89-006262F Eda Shokcic | E. S. vs. Department Of Health And Rehabilitative Services Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, July 10, 1990.

Summary: Attorney's fees-record for confidential case begins with agency file-barely enough evidence to support agency action-case upheld on appeal.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

E. S., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 89-6262F

)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND )

REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, this matter came on for hearing in Tallahassee,

Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated

Hearing Officer, Diane Cleavinger, on November 15, 1989.

APPEARANCES

The parties are represented as follows:

For Petitioner: Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire

2544 Blairstone Pines Drive

Post Office Box 1547

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: John R. Perry, Esquire

District Legal Counsel

Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services, District 2

2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 200-A

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to

attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties filed proposed orders on March 16, 1990. The parties' Proposed

Findings of Fact have been utilized in the preparation of this Final Order.

Specific rulings on the parties' proposed Findings of Fact are included in the

Appendix to this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On or about April 7, 1989, a report of child abuse was received by the

Florida Protective Services System alleging that E.S. had injured two children

enrolled at the Gladys Morris Elementary School, Taylor County, Florida.

2. On April 10, 1989, the HRS Protective Services Investigator, Linda

Douglass, conducted an investigation of the circumstances. The investigation

revealed that E.S. had removed C. from her third grade classroom. She held him

by the scruff of his neck and his arm. During the process of removal, E.S.

accidentally ran C. into a wall or door frame. No physical or mental injuries

were sustained by C. as a result of E.S.'s actions. Likewise, no harm appeared

to be threatened by E.S.'s method of removing C. from her classroom. No

investigation was conducted to determine why C. was being removed or how much

resistance C. had undertaken to avoid his removal. The second incident involved

a student named D. When D. got up to sharpen her pencil without permission,

E.S. shook D by the shoulder. During the shaking, D.'s nose began to bleed. D.

was given some paper towels to put on her nose and was sent to the infirmary.No

investigation was conducted to determine whether the nose bleed was caused by

the shaking or how hard the shaking action had been. After the case had been

forwarded for a formal hearing, it was discovered that the nose bleed was

unrelated to D. being shaken. Other than the nose bleed, there was no physical

or mental injury caused or threatened by E.S.'s actions. On April 20, 1989, the

report of abuse was classified as "confirmed." In both instances, the actual

abuse found was categorized under "other physical injury" and "excessive

corporal punishment/beatings." The narrative in the child abuse report states:

(E.S.) was observed dragging the C. child

from the classroom by an arm and the back of

his neck. She then ran the child's face into

a brick wall. The child was crying.

The teacher has shaked a child named D.

until her nose bled. The children in her

third grade room at Gladys Morse Elementary

School are "out of control, they cut up each

other's shoes," and (E.S.) -"can't control the

class so she starts slapping them around and

things". This has been going on for years and

nobody does anything about it.

3. Following an internal review, the data entry was completed on April 24,

1989 and the investigatory process was closed.

4. Because of the unusual statutory process established in Chapter 415,

Florida Statutes, E.S. was listed as an abuser of children on the Florida Child

Abuse Registry upon confirmation of the abuse report. Her job as a teacher was

thereby placed in jeopardy and she was suspended with pay. Her name would

remain on the Abuse Registry for the next fifty years unless E.S. won an

expunction of her record through the administrative process.

5. On April 26, 1989, formal notification was provided to E.S. by letter

notifying her that she had been "confirmed" as a child abuser and advising her

that she had a right to request the amendment or expunction of the confirmed

report by making a request for such within thirty days of the date of the

notice.

6. On May 18, 1989, E.S., through her counsel, requested that the record

be amended and expunged since there was no evidence that any injury had occurred

to the alleged victims and that the evidence was wholly insufficient to

establish any wrongdoing on the part of E.S.. Although not specifically

mentioned, this letter places HRS on notice that it may be facing charges of

frivolousness should this matter not be resolved during the agency's review

process.

7. By letter dated May 18, 1989, the Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services confirmed receipt of Petitioner's request to expunge the

confirmed report.

8. On May 31, 1989, the Petitioner through her counsel, supplemented the

request for expunction. Based upon a complete review of the HRS file, the

supplement again pointed to the absence of any injury or "harm" to the children

involved in the alleged abuse. Again, HRS was placed on notice of a potential

claim of frivolousness should a formal proceeding be required.

9. When more than the thirty days provided for review by the Secretary of

an expunction request elapsed, the Petitioner on July 7, 1989, requested a

formal administrative hearing to challenge the finding of "confirmed" abuse.

This letter initiated the formal proceedings contemplated under Section

120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

10. When an additional six week period passed without response to the

first hearing request, the Petitioner made a second request for hearing on

August 24, 1989. The August 24th letter to Secretary Gregory L. Coler pointed

out that the Administrative Procedure Act requires a hearing request be granted

or denied within fifteen days of the request's receipt.

11. On September 12, 1989, a third request for hearing was made to the

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The September 12th letter

outlined this proceeding's history of delay and the non-responsiveness of HRS.

1/

12. By letter dated September 18, 1989, counsel for the Petitioner

received notification from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

that her request for expunction was, on that date, being denied and that if the

Petitioner wished to have a hearing still another request for hearing was

necessary. The letter was signed by a representative of HRS and was filed in

the formal administrative proceeding by HRS. This letter constituted the action

which should have been taken by HRS within 30 days of Petitioner's first request

for amendment or expunction of the report. The agency's action was three months

late.

13. A fourth demand for formal hearing was made by letter dated September

25, 1989.

14. Referral of the expunction request was forwarded to the Division of

Administrative Hearings and a hearing was scheduled to be held on November 15,

1989.

15. Prior to hearing, the parties prepared and filed an undated prehearing

stipulation outlining the issues which remained for resolution. The stipulation

established the following issues for resolution at the hearing:

7. Issues of Fact to be Litigated -

(a) Whether the Respondent engaged in

any activity which caused "harm" [as

defined in Chapter 415] to any child

over which she exercised control;

(b) Whether any child was injured as a

result of the actions or inactions of

the Respondent;

(c) The Respondent asserts whether

information deemed confidential by

Section 415.51, Florida Statutes (1988),

was disclosed to unauthorized recipients

is an issue; the Petitioner disagrees;

and,

(d) Whether there is competent and

substantial evidence to retain a

confirmed abuse finding on the Florida

Protective Services System.

16. On November 6, 1989, the deposition of Linda Douglass was taken by

Petitioner, E.S., in preparation for the November 15, 1989, hearing. The

deposition was filed at the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion For

Attorney's Fees. Since a Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes, motion is

part of the original child abuse action, Ms. Douglass' deposition was filed in

the initial proceeding for purposes of a motion for attorney's fees under this

section.

17. Ms. Douglass' deposition constitutes the primary evidence in this case

and comprises the entire investigation of this matter by HRS. After a review of

this deposition, there can be no question that this case was poorly investigated

with very important and essential facts not looked into; facts made essential

because they are required by the statute in order to make a "confirmed" finding

of child abuse. Essential facts not investigated were the connection between

any alleged injuries and Petitioner's actions, whether there was any significant

emotional harm to the alleged victims resulting from the alleged abuse, or, in

the case involving C., what C. was being disciplined for and whether such

"punishment" was excessive. 2/ See B.B. v. Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services, 542 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Failure to

investigate such essential facts constitutes a failure to conduct a reasonable

inquiry. On the facts revealed in the deposition, which were not materially

different from the investigative report, this case should never have been

confirmed. The evidence necessary to support a case of confirmed child abuse

was never developed or investigated. Of greater concern, however, is that this

case was confirmed for reasons other than the criteria contained in Chapter 415,

Florida Statutes. One such reason, apparent from the deposition, was that Ms.

Douglass did not think Petitioner should be teaching and did not want to chance

her daughter being taught by Petitioner. In other words, this case was confirmed

in order to affect Petitioner's future employment with the school or any other

school because there was a very real difference in philosophy between Ms.

Douglass and Petitioner on how to handle the children in her class. Such a

confirmation is completely improper. However, the evidence does not demonstrate

that the agency was aware of its investigator's motives until her deposition

testimony. What the agency should have been aware of was the obvious lack of

any substantial evidence on the statutorily required areas noted above. Failing

to adduce such evidence and rubber-stamping its investigator's confirmation,

thereby forcing a formal hearing, when the statute affords an agency a second

chance to review the merits of its case needlessly increases the cost of

litigation and is a failure to conduct a reasonable into the matter at hand.

The foregoing is especially true when the statute specifically provides HRS with

an abuse classification which covers situations in which abuse is indicated but

cannot be confirmed with substative evidence. The classification is known as an

indicated abuse report. The report is maintained in the Abuse Registry for

seven years. There is no right to a formal administrative hearing when a report

is classified as "indicated."

18. On November 8, 1989, counsel for the Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services notified counsel for the Petitioner that the Department

had determined to reclassify the "confirmed" report as "indicated" and therefore

moved to dismiss the pending proceedings. The main proceeding was dismissed

with jurisdiction reserved on the issue of attorney's fees.

19. On these facts, Petitioner would ordinarily be entitled to an award of

attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1) (b)5. However, in addition to

demonstrating that there was no reasonable inquiry, Petitioner has the burden to

show that the Department's case was totally without merit, both legally and

factually. In this case, there was some, although highly tenuous, evidence

present that supported the Department's allegations under Chapter 415. Having

some basis in fact for the continued maintenance of its case, the Department's

pursuit of this matter to the point at which it reclassified the report cannot

be said to be totally without merit and Petitioner is not entitled to an award

of attorney's fees and costs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20. The Petitioner seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to

the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)5, which provides as follows:

5. All pleadings, motions, or other

papers filed in the proceeding must be

signed by a party, the party's attorney,

or the party's qualified representa-

tive. The signature of a party, a

party's attorney, or a party's qualified

representative constitutes a certificate

that he has read the pleading, motion,

or other paper and that, to the best of

his knowledge, information, and belief

formed after reasonable inquiry, it is

not interposed for any improper

purposes, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or for frivolous

purposes or needless increase in the

cost of litigation. If a pleading,

motion, or other paper is signed in

violation of these requirements, the

hearing officer, upon motion or his own

initiative, shall impose upon the person

who signed it, a represented party, or

both, an appropriate sanction, which may

include an order to pay the other party

or parties the amount of reasonable

expenses incurred because of the filing

of the pleading, motion, or other

papers, including a reasonable

attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied.)

21. In this case, on April 26, 1989, HRS notified the Petitioner pursuant

to Section 415.504(4)(c) of the completion of its investigation and that it was

classifying the report as "confirmed." That notice, pursuant to Section

415.504(4)(d)3,f provided that in the event the Petitioner did not ask for

amendment or expunction of the report, such inaction would be deemed an

admission of the correctness of the classification. Accordingly, the notice did

more than serve as a precondition to obtaining a point of entry to challenge the

classification; it began a process which required an affirmative response from

the Petitioner within thirty days or else the Petitioner would suffer the

consequence of having been deemed, as a matter of law, to have admitted the

underlying facts. Thus, an informal free-form

filing of the notice that the abuse had been confirmed.

22. Only after completion of the agency level expunction process, either

through decision or the running of time, is an accused perpetrator entitled to a

Section 120.57(1) hearing with its formal record. Only in a Section 120.57(1)

hearing does Section 120.57(1)(b)5 come into play. Section 120.57(1)(b)5 is not

available to parties in an informal setting. However, even though not available

to parties in an informal setting, the "proceeding" referred to in Section

120.57(1)(b)5 must be viewed in light of the statutory process established under

Chapter 415, Florida Statutes. 3/ Under Chapter 415, the expunction

proceeding, whether formal or informal remains the same throughout the statutory

process. The only thing which may change during the 415 expunction process is

the formality of the proceeding. Therefore, the "proceeding" referred to in

Section 120.57(1)(b)5 is the proceeding which is begun with the issuance of the

first notice of confirmation to the alleged perpetrator. If the informal

proceeding turns into a formal proceeding, sanctions can be imposed if no

reasonable inquiry was made prior to institution of the formal proceeding and

the case turns out to be meritless both factually and legally.

23. In this case, the formal hearing process was triggered with the

running of the thirty (30) day decision time and Petitioner's demand for a

formal hearing on July 7, 1989. Because of the statutory scheme for processing

abuse cases, it is irrelevant that HRS did not officially file the action with

the Division of Administrative Hearings. The demand was filed with HRS and

should have been acted upon. From July 7, 1989, forward HRS runs the risk of

incurring the imposition of sanctions under Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida

Statutes should it have failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the merits of

its case and that case is in fact meritless.

24. Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes (1989), applies to a broad

range of documents filed in an administrative proceeding. Thus, if a "pleading,

motion or other paper" is filed by the agency, the "party, the party's attorney

or the party's qualified representative" must make reasonable inquiry to

determine that the document is not interposed for any improper purposes such as

to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or needless

increase in the cost of litigation.

25. It is obvious that the party in these proceedings, HRS, filed "other

papers" in the administrative review proceedings. 4/ Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is

the notice given to the Petitioner on April 26, 1989, notifying her that she had

been confirmed as a child abuser and advising her that if she did not come

forward and take affirmative action she would be deemed to admit the

classification. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is signed by a qualified representative

of HRS.

26. Petitioner's Exhibit 9 was a letter from HRS, dated September 18,

1989, denying the Petitioner's request for expunction. The letter's tardiness

does not change the fact that this letter constitutes an "other paper" within

the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(b)5. It was signed by a qualified

representative of HRS.

27. On September 14, 1989, counsel for HRS filed a formal "pleading"

transferring the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal

hearing. Such referral notice was signed by a "party's attorney" and

constituted a "pleading" within the meaning of Section 120.57(1) (b)5.

28. Section 120.57(1)(b)5 was added to Chapter 120 in the 1986 session of

the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 86-108 adopting House Bill

792. The staff analysis to the legislation confirmed that the intent of the

amendment was to adopt the concepts expressed in Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, providing for similar sanctions when legal pleadings, motions, or

other papers are signed by a party or his attorney for an improper purpose.

Thus, resort to precedent in construing the terms of Rule 11 is instructive in

interpreting the scope of the statute. Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply,

Inc. v. Department of General Services, et al., 15 F.L.W. D1033 (1st DCA Opinion

filed April 16, 1990).

29. The main purpose behind the statute and Rule 11 is one of prevention.

The statute requires that an agency conduct a reasonable inquiry into the

background of a case to certify that the action is not interposed for an

improper purpose. Such an improper purpose can be the filing of an action which

is known or should have been known to be frivolous. Section 120.57(1)(b)5.,

Florida Statues and Mercedes, supra. Accord, Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services v. L.M., Case No. 89-2605C (Final Order filed January

24, 1990), where the Hearing Officer concluded, after a formal hearing, that an

HRS pleading was frivolous since it "presented no justifiable question for

resolution and it was without basis in fact or in law." The Hearing Officer,

sua sponte, made an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the statute.

30. Because the statute's goal is one of prevention, Section 120.57(1)

(b)5. explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty to conduct a

reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading, motion or other paper

before it is signed. Cf., Erie Conduit Corporation v. Metropolitan Asphalt

Paving Association, 106 F.R.D. 451 (E.D. NY, 1985). The purpose of sanctions is

to protect against ill-considered proceedings. See, Silverman v. Ehrlich Beer

Corp., 687 F.Supp. 67 (S.D. NY 1987), holding that "the absence of any real

investigation doomed the proceeding." Id at p. 70. A failure to conduct a

reasonableinquiry can lead to a needless increase in the cost of litigation.

See, Great Hawaiian Financial Corp. v. AIU, 116 FRD 612 (D.C. Hawaii, 1987),

noting "whether or not counsel intended to cause delay, the fact that he filed a

frivolous motion, to which his opponents had to respond, justifies the

imposition of sanctions." Id at p. 618.

31. The fact that HRS finally did the right thing and reclassified the

abuse report from "confirmed" to "indicated" does not change the question of

sanctions in this case. 5/ The reclassification occurred only after a lengthy

delay in the statutory process, and after two opportunities to make reasonable

inquiry had passed, thereby forcing this matter to a formal hearing for which

there was substantial preparation required. Stated differently, the Department

of Health and Rehabilitative Services reached a "confirmed" finding of abuse on

April 26, 1989, and did not remove it from the registry until a period of nearly

seven months had elapsed, notwithstanding the multiple and zealous efforts of

E.S. to require HRS to abide by the statutory time limits imposed upon it and

during which it had the opportunity to again make reasonable inquiry into the

circumstances of this case. In the end analysis, the evidence which HRS relied

upon in reclassifying the abuse was the same evidence it had from the day the

abuse was improperly classified, to-wit: the report of Linda Douglass, the

Protective Services Investigator. That investigation was not a reasonable

inquiry into the alleged abuse and resulted in a confirmed abuse report for

reasons outside Chapter 415, Florida Statutes.

32. It was not until November 6, 1989, when the Petitioner (not the

agency) explored with the protective intake investigator the absence of any

underlying support for the confirmed finding of abuse that HRS took note of the

actual facts. Finally, the agency concluded that the Petitioner's position was

the appropriate one and two days later on November 8, 1989, the Department

reclassified the abuse report to "indicated" thereby terminating any further

proceedings. However, the Petitioner should not have been required to force the

"reasonable inquiry" required by the statute. The party possessing the duty to

conduct a "reasonable inquiry" but who fails to do so with the resulting

increase in the cost of litigation, should ordinarily be taxed fees and costs.

This is especially true when the wrongful party is a governmental agency. HRS

has economic power beyond that of an individual citizen such as the Petitioner,

E.S. The fact that the exercise of that power caused Petitioner to be suspended

from her job is evidence of the potential effects of such power. The reckless

exercise of such power can wreak total financial devastation upon an average

citizen. Silverman, supra at p. 70. However, in addition to demonstrating that

the Department did not conduct a reasonable inquiry, Petitioner must show that

the Department's claim of abuse was both factually and legally without merit.

The reason for such a showing is that Section 120.57(1)(b)5. is not intended to

prevent an agency from pursuing hard or close cases. In this case, there was

some evidence to support the Department's claim.

33. Therefore, even though, Petitioner remained on the abuse registry in

the confirmed category for a period in excess of six months despite her every

attempt to bring the inaccuracies to the attention of HRS, and even though the

statutory time frames as well as the Chapter's substantive language were

ignored, and that various and qualified agents of HRS signed "pleadings, motions

and other papers" at various times through the proceeding without having

fulfilled their affirmative duty to conduct reasonable inquiry as to the merits

of the positions being taken, the Department's case cannot be said to be totally

without merit. Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant

to Section 120.57(1)(b)5.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is:

ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs be

denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County,

Florida.

___________________________________

DIANE CLEAVINGER

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

[phone]

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 10th day of July, 1990.

ENDNOTES

1/ The delay in this case is important since these incidents precipitated

Petitioner's suspension from her employment as a teacher in the Taylor County

school system. Petitioner's reasons for a quick resolution in this case were

obvious. Petitioner's employment situation was brought to the attention of HRS.

2/ The evidence available at the motion hearing indicated that the third grade

students in Petitioner's class were children who were consistently troublemakers

and cut-ups. Judging from some of the anecdotal material in the exhibits, these

children did not significantly feel threatened by Petitioner given their

perdurable propensity for engaging in such "bad behavior."

3/ The "proceeding" referred to in Section 120.57(1)(b)5 may be different for

other types of agency action taken under other Florida Statutes. The foregoing

is especially true in cases where the Division's role is more in the nature of

helping to formulate agency policy rather than its quasi-judicial role.

4/ It is irrelevant, given the facts of this case and the statutory process,

that part of the record is filed or begins at the agency level as opposed to the

Division of Administrative Hearings. The "papers" are all part of the same

process and constitute one record irrespective of the fact that part of the

record is created during the informal part of the statutory process. However,

sanctions cannot be imposed unless the formal part of the process is reached.

5/ The Petitioner does not contend that the agency acted improperly on November

8, 1989, when, after being forced by the Petitioner to make reasonable inquiry

into the circumstances, it reclassified the abuse report and terminated further

legal proceedings. The point is that that same decision should have been

reached on April 26, 1989, and at a number of subsequent intervals prior to

November 8, 1989, without the Petitioner being forced to the expense of

fruitless attempts for expunction and hearing, discovery and trial preparations.

However, such action `nay go to mitigate the type or amount of sanctions

imposed.

APPENDIX

1. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted

in substance, in so far as material.

2. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of

Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, in so far as

material.

3. The facts contained in paragraph 9 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of

Fact are subordinate.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Sam Power, Agency Clerk

Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services

1323 Winewood Boulevard

Building One, Room 407

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

John Miller, Esquire

Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services

1323 Winewood Boulevard

Building One, Room 407

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire

2544 Blairstone Pines Drive

Post Office Box 1547

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

John R. Perry, Esquire

District Legal Counsel

Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services

District 2

2639 North Monroe Street

Suite 200-A

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL

REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE

GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE

COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING

FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR

WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY

RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE

ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.