016
Proceedings: Respondent's Final Witness and Exhibit List filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/01/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Ex-parte Communication.
PDF:
Date: 10/31/2016
Proceedings: Petitioner's Exhibit List filed (proposed exhibits not available for viewing).
PDF:
Date: 10/31/2016
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Culpepper from Jose Ramirez requesting bilingual assistance and enclosure of Witness List filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/20/2016
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 10/20/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 8, 2016; 9:30 a.m.; Orlando, FL).
PDF:
Date: 10/19/2016
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/18/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance (Grissel Seijo) filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/18/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance (Grissel Seijo) filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/13/2016
Proceedings: Petitioner's Letter response to the Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/06/2016
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 10/05/2016
Proceedings: Employment Charge of Discrimination filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/05/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Dismissal filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/05/2016
Proceedings: Election of Rights filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/05/2016
Proceedings: Petition for Relief filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/05/2016
Proceedings: Transmittal of Petition filed by the Agency.

Case Information

Judge:
J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
Date Filed:
10/05/2016
Date Assignment:
10/06/2016
Last Docket Entry:
07/13/2017
Location:
Orlando, Florida
District:
Middle
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (5):

Related Florida Rule(s) (1):